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In the years after the First World War numerous paramilitary organizations were
set up in Bavaria with the expressed purpose of preventing a communist revolution in the
state. Encouraged by Germany’s and Bavaria’s Social Democratic leaders, military
officers and men of means formed Freikorps units to overturn the Spartacist revolt in
Berlin in January 1919 and the Räterepublik in Munich in April 1919. After the specter
of revolution receded these groups did not disband but reorganized themselves as
paramilitary leagues. In Bavaria the most significant of these early organizations was the
Civil Defense Guards, or Einwohnerwehr, which was succeeded after 1921 by Bund
Bayern und Reich. In the years that followed both groups worked assiduously to impose
their ideological imprint on Bavaria, but failed in the main. However, through their
efforts they set patterns and helped propagate ideas that would later be taken up by Adolf
Hitler and his Nazi Party.
This dissertation looks at the creation, growth, ideology, and activities of these
two paramilitary associations from 1918 to 1928. Using archival sources from the
Bavarian State Archives and the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, it argues
that both groups subscribed to the culturally despairing völkisch nationalism that had
been prevalent in Germany prior to World War I. These tendencies were combined with
a desire to crush the political left and return to older forms of government, including the
preservation of the federalist constitution of 1871, ideas that were not shared by every
organization on the right. Instrumental in returning Bavaria to conservative rule in 1920,
both groups failed to bring about their major goals in restoring the old regime to power.
The closeness of both groups to the established authorities often undercut their efforts at

critical junctures, making both seem creatures of the state rather than true
counterrevolutionary forces, something that the Nazis were increasingly able to exploit.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This is a study of paramilitary politics in Bavaria during the early and middle
years of the Weimar Republic. In particular it is an examination of two organizations: the
Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich. These two groups played an important role
in fostering a climate of hatred and opposition to Germany’s first democracy. Claiming
to protect ‘law and order’ and the state from internal enemies bent on its destruction, both
paramilitaries engaged in activities that had the effect of retarding the creation of a
democratic republic in Bavaria, and overturning it when possible. In addition, both
associations were critical to fanning the flames of discontent over the Treaty of
Versailles, a dissatisfaction that was central to the world view of many ultranationalist
Germans during the Weimar period and helped to shape their view of the republic.
Finally, the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich gave respectability to ideas and
tendencies that would be exploited by organizations, like the Nazi Party, which far more
revolutionary in their goals.
However, for the Nazis to succeed, the Einwohnerwehr and its successor, Bund
Bayern und Reich, had to fail. This, then, is a story of the limits of paramilitary politics
in Bavaria in the 1920s. Despite the success both groups had as agents of the
counterrevolution, the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich failed to achieve the
ideological goals laid out by their respective leaderships. That agenda relied on a
combination of old notions of federalism and states’ rights carried over from the imperial
period and a romantic, highly-stylized, and culturally despairing German nationalism that
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had been amplified during the war years. As a result both organizations advocated
solutions to the country’s problems that were both conservative/reactionary (i.e., wanting
to restore the previous form of government) and more radical (the creation of a völkisch
utopia) at the same time. This study will look at the history of these associations, how
each was founded, the respective ideological programs, and the activities of both groups
to determine those factors that limited their success.
Historical Context
During the years following Germany’s defeat in the First World War bands of
young and middle-aged men streamed into paramilitaries, Freikorps, voluntary
associations, and Einwohnerwehren to save a world that, for them, seemed to be ending.
That world, the German Empire with its attendant kings and princes, had been supplanted
at the end of World War I by a new government. This new regime, Germany’s first true
democracy, was brought into existence on the strength of revolution and proclaimed from
the balcony of the Imperial Palace by a politician belonging to the Social Democratic
Party, which prior to the war was considered illegitimate and illegal by a not insignificant
number of Germans. 1
That fact made the Weimar Republic a monstrosity in the eyes of many Germans.
For them the republic stood for everything that had gone wrong in their country: the lost
war, the breakdown of civil order, the continued material deprivation, and most
significantly the hated Treaty of Versailles. That agreement, signed in Paris on June 28,
1919, blamed Germany for starting the war, took territory from the country in the east,
1

Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007),
19.
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limited the size of its army, set up an army of occupation in the Rhineland, and forced it
to pay reparations to the wartime allies. 2 In none of these instances did the men who
joined paramilitary units blame the old imperial elites for this state of affairs, only
Germany’s new democratic leaders.
Anger over the loss of the war and the humiliation of a “harsh” peace were not the
only factors leading men to join paramilitary groups. Just as important was the continued
revolutionary fervor in Germany during the months following the end of the war. The
republic had been brought to power by revolution and that fact, coupled with the
continued deprivations of the allied blockade, meant that further revolutionary changes
might be in store. For the new republican leaders the memories of the Russian
Revolution, with its moderate and Bolshevik phases, were ever present. If order was not
restored they feared it would lead to the bolshevization of the country, or worse, the
complete breakdown of civil order. It was in order to prevent this development that the
first paramilitary units were called into existence by a government composed of the
liberal and socialist parties of the Weimar Coalition. 3 Led by Philipp Scheidemann,
under the supervision of President Friedrich Ebert, this regime had claimed for itself the
mantle of revolution, but was doing everything possible to insure the continuity of the old
German order. 4

2

Margaret MacMillan, Paris, 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, (New York: Random House,
2001), 157-93.
3
Weitz, Weimar Germany, 84-9. The Weimar Coalition was usually made up of three parties: the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), which represented Germany’s workers, the German Democratic Party (DDP),
which spoke for the middle class and trended towards progressive politics, and the Center Party (Zentrum),
that represented German Catholics. Smaller parties, like the Independent Social Democrats (UPSD),
sometimes joined this coalition, but played a lesser role compared to the major parties, ibid.
4
Detlev J.K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, trans. Richard Deveson,
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 28-33. One of the major themes in the historiography of the Weimar
Republic was the continuity of elites from the old imperial to the republic itself. Many institutions that

4
The first widespread use of paramilitary organizations came with the Spartacist
Uprising of January 1919. The revolt was the result of continuing discord between the
Social Democrats and Independent Socialists over the course of the revolution. Stymied
in their efforts for reform the Independent Socialists and their Spartacist allies, led by
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, rioted and seized much of Berlin in the process.
The Social Democratic leaders, Friedrich Ebert and his defense minister Gustav Noske,
used the Freikorps to put down the insurrection with great severity, executing
Luxemburg and Liebknecht in the process. 5
It was in suppressing the Spartacist Revolt in Berlin that government officials
decided they needed a more dependable force to ensure domestic peace. The Freikorps
had simply been too brutal in their suppression of the rebels. Almost immediately after
the situation was secured emphasis shifted to the creation of the Civil Guards, or
Einwohnerwehr. This organization had a much broader basis than the Freikorps units,
drawing most of their manpower from the citizenry at large, as opposed to ex-soldiers as
many Freikorps units had. Over the course of early 1919 units were set up throughout
Germany. 6
The most significant of these Einwohnerwehren would be set up in Bavaria. Not
only would the organization be the largest in the country, but it would be the most
important politically. The Bavarian Einwohnerwehr would not only become the leading
served the republic were staffed by people with no real love for democracy and, thus, no loyalty to the new
government. These included the army, the civil service, the judiciary, and academia. The decision for
continuity, as opposed to using the worker’s councils as an element of the new democratic republic, broke
up the fragile coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the Independent Social Democratic Party
(Independent Socialists) in December 1918, ibid.
5
Ibid. See also, James M. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany, (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1977), 23-30 & 38-40.
6
Ibid, 32-8.
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agents of law and order, but of the counterrevolution as well. That transformation would
have a profound impact on the history of Bavaria and Germany. The state became in the
1920s and 30s the epicenter for right-wing political activity in the country. Most groups
that hated the Weimar Republic had a strong presence in Munich and other Bavarian
cities during this period.
Sources
This study is based heavily on archival research in the Bavarian State Archives
(Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv) located in Munich, and its departments; I – files of the
Ministry of Interior, including files on the Einwohnerwehr, the Räterepublik, Bund
Bayern und Reich – including the Beer Hall Putsch, and general political disturbances; II
– the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellery, including the private
correspondence of Gustav von Kahr during his presidency in Bavaria from March 1920
to September 1921, the workers movement and the Räterepublik, forbidden
organizations, the disarmament debate, and the files of the General State Commissioner
(Generalstaatskommissar), an office held by Gustav von Kahr in the months leading up
to the Beer Hall Putsch; IV – the war archive, which contains the complete records of
both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich; and V – the collections and papers
of leading political and historical figures of the period including Georg Escherich, the
head of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, and his second in command Rudolf Kanzler. 7
Additionally this study is based on archival research done at the Institute for
Contemporary History (Institut für Zeitgeschichte) in Munich. This archive contains the
7

The collection of Rudolf Kanzler’s papers are actually located in department five, but are listed in guides
and this dissertation, as being part of the Einwohnerwehr archive.
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main archive of the Nazi Party (Hauptarchiv des NSDAP) – from which files were
obtained relating to Bund Bayern und Reich, the Working Group (Arbeitsgemeinschaft)
and Fighting League (Kampfbund) from 1923, the Röhm-Pittinger dispute, and the Beer
Hall Putsch. Additionally sources were obtained from the library of the Institute, which
contained the regulations and program for both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und
Reich.
Finally this study is based on published materials located in the University of
Nebraska library, and research libraries around the country. The most significant of these
published materials is the memoirs of Rudolf Kanzler, Bavaria’s Struggle against
Bolshevism, which recounts his years as the number two man in the Einwohnerwehr. All
secondary source material used in this study is used to either explain the historiographical
disputes, as background material, or to fill in holes where archival material is missing or
not available.
Overview of the Historical Literature
There are numerous works on the history of the Weimar Republic that try to
explain the rise of the Nazis, and their role in the downfall of the republic. Two of the
more recent attempts to analyze the failure of Weimar have been by the historians Detlev
J.K. Peukert and Eric Weitz. Peukert’s The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical
Modernity, argued that there was broad continuity from Imperial Germany to the
Republic epitomized by the survival of old elites – bureaucracy, judiciary, army, to name
a few. The decision made by the republican leaders to emphasize stability over chaos led
them to make choices that helped set the stage for the paramilitaries that would be such a
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feature of Weimar. 8 Moreover, when the crisis years came, the decisions made by the
early republican leaders led to a perfect storm of enraged elites and a loss of legitimacy
that made Hitler’s eventual triumph more likely. 9
Meanwhile Eric Weitz, in Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, divided the
history of Weimar politics into three phases: left-liberal, moderate conservative, and
authoritarian conservative. The republic’s eventual collapse was due primarily to a
coming together of conservatives and radicals in a grand coalition to destroy the republic
in the last phase. This occurred because old elites had lost control of the situation in the
depression and was willing to countenance an alliance with the radical right. This had
not happened during the 1920s due to the broad diversity amongst the radical right,
epitomized by the paramilitaries. By the 1930s, however, the situation had changed
because the Nazi Party had assimilated, or grown much larger, than many of these
groups. This allowed more conservative interests to work more closely with the radical
right in the last years of the republic. 10
A wide diversity of literature also exists about the Nazi Party itself, divided up
between general works on the party, biographies of Hitler, and on the party’s rise to
power. In terms of general histories, Michael Kater’s The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of
Members and Leaders, 1919-1945, is a comprehensive guide. Kater used comparative
statistical analysis to prove that very little difference existed between the Nazi elite and
common members of the party in their reasons for joining the party, but that significant
difference existed between the leadership and common members in terms of social
8

Peukert, The Weimar Republic, 21-49.
Ibid, 266-7.
10
Weitz, Weimar Germany, 331-60.
9

8
class. 11 For biographies of Hitler Ian Kershaw’s masterful Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris,
has become an instant classic. In it he argued that Hitler’s ego was fed in these early
years by worshipful subordinates, themselves willing to play a role that Hitler had carved
out for them, who treated him in a messianic fashion, which led him to believe his own
myth. 12 Geoffrey Pridham wrote a classic local study of the Nazi movement in Bavaria
that argued while many of Hitler’s most fervent followers came from Bavaria, the Nazi
Party’s ability to pull votes in the state varied by region, with more Catholic areas being
resistant to Nazi appeals, while northern Bavaria proved more fertile. 13
Narrowing the literature down to paramilitary movements also yields a wide
diversity of scholarship. Here the focus on the Nazis’ own paramilitary, the S.A. or the
Brownshirts, dwarfs the scholarship of other organizations. Similiarly there are several
studies of German or Bavarian paramilitaries as a general movement, or a phenomenon of
the Weimar period. These tend to include all the organizations that engaged in this type
of political activity: Freikorps, Einwohnerwehren, and smaller conspiratorial groups.
Finally, there are works that focus on individual paramilitary organizations.
As mentioned, the S.A. has received a lot of attention from historians. This is
understandable considering the organization’s role in helping the Nazis attain power,
coupled with its sudden loss of prestige in 1934. Much of the historiography on the S.A.

11

Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1983), 234-9.
12
Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998), 591. Kershaw’s work
itself builds upon the work of German historian Albrecht Tyrell, who wrote that Hitler’s consciousness as
the Führer of the movement was the result of a long evolution of the leadership principle that began when
Hitler gained total control over the party, Albrecht Tyrell, Vom Trommler zum Führer: der Wandel von
Hitlers Selbstverständnis zwischen 1919 und 1923 und die Entwicklung der NSDAP, (Munich: Wilhelm
Fink Verlag, 1975), 9-16.
13
Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler’s Rise to Power: The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933, (New York:
Harper & Row, 1973), 318-24.
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has been dedicated to understanding the social basis for its membership. 14 Conan
Fischer, for instance, using archival resources throughout Germany, presented a detailed
sociological profile of S.A. members from 1929 to 1935. He argued that the fantastic
growth of the stormtroopers during these years was spurred by men “who took for
granted the social and political advances achieved by Weimar, but experienced its
economic failings first hand.” 15 This had a tendency to blur class line as the Brownshirts
offered a way to escape the misery of the Depression for many lower class youths, while
giving the Nazis a way to project power into working class neighborhoods. 16
Other works have emphasized the regional factors behind the growth of the
Brownshirts, the role of violence, and the creation of what Bruce Campbell has called the
political soldier. In Die braunen Bataillone, Peter Longerich argued that the S.A. went
through several stages of growth, from the radical arm of the party in the early years to
the primacy of the soldier after the seizure of power. Each phase changed the nature of
the organization. 17 Richard Bessel analyzed the role that violence played in the rise of
Nazism, noting that the difference between the S.A. and groups like the Freikorps was
that the Stormtroopers never employed violence to achieve power illegally. 18 Meanwhile
Eric Reiche looked at the growth the S.A. in Nuremberg, noting that the organization’s
growth benefitted from the presence of a home grown movement that the Nazis co-opted
14

Peter Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Merkl’s
work builds upon the work of Theodore Abel, who studied 581 early Nazis for his monumental, Political
Violence under the Swastika, but using social science methodology to reach his conclusions.
15
Conan Fischer, Stormtroopers: A Social, Economic, and Ideological Analysis, 1929-35, (London: Allen
& Unwin, 1983), 223-5.
16
Ibid.
17
Peter Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone: Geschichte der SA, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1989), 239-45.
18
Richard Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany,
1925-1934, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 1-6. It must be noted that Prof. Bessel’s starting
point for analysis was after the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, when the SA did try to help seize power
violently.
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and the placement of the annual party rally in Nuremberg. 19 Finally Bruce Campbell
looked at profiles of the 178 men at the top of the national organization to determine the
definition of the “political soldier.” He concluded that what made the organization so
successful was the unity of purpose amongst its leadership due to the fact that all had
seen action in the army and thus had a nearly identical world view. 20
Less attention has been paid to the Freikorps vis-à-vis the S.A. These units,
which had a very short existence, loom large in the historical imagination. Often they are
lumped together by scholars with other paramilitary units like the Einwohnerwehr. This
stands to reason as a good many Freikorps units reorganized themselves as paramilitaries
once the danger had passed. Despite this, there are a couple of major works dealing
specifically with the Freikorps. The first, and earliest, was by Robert G.L. Waite, who
wrote a book called Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar
Germany, 1918-1923.
Waite’s thesis was that the Freikorps soldiers were not ‘political soldiers’ as
would be later claimed in the Nazi period, but freebooters who latched on to any ideology
if it provided them the action they craved. Indeed Waite believed that to be their guiding
principle, certainly not a thought out program. This explained how they could fight
communism, but still show an affinity for its precepts. The same went for Nazism. The
men who joined these units always looked for a great leader, and until Hitler emerged as

19

Eric G. Reiche, The Development of the SA in Nürnberg, 1922-1934, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), 222-30.
20
Bruce Campbell, The SA Generals and the Rise of Nazism, (Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky, 1998), 1-7.
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that man, (not until very late), most shied away. 21 Another major work was by Hagen
Schulze, whose history of the Freikorps portrayed the organization in a more sympathetic
light. He argued the tragedy of the Weimar Republic was that it was not able to find a
way to come to an accommodation with the Freikorps fighters. The animosity of these
units came to a head in the Kapp Putsch and irretrievably set these units against Weimar,
which he argued set the stage for the success of Hitler and the Nazis. 22
For the purposes of this study the major historical literature is very diverse,
dealing with a variety of works that include general studies, specific unit and
organizational histories, or of individual events in the history of the paramilitary and
patriotic movements. The Einwohnerwehr is analyzed in two individualized studies as
well as some of the general works, while there has yet to be written any detailed study in
English or German on Bund Bayern und Reich as a standalone group. The latter
organization is discussed in the general works on the paramilitary movement, or in
relation to specific events like the Beer Hall Putsch.
There have been several excellent monographs that deal with the general
phenomenon of paramilitary politics. Each work reflects the focus of the author. The
first major work produced in this vein was by the German historian Hans Fenske.
Writing in 1969, his Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern nach 1918, is a
local study of the entire paramilitary and patriotic, or vaterländisch, movements in
Bavaria, though his principal focus was more on the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern
und Reich than on other organizations like the Nazi Party. Based on archival research in
21

Robert G.L. Waite, Vanguards of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 264-82.
22
Hagen Schulze, Freikorps und Republik, 1918-1920, (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1969),
326-34.
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the Bavarian State Archives and the Institute for Contemporary History, Fenske’s
monograph remains one of the better introductions to the subject, and remains the work
most relevant to the topic of this study.
Fenske’s thesis was that “national opposition” to the Weimar Republic ranged
from groups that offered passive resistance to the republic to organizations that actively
worked for its destruction. Both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich fell into
the latter group. Within this wing of the “national opposition” Fenske argued that a
spectrum of opinion existed within the wider patriotic movement, with the Civil Guards
being the most conservative of the paramilitaries, followed by Bayern und Reich which
was more radical, and finally the Nazi Party as the most radical of these organizations. 23
It was in 1924, after the failed Putsch, that the extremism on the political right, as
epitomized by the Nazis and their allies, morphed into outright fascism. Bund Bayern
und Reich and the Einwohnerwehr were radical, by Fenske’s estimation, but were not
fascist. They were deadly opposed to the socialist government and political left in
Bavaria, they flouted the Treaty of Versailles, they favored an expansionist foreign policy
for Germany, and subscribed to a racially völkisch world view that (at least for Bund
Bayern und Reich) sought to eliminate Jewish influence in society. However their
radicalism was held back by the essentially conservative structure of its organization and
parts of its program like the preservation of the federal structure of government. Without
this, Fenske argued, the radical aspects of their program might have prevented them from
gaining the respect and esteem of the governing elites. It would not be until the Beer Hall

23

Hans Fenske, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern nach 1918, (Bad Homburg: Verlag
Gehlen, 1969), 17-19.
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Putsch of 1923, when such respectability was no longer needed, that one saw a true
fascist movement emerge, as the Nazi Party had reached a critical mass and was able to
make its case on its own. 24
Fenske viewed the history of the patriotic movement as a gradual evolution from
conservatism to outright fascism. There are a couple issues, however, that he did not
address that are taken up in this study. One was his analysis of the Einwohnerwehr’s
formation. Specifically he omits many details on the formation of militias in the period
before April 1919. This is particularly jarring as several proto-Einwohnerwehren were
formed in months before the call went out to form paramilitary units. 25 Another
weakness was the way the Beer Hall Putsch affected Bund Bayern und Reich internally in
the years after 1923. 26 The difficulties between local units and the leadership was a
major component of the organization’s history in the two years following the putsch, and
played an important role in setting the group on a different course. Fenske only glanced
over these issues, a noticeable omission that this study seeks to correct.
Another general work that looks at the paramilitary organizations, but from a
slightly different perspective is by Horst G.W. Nusser in Konservative Wehrverbände in
Bayern, Preussen, und Österreich 1918-1933. Written in many ways as a response to
Fenske’s work, Nusser expanded his scope beyond Bavaria, necessitating using archival
material from the Bundesarchiv, then in Koblenz, and from archives then in East
Germany. This allowed him to write a more expansive book that gave greater coverage

24

Ibid, 313-21.
Ibid, 78-89.
26
Ibid, 188-223.
25
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to events in East Prussia and Austria, which Fenske had touched on but not explored in
great depth. 27
The main thrust of Nusser’s work was that the paramilitary movement needed to
be seen more properly as a movement of monarchists. Their greatest period of influence
came under the Einwohnerwehr, but the dissolution of the organization led to a loss of
influence epitomized by strife amongst paramilitary units and the dwindling fortunes of
Bund Bayern und Reich after 1923. It is only after 1929 that one saw a revival of
paramilitary activity that was cut short by the ascension of the Nazi Party to power in
1933. In the years that followed, the Nazi Party went to great lengths to discredit many
of the leaders of this movement. 28
American historian James M. Diehl looked at the paramilitary movement in a
national context in his major work, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany. Based
heavily on archival sources in Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Bremen, and the Federal Archives
at Koblenz, Diehl’s work was comprehensive, covering all paramilitary units in the
Weimar Republic – those on the left as well as on the right. As a result Diehl was the
first scholar to present the story of paramilitary organizations in its entirety to an Englishlanguage readership.
Diehl’s thesis was that leaders of the Weimar Republic, because of compromises
made at its beginning, could never adequately enforce its will on the populace. Fearing
further revolution, and unable to maintain military discipline, they made use of voluntary
military groups, the notorious Freikorps. The use of these, along with the Wehrverbände,
27
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by both sides of the political spectrum, quickly created a situation where it became
normal to solve political disputes with violence outside the prescribed constitutional
procedures. This development had a debilitating effect on political life in Germany,
acculturating a whole generation of Germans to the militarization of civilian life. Such
militarization, Diehl pointed out, was a crucial component of the eventual success of
Hitler and the Nazi Party. 29
Another major work actually looked at a specific event of these years. Harold
Gordon Jr’s Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch analyzes the year 1923 leading up to the
events of November 8 and 9, 1923. Based on archival research conducted at the National
Archives in Washington D.C., plus published material from many of the participants,
Gordon’s work still stands as the single best history of the Beer Hall Putsch. Coverage
was given to all the participant organizations right down to the last detail. The only
criticism that could be lodged against the book is that Gordon never ventured into the
relevant German archives, working instead in the U.S. National Archives and with
collections of documents that he himself had obtained over the years. 30
Gordon argues that the politics of the pre-putsch years put enormous pressure on
the Bavarian government and forced it to adopt policies that were simply unwise. Unable
to expand the police forces due to the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, Bavarian
leaders turned a blind eye towards the creation of local self-defense organizations. As the
29
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Treaty of Versailles prohibited them from expanding the police, Bavarian leaders were
forced to create, or tolerate, groups dedicated to private defense. 31
In Gordon’s view Bavarian officials, unable to save the Einwohnerwehr, tried to
keep as much of its structure intact as possible. This led to the creation of Bund Bayern
und Reich, which was seen as a way to stem the tide of Marxism. Due to the secret
nature of the group, and the fact that it was smaller and narrower than the old Civil
Guards, the government also tolerated more radical groups, like the Nazi Party.
According to Gordon, this opened the floodgates as the leaders of the more revolutionary
radical groups were determined to overthrow the Weimar system – a goal shared by
certain members of the Bavarian government – and began to arm themselves in
preparation for it. By the time the Knilling Cabinet realized its mistake it was too late, it
was forced to ride the tiger it had unleashed and found itself increasingly caught between
the radical demands of Hitler on the one side, and the extortions of Pittinger on the other
during the course of 1923. This situation prevailed until the Beer Hall Putsch in
November, when the government gained the upper hand because of Hitler’s uprising. 32
The Einwohnerwehr, like Bund Bayern und Reich, has been analyzed by
historians in more general works. However, unlike the latter, the former has been the
subject of a couple of full length studies. The first of these was written by the East
German historian Erwin Könnemann. Like many historians from the eastern bloc his
analysis relies heavily on Marxist theory for the force of its arguments. His research is
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based on archival material found in the former East Germany (though he did travel to
Koblenz), published sources, and secondary source material.
His thesis was that the Einwohnerwehr represented the beginnings of a new
imperialist system. His work, Einwohnerwehren und Zeitfreiwilligenverbände, stated
that the Civil Guards were simply part of a complex that consisted of the Reichswehr, the
police, and the Freikorps. These reactionary forces overturned the German revolution
and were the means by which the elites of the republic consolidated their power. They
then used their dominance to attempt to crush the power of the working class, beginning a
struggle that would characterize the Weimar Republic. Crucial to helping create the
guards was the SPD, which Könnemann predictably lambasts for betraying German
workers. Only the communists and certain elements of the USPD are praised for
standing up to the paramilitaries. 33
The other major work on the Einwohnerwehr, and the only one in English, is
David Clay Large’s The Politics of Law and Order: A History of the Einwohnerwehr,
1918-1921. Like Diehl, Large argued that the development of private military bands was
disastrous for Germany. Based on archival material obtained in the Bavarian State
Archives, the Federal Archive then in Koblenz, and the Foreign Ministry Archive then in
Bonn, Large postulates that the Civil Guards in Bavaria initiated the citizens of that state
“into the politics of violence and intimidation.” 34 Membership had a deleterious effect on
those who joined because it placed them outside of, and antagonistic to, the state. More
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importantly, by pursuing activities designed to preserve law and order (Ruhe und
Ordnung in German), the Einwohnerwehr helped to undermine it in the state, and to
change the term’s definition. Law and Order, in this sense, came to mean preservation of
the state as the leaders of the Civil Guards defined it. 35
The organization’s definition of safety helps to explain, according to Large, the
connection between the Einwohnerwehr and the more radical groups like Hitler’s Nazi
Party. Rejecting the notion that, had it survived, the Civil Guards would have served as a
safety valve against the more revolutionary ideas of Hitler, Large argued that, during the
course of its development, the Einwohnerwehr went through a process of internal
radicalization. The growing extremism was due to a couple of factors, the taking in of
whole organizations, like the Freikorps Oberland, into the guards, and the effects of the
long struggle against its dissolution. The result was that, in Large’s view, the Civil
Guards helped to prepare the way for Hitler almost as much as the Freikorps had. 36
This study looks to build upon previous interpretations of both the
Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich and fill in gaps that exist in our knowledge
about both organizations. The major argument of this work is that both paramilitaries
were limited in their actions due to their relationship to the government. Each came into
existence with the help of the Bavarian Reichswehr and lower-level civil servants, like
Gustav von Kahr, who helped provide them with funds, weapons, and political cover.
The result was that these units could only operate within parameters defined by their
political patrons. When goals were in alignment both units had great latitude of action,
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even independence. However, when these were not aligned neither organization could do
much to influence events, and indeed were often captive to them.
In the case of the Einwohnerwehr two examples illustrate this phenomenon. The
first occurred during the Kapp Putsch where the Einwohnerwehr, working in conjunction
with the army, the Munich police, and Gustav von Kahr, forced the resignation of the
legally and democratically elected Social Democratic government. Their participation
not only would bring to power a regime more aligned to their world view, but bring with
it enhanced powers and responsibilities that were governed in a series of service
agreements with the Interior Ministry, contracts that made them a power in the state.
On the other hand, the conflict over disarmament and dissolution showed the
limits of government cooperation. The dispute was brought on by the Einwohnerwehr’s
involvement in the Organisation Escherich and the Organisation Kanzler, two
associations created to allow the Einwohnerwehr to play a larger role in Germany and
German-speaking Europe. This led inexorably to allied demands for the
Einwohnerwehr’s disarmament and dissolution. Despite strong support for the
organization in the Bavarian cabinet, the dispute proved to a political disaster for the
Kahr government, who found their room to maneuver increasingly restricted. Despite the
willingness of many Einwohnerwehr members to fight the central government and allied
powers, the Bavarian government was forced to accede to wishes of the Allied Control
Commission. Once that happened, the political support for the Einwohnerwehr
evaporated.
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The same phenomenon can be seen in the history of Bund Bayern und Reich,
though here the examples are even starker. For the Bavarian army Bayern und Reich was
their preferred partner amongst the paramilitaries, a relationship that allowed the group
access to weaponry and army training. It also made them integral to the army’s plans for
restoring public order. Moreover, whenever a dispute arose between Bayern und Reich
and one of the other patriotic leagues the army and its allies sided with Otto Pittinger, the
head of Bund Bayern und Reich, in almost every instance. No other Bavarian
paramilitary group had this type of access or influence, something that made Bayern und
Reich the preeminent paramilitary group by 1923.
However, as with the Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern und Reich found itself bound
to its political patrons. The Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923 clearly demonstrated the
limits of such close cooperation. Bayern und Reich, like all vaterländisch groups in
Bavaria, were feverishly preparing for a march on Berlin to overthrow the government; a
move that was supported by the leadership of the Bavarian army. When the designs for a
coup fell through the army backed down, and so did Bund Bayern und Reich, despite the
desire amongst many of the local units to actually join with Hitler and the putschists.
The limits of the paramilitaries’ relationship to the governing authorities have
been hinted at, but only David Clay Large has explored them in any depth in regards to
the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr, which he rightly attributes to the organization’s
activities in the Orgesch. 37 Most scholars tend to ascribe the dispute to the desire of the
allies to eventually force the paramilitaries to disband, 38 or on the reliance of Kahr on the
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Einwohnerwehr for his political survival. 39 In the case of Bund Bayern und Reich
historians have tended to view their inaction as a manifestation of their increasingly
strained relationship with the Nazis and their allies, 40 or as involving a power struggle
between Kahr and Hitler without reference to Bayern und Reich. 41
The other major argument of this work is that the Einwohnerwehr and Bund
Bayern und Reich were conservative organizations with radical overtones, and that this
dichotomy was ever present in both organizations. As Robert Paxton has shown with
fascist organizations, many of the vaterländisch groups, like the two surveyed here, were
a mixture of views and sentiments. 42 The men who belonged to the Einwohnerwehr and
Bund Bayern und Reich were conservative, even reactionary, in that they hoped to see a
return to traditional forms of government or, at the least, preserve the federal structure of
the German constitution. However, they also ascribed to the racial völkisch nationalism
of the more radical right. They were not exclusively monarchists, nor did they subscribe
to the centralizing tendencies of the Nazis. 43 Moreover, this split was evident in both
organizations early on. 44
In the case of the Einwohnerwehr, for instance, völkisch sentiment manifested
itself in outbreaks of antisemitism. There were numerous incidents recorded at the local
level, the most significant being in the city of Rosenheim in 1920. Moreover, many of
the terms used by völkisch thinkers before the war, like community of the people
(Volksgemeinschaft), became commonplace in the propaganda and publications of the
39

Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 100-1.
Nusser, Konservative Wehrverbände, 239-44.
41
Fenske, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus, 207-23.
42
Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, (New York: Random House, 2004), 1-15.
43
Nusser, Konservative Wehrverbände, 221-2 & 234-47.
44
Fenske, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus, 313-21.
40

22
Einwohnerwehr. Many of the group’s activities were focused on eliminating the specter
of socialism, which was one of the ideologies that völkisch thinkers found so abhorrent.
Even much of the philosophy about the German past, the despair for a culture lost, can be
seen in propaganda that talked about a society of estates working towards the mutual
benefit of the other.
The völkisch aspects of the Einwohnerwehr remained latent, however, due to the
need to maintain the fiction that the organization stood above party and religious
orientation. No such need was ever present for Bund Bayern und Reich. From the very
first propaganda materials trumpeting its establishment, the leadership claimed that it was
working towards a völkisch-oriented state. According to the group’s program, all
members had to be German nationals, i.e. Aryans. No Jews, nor members from any other
foreign group, could apply. Furthermore, it propagated this world view in its propaganda
and joined with other vaterländisch organizations in German Day celebrations that were
celebrations of German racial solidarity. Like the Einwohnerwehr before them they
worked for the elimination of socialist organizations and parties. Thus, the presence of
völkisch ideology in both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich from the
beginning, and the way this ideology was put into practice by the leadership and
membership, suggests that these organizations were more than simply ‘conservativerestorative,’ and that the evolution from conservative to radical in the patriotic movement
should be placed earlier than it has been by historians. 45
The radical nature of the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich and their
willingness to work against the nascent Weimar Republic did not occur in a vacuum.
45
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Both groups drew upon several decades of völkisch nationalism. That ideology gained
currency and adherents amongst a certain strata of the middle class in the years prior to
World War I, becoming the basis for a critique of the Wilhelmine Reich. Moreover, its
viewpoints formed an important part of the program of many patriotic pressure groups in
the years before 1914. The advocacy of these organizations helped spread völkisch
ideology and formed a crucial link between it and the paramilitary groups of the patriotic
movement in post-1918 Bavaria.
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Chapter 2
The Origins of the Patriotic Movement – Völkisch Nationalism and Patriotic Leagues in
Bavaria to 1914
The patriotic (vaterländisch) organizations that sprang up in Bavaria after 1918
were the manifestations of a long gestation period in which certain individuals and
groups voiced their discontent with the state of affairs in Imperial Germany. These
critics were not to be found on the political left, as one might expect, but on the political
right. They were not concerned with the expansion of democracy, civil liberties, or
greater economic and social justice for Germany’s workers but with the preservation of a
certain way of life and social organization within the Reich. Their writings helped to
create an impression of an impending crisis within both German society and government.
The organizations they inspired, both large and small, helped to diffuse their views into
the wider society and provide a template with which to organize after the armistice.
Völkisch Nationalism in the late Nineteenth Century
The key intellectual movement that animated the post-World War I patriotic
movement was the Germanic ideology of völkisch nationalism. Völkisch ideas had their
origins in the years following Germany’s unification under Bismarck, and were put
forward by writers who considered themselves the prophets of a new era. Many of these
thinkers felt alienated from German society, a disaffection that stemmed from frustration
at not having achieved their desired station in life. One of the best examples of this was
the Biblical scholar Paul de Lagarde who had a life-long antipathy towards the academic
establishment of Wilhelmine Germany, owing in no small part to the fact that it took him
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much longer to achieve an academic appointment than many of his contemporaries. 1
They rejected the rational discourses of the Enlightenment preferring, instead, to rely on
intuition and sentiment. As a result they preferred the artist over the scientist and the
man of action over the thinker in their political and philosophical works. Finally, most
völkisch intellectuals believed that by creating a new ethic or civil religion, they would
usher in a new era in German history – both in its politics and society. 2
The new spirit that völkisch nationalists wanted to build relied upon a particular
view of the German past, a past that never really existed in any practical way. As George
Mosse noted in the Crisis of German Ideology, the people who held this worldview
believed that the only worthwhile society was one that was rural, “hierarchical in nature
and patterned after medieval estates.” 3 They saw in Germany’s Middle Ages a
harmonious social order where everyone knew their proper place and economic function.
Their ideal of medieval society was rural and based on the German peasant, who was tied
to the land and thus had a vital connection to his home region. This concept of
rootedness, as Mosse noted, was very important to völkisch intellectuals. It is what gave
society its meaning and made Germany a true nation and Volk. 4
Because their view of Germany’s medieval past put such importance on the social
order and the rural landscape, völkisch intellectuals naturally held a more dim view of
Germany’s present. They believed that the Germany in which they lived was a society in
decline. The empire forged by Bismarck did not conform to the rural idyll they believed
1
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to be natural, but instead was a rapidly urbanizing, modern state where the clear lines of
social class evaporated in the relentless advance of the Industrial Revolution. The
peasant, the hero in their worldview, did not form the backbone of the nation, but instead
migrated to the cities to join the urban proletariat. The existence of this class itself was
problematic for the industrial workers did not conform easily to the organic castes they
believed existed during the Middle Ages. Most importantly, Germany’s modernization
was accompanied by increasing calls for greater democracy and civil liberties, ideas that
had been born of the French Revolution. As a result völkisch intellectuals held these
ideas to be un-German and despaired that so many of their countrymen adhered to them. 5
The views that völkisch intellectuals had of contemporary society were not new,
but instead ran as a critique throughout the nineteenth century and had their origins in the
philosophy of Idealism that emerged during the Romantic era; indeed völkisch
nationalists often used the language of Idealism to buttress their arguments. Idealism
held that the pursuit of a material existence, as epitomized by the just-emerging Industrial
Revolution, or the struggle for greater political freedoms, as seen in the French
Revolution, retarded the spiritual dimension of humanity which these thinkers saw as
essence of human existence. Roderick Stackelberg noted that one of the main features of
völkisch thought was how closely it conformed to Idealist thought as outlined above. The
great difference between earlier Idealist philosophers and the advocates of a Germanic
Ideology was that the idealism of the latter was more conservative in nature and sought to
prevent political and social change. The result was that völkisch writers decried the
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pursuit of wealth and greater freedoms all in order to protect the material prosperity and
political privileges of those at the top of German society. 6
For völkisch thinkers their primary task was to recreate, or restore, this ideal
society. A mythologized past was a large part of it. Equally important was having a foil,
and the Jews provided this. For völkisch nationalists the Jew was a symbol of all that
they hated. They were rootless, whereas the peasant was rooted to the land. They were
cosmopolitan, lived in cities, and traveled widely. Because of their traditional role as
money-lenders and peddlers, Jews came to be seen as synonymous with modern
capitalism by many of these writers. It was the Jew who they believed came into the
countryside and turned the peasant’s world upside down, depriving him of land and cattle
and forcing him, through circumstance, to migrate to urban areas. Also, Jews were more
likely to be liberals and socialists than conservatives. Many German Jews gravitated
towards the more progressive and democratic political parties – everything that völkisch
intellectuals abhorred. They were the de facto bogeyman. 7
Jews were not the only enemies identified by völkisch thinkers. Marxian
socialism increasingly came to be seen as the bête noire of national consciousness and
was vociferously attacked. This ideology, trans-national, revolutionary, and dedicated to
leveling the distinctions völkisch writers so loved, gained ground with an urban
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proletariat that manned the factories of a rapidly industrializing country. 8 Fear of
Marxism and the Social Democratic Party (the party inspired by revolutionary rhetoric),
became one of the constants of politics in the imperial period, most famously illustrated
in Bismarck’s anti-Socialist Laws. Völkisch writers, like the political elite, also shared
this anxiety. Paul de Lagarde, for instance, was obsessed with the unity of the nation in
his writings partially because he feared that socialism would alienate the worker from
society. 9
Equally important was the role of religion in the völkisch worldview. For these
intellectuals traditional Christianity was insufficient to the problems of the modern age, a
view they justified because many Germans seemed to abandon the church as the century
progressed. Moreover, for many leading individuals in völkisch circles the religion had
never seemed wholly German to begin with. Many of them argued for a new approach.
Paul de Lagarde was critical in this move towards a German Christianity. In his view, the
problem with the religion was the influence that Judaism had on its development and
theology, particularly the writings of Paul. To save religion for the German people – as
Germany was still a nominally religious nation – it would be necessary to purge the
Christian faith of its Jewish elements. In its place would be a religion that relied on the
national characteristics of the German people. 10 In this new faith Jesus would be
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portrayed as if he were German himself, and his teachings and actions would be more in
line with the German national, as opposed to the universal, spirit. 11
One of the ways in which this new Germanic faith came to express itself was in
the belief that Germany needed to be redeemed. Such redemption would come only in
political form, in a person who emerged to save the German people and restore the
mythologized social order völkisch thinkers talked about. The example par excellence of
such thinking came from the author Moeller van den Bruck who, in his book Das Dritte
Reich, spoke of just such a political figure. This leader would stand above all parties and
factions, unite all of the German people together, and do away with un-German
tendencies like capitalism and socialism. Written in the early 1920s, just immediately
after the First World War, Das Dritte Reich prefigures in many ways the mythologizing
of the leader that the Nazi Party took advantage of after they came to power. 12
Patriotic Societies and the Political Pressure Groups
While the ideological musing of völkisch intellectuals helped to provide one
cornerstone of the patriotic movement, it was nothing without the structure provided by
social organizations and political pressure groups. Working both inside and outside
government groups such as the Wandervögel and the Pan-German League not only
helped to spread and popularize the radical ideals of völkisch nationalism, but they also
helped to provide a place where like-minded people could meet and organize. In this way
they proved a crucial link between the musings of disparate, and often obscure,
intellectuals and post-World War I paramilitary organizations.
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The role of education was critical in helping to propagate völkisch ideas to a wide
audience. Many educators came to see in the ideas of a Paul de Lagarde or Julius
Langbehn the key to greater cultural unity, which in their minds was the greatest
challenge of the day. As Mosse points out, a great many of the teachers of the late
Wilhelmine period, as well as the early Weimar Republic, came of age in the 1870s and
1880s when völkisch ideology first came to be articulated. They imbibed it at the
university through the fraternities and student social clubs which were known for their
staunch conservatism. As a result, when this generation became teachers they assigned
the writings of völkisch authors in class and authored texts that subscribed to Germanic
ideology. Many of the history books of this period contained passages and allusions to
ideas that would have pleased Lagarde. 13 Other educators, inspired by the call for
spiritual renewal in the nation, set out to create their own schools that would serve as
models. Nearly forty such schools were created over a period of twenty-five years from
1898 to the mid-1920s. 14
Through their efforts, this generation of teachers helped to lay the groundwork for
the youth movement of the early twentieth century. Started in 1901 by Karl Fischer, the
Wandervögel, as they were known, consisted of bourgeois youth who rejected the staid
society of Imperial Germany in preference for returning to the mountains and forests of
the Fatherland. Hikes in forests and up mountains, camping trips to the German
countryside, and communal existence typified their activities. It was a revolt by German
youth against the world of their parents, but this revolt had an ideological ring to it.
13
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Many youth joined to reconnect to nature, to escape the drudgery of urban life, and to lay
bare the hypocrisy of modern industrial society. In this way their emphasis dovetailed
very closely to the ideological precepts of völkisch intellectuals. They saw politics as
practiced in the Wilhelmine Reich as superficial and alien. Further, they desired a unified
existence within their own group typified in a strong leader. Most Wandervögel groups
were organized around a particular leader who greatly affected the structure and ideology
of the local troupe despite the national organization that linked them together. Finally, all
local bodies of the youth movement had to deal with the issue of Jewish membership,
which – despite the variety of opinions – showed the impact of völkisch ideas. 15 Many of
the soldiers who fought in World War I, and who later joined the patriotic movement, had
participated in the Wandervögel as youths.
Organizations based on völkisch ideology were not confined to the areas of
education and the youth movement, other groups were founded in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries that tried to put the ideological prescripts of Germanic
ideologues into practice. These organizations often were small and cut off from
mainstream society. Utopian in nature, groups like the Artamanen of Willibald Hentschel
sought to create the kind of peasant-centered culture that lay at the heart of völkisch
theory. In this regards they were not that far removed from the utopian socialist
communities that sprang up earlier in the nineteenth century. Many people who would
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make a name for themselves in the post-war patriotic movement, and even the Nazi Party,
like Julius Streicher and Walther Darre, participated in such organizations. 16
While the Artamanen and related groups were small communities, the patriotic
associations were much larger entities. The various patriotic associations formed
beginning in the 1880s; the last of them was founded in the year just prior to the outbreak
of the First World War. Their role in the public life of Imperial Germany has been quite
controversial. Often these organizations were looked upon as appendages to the ruling
caste, a way to direct the political life in Germany away from the need for greater
freedom and democracy. More recent scholarship has emphasized the rather popular
nature of these groups. They provided an outlet for political agitation outside the normal
political process, which allowed them to be critical of the government while being
supportive of the state. They also struggled against those elements of the Reich who
seemed to oppose both their policies and the socio-political makeup of the state itself. 17
The first of these patriotic associations, the German Colonial Society, was
founded in 1887. Like the more famous Pan-German League, which became infamous
the world over prior to 1914, the Colonial Society went through several incarnations
before the final organization was founded. Its purpose was to push for the acquisition of
overseas colonies for the German Reich, a popular cause in the 1880s. Despite its
advocacy, German possession of overseas colonies did not depend upon the efforts of the
Colonial Society, or its predecessors. However, as Roger Chickering has noted, the
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propaganda efforts undertaken in support for the establishment of colonies had a dramatic
effect on the future course of German politics. The full-throated support that the Colonial
Society gave to Bismarck, and his government, when his policies ran parallel to their
aspirations provided a crucial element for support in the Chancellor’s struggles with the
Reichstag. However, when Bismarck decided to halt colonial expansion the Colonial
Society expressed its frustration towards the imperial government, something that would
occur frequently within all the patriotic associations from 1890 to 1914. 18
As mentioned previously the patriotic associations served in many ways as an
outlet for mass politics in the Wilhelmine Reich. Partly this was due to the political
structure of Imperial Germany which had many of the trappings of a parliamentary
democracy, but none of the responsibilities. Because the Chancellor was appointed by
the Emperor, and served at his pleasure, there was never any real chance for the political
parties to positively affect political change. Laws and budgets originated with the
government, depriving the parliament of the ability to introduce legislation or to hold the
government accountable. This did not mean that the parties in the Reichstag were
completely ineffectual. They voted on the budget, and this allowed the political parties to
have some influence on the laws that were passed as well as the fiscal affairs of the
Reich, but for the most part politics in Wilhelmine Germany represented little more than
a sideshow, something that was only of interest to people who had some stake in the
system.
It was in this bizarre relationship between the Imperial Diet (Reichstag) and the
Imperial Government that the patriotic societies were able to have an influence on
18
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government policy. Many of these organizations were closely tied to one or more of the
political parties represented in the parliament, and this allowed them to create dissension
in the parliament in support of their agenda. 19 Equally important, groups such as the
Colonial Society and the German Navy League often had extensive ties to various
commercial and industrial interests that benefitted from the fulfillment of the
organization’s program. German business had a tremendous stake in the government of
the Reich, particularly after 1878 when Bismarck erected tariffs in an effort to please both
industry and agriculture. Since both were politically represented by political parties in
the parliament, the government paid particular attention to their needs. For instance the
various Navy Bills passed in 1898 and 1907, and supported by the German Navy League,
served the interests of heavy industry who stood to profit from the building of a large
fleet. 20
The social makeup of the patriotic societies also contributed to their growing
influence. While many of the leaders tended to come from elite circles, much of the
membership represented a wide cross section of the German middle class, from
university professors to businessmen. This social class tended to be far more nationalistic
than either the Junker aristocracy or the growing proletariat. They feared the rise of the
industrial working class and saw in their membership a way to fight the rising specter of
socialism. Membership also gave them a chance to participate in what seemed important
national matters beyond the mundane business of everyday politics. The support of this
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class was something that German chancellors from Bismarck on sought to obtain, as they
seemed key to preventing political change within the Reich. 21
Ideologically, the patriotic societies promoted an aggressive German nationalism,
one that was very compatible with the aggressive “world politics” of William II. They
also adopted, to varying degrees, aspects of the völkisch worldview. The most important
of these was the belief that Germany was rent with internal division and this would need
to be overcome if a truly national body were to emerge. Each of the patriotic societies
defined this differently, but every one of them placed special onus on the need to fight the
socialist movement mentioned above. The spread of socialism amongst Germany’s
industrial working class was one of the key political and social struggles of the late
nineteenth century, providing the pretext for Bismarck’s repressive Anti-Socialist Laws
and helping to cause panic for the ruling elites as the SPD’s block in the parliament grew
ever larger in the years preceding the First World War. For the leaders and members of
the patriotic societies the Social Democratic Party represented a dangerous development,
one that competed with traditional centers of authority for the obedience and devotion of
Germany’s workers, preventing them from being fully integrated into the nation as they
conceived it. 22
To combat these divisions the patriotic societies argued for a more aggressive
policy of German expansion; indeed, this was the one thing they all agreed on. They
differed to a certain extent as to where this expansion would take place. Most of the
societies wanted to see Germany pursue overseas colonies like other European powers.
21
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In their view the acquisition of colonies was a sign of importance and prestige for the
Reich. This was the raison d’être of the Colonial Society and was equally important for
the German Naval League, for colonies helped to justify the building of a navy with
worldwide reach. 23 Other groups desired expansion on the European continent. The
Association of the Eastern Marches and the Pan-German League both expressed a desire
to forgo colonies overseas for the conquest of large territories in Eastern Europe, though
Chickering notes that, for the Pan-Germans, this was but prelude to conquest of overseas
colonies later. 24
German expansion would inevitably involve conflict with other powers, and the
patriotic societies were more than willing to see this happen. In fact their ideology was
predicated upon it. Many within the societies believed war to be inevitable and that the
only way the German Reich would survive such a cataclysm would be to aggressively
build up its armed forces and pursue an imperial policy. The German Army League
provided the penultimate expression of this vision. Founded in 1913, this organization
was dedicated to helping to enlarge the German army and preserve the special place that
it held in society. According to its leaders the German Army League helped to prepare
the population for the sacrifices necessary in the coming conflict. To them war was a
spiritually purifying experience, one that purged the decadence of society. As such, it
was part and parcel of humanity’s natural development. These Social Darwinist views
led the leadership of the Army League to adopt maximalist terminology to describe the
conflicts they envisioned. In their opinion war was not a struggle for resources or for
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outdated notions such as the balance of power, but for the survival of a people and the
destruction of the enemy. 25
It is in this context that we must look at the ideology of the Pan-German League.
This organization, though smaller than other patriotic societies, combined almost all of
the elements mentioned above. They also were the most völkisch of the patriotic
societies, as their beliefs and attitudes betrayed a paranoia that was common amongst
those who subscribed to Germanic Ideology. For members of the League the world was
divided into friends and enemies, and the list of the Reich’s friends was small indeed; so
small that it excluded just about every major power in Europe minus the AustroHungarian Empire. This highlighted for them the need for expansion, for if Germany
was to survive it would need to be a state that encompassed all Germans wherever they
lived. Like many in the völkisch movement they dreamed of a new Reich, one that
included Germans who lived in the Habsburg Monarchy, Russia, and northern and
western Europe, and they strenuously advocated for policies that would make this
German superstate a reality – often to the embarrassment and consternation of the
Imperial Government. 26
However, for the Pan-Germans it was not enough to simply expand, they also had
to purge Germany of all those elements that threatened its internal tranquility. Members
of the league obsessed over order and saw German society as sliding ever closer to chaos,
with workers, women, Poles, and other minorities demanding greater political and social
equality, a rapacious capitalist system destroying the last vestiges of the old feudal order,
25
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and the slow growth of parliamentarianism and democracy. All of this upset what they
believed was the proper order of both society and the world, a hierarchically organized
society internally and an external order where the German people stood at the apex of
humanity. Internally, they advocated the repression of national minorities, the purging of
foreign words out of the German language, and the inculcation of a new appreciation of
the uniqueness, and superiority, of German culture in education. 27
The Pan-German League also shared the völkisch obsession with the position of
the Jews in the Reich. It was a question that would be taken up frequently in the
organization’s early years. In their first official program the Pan-Germans stated their
opposition to further Jewish immigration to Germany. Because the league saw ethnicity
as the crucial division of humanity they believed that the immigration of Jews, most of
who came from the Russian Empire, would lead to a greater weakening of the German
nation as they saw it. Thus Jews, in this context, were seen in much the same way that
the Pan-Germans looked upon Poles or Hungarians. It must be noted that, though there
were many antisemites in the Pan-German League from the beginning, there were
chapters that had Jewish members, particularly in the larger cities like Berlin or
Hamburg, and the question of German-born Jews was handled more delicately than those
of the foreign-born. 28
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All this changed after Heinrich Class became the leader of the Pan-German
League in 1908. A believer in the new racial theories then popular, Class was an ardent
antisemite who believed that German born Jews were just as dangerous as those who
immigrated to Germany from the east. He saw the Jew as the epitome of everything that
was un-German, a belief shared by völkisch intellectuals. He purged the Pan-Germans of
Jewish members and urged that the lives and activities of Jews within Germany be
monitored by the government. He pushed for laws that restricted Jewish participation in
the German economy, took away or prohibited them from taking jobs in cultural and
education fields, and denied them the right to own land. Finally, Class influenced the
league to put forward a statement in 1919 saying that the renewal of Germany would only
come about through “the removal of Jewish influence.” 29
Völkisch nationalism spread to Bavaria in the early years of the twentieth century,
but unlike in northern Germany the ideas enunciated by its thinkers found a less than
receptive audience. The organizations created in the state to spread völkisch ideas tended
to be small and had difficulty in recruiting members. The Pan-German League for
instance was only able to maintain chapters in Munich and Würzburg, cities that had
significant Protestant minorities. 30 Other völkisch groups, such as Theodor Fritsch’s
Germanen Orden, also had small memberships. The numbers were so small for this
association that the leadership debated closing one of the two main lodges, located in
Munich and Nuremberg, in order to save money. The lack of interest in these years
prompted remarks that the state was simply not receptive to völkisch ideas. As a result
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the full flowering of völkisch nationalism in Bavaria would not occur until the First
World War. 31
The völkisch movement, and the organizations that it inspired or influenced, were
critical in creating an atmosphere in which the patriotic movement in Bavaria would
flourish after 1918. Their writings created a world view that animated the youth of a
generation to reject the bourgeois world of Wilhelmine Germany as seen in the
Artamanen and the Wandervögel. Their discontent over Bismarck’s creation in 1871 led
them to hope for a more thorough unification, one that brought all Germans together
under one state. This desire led the patriotic associations, the Pan-German League above
all others, to call for a more expansionist policy, one that was not dimmed either by the
diplomatic isolation of Germany prior to war, or its defeat in that war. Finally the
patriotic associations of the Reich provided a template for political participation that was
both extra-parliamentary and oppositional in nature, all the while being nationalistic in its
outlook – something that would help to characterize the post-war right in Bavaria.
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Chapter 3
War, Revolution, & Repression in Bavaria – 1914-1919
The First World War transformed Bavarian, and by extension German, society. It
greatly increased the power of the state in people’s lives, brought large scale
industrialization to the state, and changed the relationship of Bavarians to the old regime
that had existed prior to 1914 on both the state and federal level. More important, radical
nationalism on the model of both the völkisch movement and the patriotic associations
became critical to the maintenance of popular support for the conflict, for as the military
stalemate continued, and the country’s material condition worsened, discontent began to
surface amongst the population that eventually ended in revolution in 1918.
Bavaria and World War I:
Bavarians greeted the outbreak of war on August 1, 1914 in much the same way
as their fellow countrymen in other parts of Germany, with an outpouring of patriotism
that seemed to convey acceptance, if not jubilation, at the prospect of conflict with the
allies. This mood, which manifested itself in parades, impromptu festivals, and public
speeches by leading figures, was always more apparent than real. In late July 1914
Bavarian workers protested the growing danger of war in many parts of the kingdom, as
they had during previous war scares. Many people, fearing financial ruin, began to
withdraw their money from banks – insisting that their paper notes be converted into gold
marks. The unease extended even into intellectual circles; the philosopher Oswald
Spengler noted that even anarchists seemed to buy into the hyper-nationalistic fervor
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being whipped up in this period. 1 Nevertheless these expressions of anxiety ran counter
to the prevailing mood, which saw the coming conflict as a relief from the monotony of
daily life in Bavaria and Germany. 2
The governing elites in Germany and Bavaria did much to encourage this
sentiment. Nationalist and conservative papers ran articles extolling the general
outpouring of the people in favor of war, seeing in such demonstrations the coming
together of all Germans, regardless of class or region, as one people united against its
enemies. This mood was given official imprimatur on August 4, 1914 when Kaiser
Wilhelm II declared that he recognized “no parties, only Germans.” 3 The civil peace, or
Burgfrieden, as declared by the Kaiser, became more concrete later when all the political
parties in the Reichstag, including the Social Democratic Party, voted for the necessary
war credits. Thus was created the myth of the “spirit of 1914,” a belief that out of the
war a new national community had been created. This powerful sentiment, as Jeffrey
Verhey has noted, helped to sustain Germany’s war effort throughout the four long years
that followed. 4
To maintain the German people’s morale, and maintain the ideal of a national
community, the political leadership resorted to propaganda. Initially the German
government’s attempt to control the flow of information was limited to censoring news
about the conflict. More effective methods were hampered to certain degree by the
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disagreement within the cabinet about how to maintain the civil peace. 5 As the war
progressed this ramshackle apparatus was replaced in favor of one increasingly under the
sway of the German military, headed from 1916 by Generals Paul von Hindenburg and
Erich Ludendorff. Their efforts to maintain morale revolved around explaining the war
to the populace, and the troops, through the use of patriotic instruction. These gatherings,
which were first utilized at the front during 1917, featured a variety of speakers who
explained the goals of the German government in the war, the causes of the conflict, and
the potential consequences of failure. While the efforts at improving morale did not turn
out successfully, the use of patriotic instruction – especially within the armed forces – did
have an insidious effect; the material used in these lectures were derived in many cases
from the ideological program of the Pan-German League, other patriotic societies, and
the writings of völkisch intellectuals. 6
The adoption of such rhetoric to drum up support for the war’s continuation
marked a break between the type of dynastic nationalism that had characterized Imperial
Germany prior to 1914 and the kind that would animate post-war patriotic (vaterländisch)
groups. The new propaganda emphasized Germany’s war goals, which were defined by
annexations to the east and the creation of a state freed from political strife. It subscribed
to the idea, prevalent in some governmental circles, that the events of July/August 1914
marked the creation of a true national community (Volksgemeinschaft) – one where all
Germans regardless of class, religion, or political affiliation could join together in
supporting the state. For the people who supported these ideas it was not necessary to

5

Ibid.
David Welch, Germany, Propaganda, and Total War, 1914-1918: The Sins of Omission, (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 201-221.

6

44
promise reforms to the political system in order to rally support for the war effort, as
those around Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg argued, but only to achieve the final victory
in which Germany would gain the spoils of victory. 7
Bavaria, in particular, became a home to the radical right groups, and those who
supported the “national” cause. While generally supportive at the beginning of the
conflict, organizations like the Pan-German League became increasingly critical of the
actions of the German government. They disapproved of the military strategies
employed and, more specifically, the domestic policies pursued by Chancellor BethmannHollweg. Many articles in the publications of these groups increasingly came to be
censored. To escape these restrictions most groups moved their publications and offices
to Munich for the remainder of the war, where they continued to criticize the
government. 8 Many of the people who helped to create the radical right in Bavaria after
World War I, like the ultra-nationalist publisher Julius Lehmann, became active during
the conflict.
Despite the efforts of the army, or the virulence of the patriotic associations – and
publishers like Lehmann, most Bavarians turned decisively against the war by 1917.
Several factors helped to explain deteriorating attitudes amongst the populace. The most
important of these was the material deprivation caused by war. Munich, like other
German cities saw the consumption of food drop precipitously from the beginning of
1915. To deal with this problem the authorities instituted rationing and tried to get
people to use substitutes for products like sausages and sauerkraut; turnips becoming a
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universally-consumed, and universally-hated, product. People in Bavaria did their best to
evade these restrictions. They bought food on the black market, bribed public officials
for extra rations, and raided rural farms for their produce. In 1916 food riots broke out in
Munich. Government authorities dealt harshly with those who violated wartime
rationing. 9
Deprivation, however, was not just confined to food but covered many facets of
life in Bavaria. During the war Munich grew in size as armaments factories and other
war-related industries were relocated there, leading to an increase of workers drawn from
the Bavarian countryside and other parts of the country. Unfortunately there was not
enough housing for these workers, as most building materials were expropriated for
military use. Additionally, small businesses were hit hard by the war because they did
not have the capital, or workforce, to fill the production quotas required by the
government. The countryside was also hit hard, as farmers found that they were required
to grow more food, but were not paid the price they believed they had earned. By 1918
discontent in Munich, and throughout Bavaria, was widespread. 10
The Revolution of November 1918
Revolutionary fervor gripped Bavaria in the fall of 1918 as German forces were
collapsing, but intimations of the coming uprising percolated throughout the year. At the
beginning of 1918 there were massive demonstrations in both Munich and Nuremberg
9
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involving thousands of workers, the first such disturbance during the war – in fact the
first to have occurred in Bavaria since 1848. 11 The protesters demanded an immediate
end to the war without annexations. Furthermore they demanded that the monarchy be
abolished in favor of a people’s state, or Volksstaat. The authorities reacted swiftly to
these protests by arresting the ringleaders, the most famous of these being Kurt Eisner, a
transplanted litterateur from Berlin who came to play an important role in Bavaria’s
revolution. 12
Though suppression worked in these early months, by the fall everything had
changed so much that the government began putting out peace feelers to the allies and
promising reform at home. In Bavaria, like elsewhere, this involved bringing the Social
Democrats into the government in the hopes of forestalling a Bolshevik-style revolution.
The Social Democratic Party, despite its revolutionary rhetoric and Marxist heritage, had
become thoroughly dedicated to reforming society slowly through the democratic
process. While whispers of revolution were everywhere, the leaders of the Social
Democrats – most especially Erhard Auer – were determined to chart a more moderate
path. In October the SPD, along with Centre Party, entered into negotiations which
produced a constitutional monarchy in Bavaria. 13
The arrangement was superseded by events. Constitutional reform was passed in
the Bavarian Diet (Landtag) on November 2; by November 5, 1918 revolution had
already broken out within the High Seas Fleet at Kiel. News of the uprising had an
electrifying effect throughout Germany. In Bavaria the voice of revolution came to be
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symbolized in the person of Kurt Eisner, who had helped organize the general strikes in
Munich and Nuremberg in January. A member of the Independent Social Democratic
Party, Eisner moved to Munich from Berlin in 1906. A journalist by trade, he became a
staff writer for the Munich Post, which was the major Social Democratic daily in
southern Germany. During the war, like many German socialists, Eisner parted ways
with the Majority Social Democrats and joined the Independent Social Democratic Party
(USPD) which had split with the larger party over the issue of support for the war. Eisner
was an unrelenting critic of the both the war and the German imperial system, something
that would put him at odds with patriotic groups; almost as much as his Jewish heritage
did. 14
Upon his release from prison on October 14, 1918 Eisner rapidly became the
voice for those Germans, socialist or otherwise, who were sick of the war and wanted to
change the German state, and Bavaria, root and branch. Prior to his release Eisner had
been entered by the Independent Socialists as a candidate to succeed Georg von Vollmar,
the long-term Social Democratic parliamentary chief who retired due to illness. This
election pitted Eisner against Auer, who was the candidate for the majority SPD. In the
campaign Eisner made his most daring statements against the war and the Bavarian
monarchy, which he believed was just as complicit in causing, and prolonging, the war as
the Hohenzollern royal family in Prussia.

In an October 23 speech in the

Schwäbingerbräu Eisner claimed that a people’s state that had a Wittelsbach sitting atop
it as ruler was no real change at all. Two days later Eisner made another speech in which
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he said that, for Germany to move forward, the Kaiser and his sons must abdicate and the
country become a republic. 15
The campaign between Eisner and Auer was still ongoing when revolution broke
out in early November, and it was in this context that revolution came to Bavaria. On
November 7, 1918 both the SPD and USPD held a joint rally in Munich’s Theresienwiese
to call for an end to the war and forge a common vision for the future. While both parties
agreed to a series of proposals – the abdication of the Kaiser, the placing of the army
under the constitution, and the democratization of public life, it was Eisner’s address to
the crowd, lasting over an hour that sparked revolution in Munich. 16 Afterwards the
crowd, numbering near 50,000 marched to a temporary armory, seizing guns and
ammunition. Over the remainder of the day revolutionaries seized other parts of the city
– beer halls, military posts, and the Diet, from which Eisner proclaimed a Bavarian
republic. By the end of the day King Ludwig III had left the city for the countryside, and
later exile, bringing the old order in Bavaria to an end. 17
Eisner’s Death and the Radicalization of the Revolution
The success of the revolution in Munich led to the establishment of a republican
form of government in Bavaria. This government was headed by Kurt Eisner, who had
led the revolutionary bands on November 7. Eisner had been active during the day, not
only speaking to the large crowd at the Theresienwiese, but also organizing new political
forms to take the place of the old guard. Under his guidance the first Worker’s, Soldier’s,
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and Farmer’s Councils (Räte) were set up. 18 These councils, patterned on the Soviets
(councils) of the second Russian Revolution, began the task of bringing about reform
within Bavaria. Their existence, tied closely to the political prestige of Eisner, and the
resistance it engendered from the SPD and other elements in society decisively
influenced the development of the patriotic movement in the years to come.
The first official act of the high council of the soldiers, workers, and farmers was
to name Kurt Eisner as the new minister-president of Bavaria and, along with him, the
entire cabinet.

They did this despite the fact that the high council itself had been

unelected and hastily put together. 19 In fact almost all of the councils throughout Bavaria
and Germany had been hastily put together. The councils swept into the power vacuum
that had been created by the collapse of traditional government. It was hoped by those
who composed and supported them that the councils would become in the words of one
enthusiast, “the fulfillment of their (the Proletariat’s) social hopes and longings, which,
despite democracy, have been previously unfulfilled.” 20 This was certainly the goal of
Eisner, who argued that the councils be given a prominent place in the new republican
government. In his view they would serve as a bulwark to the parliament – a kind of
secondary parliament to ensure further reforms. 21
For Eisner the role of the councils was vital to the success of the revolution.
Bavaria had up to 1918 been ruled by monarchical government. Despite the existence of
a provincial diet, Bavaria’s politics tended to be conservative – owing to the power of the
18
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countryside – and Catholic, reflecting the importance of the Catholic Church in Bavarian
society and its position among the elites. Eisner understood that his goals for reform
could be undermined by the conservative political parties, the Catholic Center party, and
even by his coalition partners, the SPD, within the parliament. In this vein it would be
necessary to use the councils to serve as a counterpoint to the Diet, which Eisner believed
would tend towards more conservative policies. 22
Needless to say the position of the councils was controversial within the Bavarian
cabinet.

Though supported by Eisner and the Independent Socialists, the Social

Democrats were conflicted about keeping the councils. Some members of the cabinet
believed that they were too similar to the Soviets in Russia that the Bolsheviks had used
to come to power in 1917. Furthermore, creating multiple lines of authority had the
potential to create anarchy within the state as government agencies would not know
whose edicts to follow. Auer, the most senior member of the cabinet for the SPD,
believed that there was no legal basis for the councils, but favored keeping them so long
as they could evolve into a more traditional parliamentary chamber. This viewpoint
gradually became the consensus, and allowed Eisner to preserve the councils but only as
an advisory body to the diet. 23
The dispute over the allocation of political power was not the only point of
contention within the young revolutionary government. Eisner would spar with his
coalition partners over a variety of topics. Foreign policy in particular was a flashpoint of
controversy. Allan Mitchell noted that the revolution in Germany and Bavaria produced
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nearly opposite results which corresponded to, in many ways, the antagonism that always
existed between Berlin and Munich.

The revolution in the capital produced a

revolutionary government that was dominated by the Social Democrats, which hoped to
maintain continuity and order, with the Independent Socialists in a minority position in
the cabinet.

In Bavaria, by contrast, the revolutionary government was led by the

Independent Socialists with the Social Democrats in the background. Eisner and his
cohorts, while concerned with maintaining order, were far more interested in a clean
break with the policies, and even the elites, of the past. 24
The most dramatic example of this occurred in the area of foreign policy. Eisner
hoped, like most Germans, that the very fact of the revolution and the creation of a
republican government would persuade the allied powers, most especially U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson, to negotiate an honorable peace with the new Germany. While the
government in Berlin tried to gauge the attitude of the Entente powers through the
Disarmament Commission and the terms of the armistice then being enforced, Eisner
believed that only by exposing the corruption of the old imperial elites – thus taking
responsibility for the conflict – could Germany hope to gain favorable terms. The
Bavarian leader had a chance to put his ideas into action during the weeks following the
November revolution. On November 10, 1918 he issued a proclamation aimed directly at
the western powers in which he claimed that those who “bore and shared responsibility”
for the conflict had been swept away in the revolution, and that this same revolution was
now under threat from the harsh armistice conditions. Even more provocative was
Eisner’s publishing of Bavarian state documents from July and August 1914 that showed
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the role that the imperial government played in encouraging the Austrians to go to war
with Serbia. This controversy, which occurred against the backdrop of a conference of
provincial leaders in Berlin on November 23, 1918, helped to deepen the differences not
only between Berlin and Munich, but also within his own ruling coalition. 25
The issue of parliamentary elections also led to conflict amongst Eisner’s cabinet.
After the revolution the cabinet promised parliamentary elections at the earliest possible
opportunity. However, much of November passed without movement on the subject. As
noted above Eisner viewed the Bavarian parliament with suspicion because many of the
parties within the body, particularly the conservative and middle class ones, would be
resistant to the type of reforms he hoped to carry out within the state. Furthermore he
believed that not enough time had passed in which the citizens of the province could be
“liberated” to vote for the Independent Socialists, which he saw as the vehicle for reform.
However Eisner’s Social Democratic coalition partners saw this as a delaying tactic and
forced him to call for parliamentary elections to be held on January 12, 1919. 26
Eisner’s decision to hold elections in January had been taken at a cabinet meeting
on December 5, 1918 – just slightly less than one month after the revolution had taken
place. While his coalition partners saw elections as a way to regain the initiative in
creating a new order in Bavaria, some of the more ardent revolutionaries saw in elections
the beginnings of reaction. 27 Many of these people believed that Eisner himself was not a
true revolutionary, but more of a traditional, bourgeois politician who looked to create a
more humane version of the old order. Others were inspired by the success of Lenin and
25
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the Bolsheviks in Russia. These radicals on the left coalesced around Erich Mühsam, an
inveterate critic of Eisner, and on the following day stormed the offices of several
bourgeois papers in the city, the most prominent being the Bayerische Kurier, and
“socialized” them. Additionally, they kidnapped Erhard Auer, the most prominent of the
Social Democratic members of the cabinet, and forced him to resign his post. These
demonstrations were brought under control and dispersed only through Eisner’s personal
intervention; and this was just the beginning. A few days later, on December 11, 1918
members of the Independent Socialists, and more radical members of the councils,
formed a Spartacus group in Munich, one dedicated to pushing the revolution forward. 28
The threat from the left epitomized by Mühsam and the more radical members of
the councils was mirrored by threats emanating from the radical right. During the course
of the war numerous völkisch groups had been established in Munich.

The most

prominent of these was the Thule Society. Formed in 1918, the Thule was an outgrowth
of Theodor Fritsch’s Hammerbund and Germanen Orden, both of which had been
organized in the years just prior to 1914. The second of these organizations operated in
total secrecy, much like the Thule Society would in 1918/19. Conspiratorial in nature,
the group only admitted those who could prove pure Aryan ancestry as members. They
were heavily antisemitic, dabbled in mystical religious ideas such as Theosophy, and saw
themselves as an elite organization. 29
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The Thule Society and other radical right groups in Munich coalesced around the
publisher Julius Lehmann, who had been an active opponent of the political left during
the war. In the aftermath of the revolution Lehmann began to work in a concerted
fashion to overthrow the revolutionary government. He made contact with the Thule
Society and urged them to create an armed militia for this purpose, the Thule Kampfbund.
As David Clay Large notes, this organization would have an enormous impact on the
future of right-wing politics in Bavaria during the Weimar Republic. Several people who
would become important Nazis, like Hans Frank, Rudolph Hess, and Alfred Rosenberg,
were members of the fighting society. The party itself was also an offshoot of this group,
created by Thule member Anton Drexler after the Munich police infiltrated and broke up
the militia. Most important, the Thule Society would be implicated, though not directly
involved, in the assassination of Kurt Eisner. 30
The events leading up to Eisner’s death were bound up in the maneuvers that
accompanied the Diet elections of January 12, 1919. Though the number of voters nearly
trebled from the most recent general election of 1912, the result followed what Allan
Mitchell called predictable results. The Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) won a plurality
of seats in the diet, but the Social Democrats in conjunction with the German Democratic
Party (DDP), were able to create a working majority in the chamber. 31 The Independent
Socialists of Kurt Eisner did not improve their share of the vote total at all, and the
minister president’s appeals for a united socialist front went unheeded.

By early

February the cabinet essentially made decisions without him, especially the opening of
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the parliament where Eisner would be forced to resign. In the days that immediately
preceded the first session of the parliament, Eisner tried to revive the councils as a
counterpoint to the parliament in a vain effort to save his position, leading to charges that
Eisner intended a second revolution. Though these were false, it sealed his fate within
the cabinet, which essentially forced his resignation. 32
It was at the opening of the Diet on February 21, 1919 that Eisner’s resignation,
along with that of the rest of the cabinet, was to take place. He never got a chance to
deliver it. Before entering the parliament building Kurt Eisner was assassinated by Count
Anton Arco-Valley, an ex-soldier. 33 Like many demobilized soldiers, Arco-Valley had
the misfortune to run into radicals in the streets of Munich, a fact that instilled within him
a profound hatred of the revolution. He had tried to join the Thule Society but was
rejected, partially from rumored Jewish heritage on his mother’s side – the rumor of the
Thule Society’s involvement seemed to only inflame the councils and the Spartacists.
The assassin himself was shot by Eisner’s bodyguards, though he survived to stand trial.
The murder shocked the residents of Munich, turning a controversial politician into a
martyr overnight and, more importantly, turning the revolution more radical. 34
The Räterepublik
Hans Fenske noted that there were four major phases of the 1918 revolution in
Bavaria. The second phase, in his view, began with the murder of Kurt Eisner by Arco-
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Valley and was marked by a radicalization of the councils. 35

This began almost

immediately. The day after the assassination a central council (Zentralrat) was set up by
representatives of the existing councils. Headed by Ernst Niekisch, a member of the
Social Democrats who had supported Eisner, this body claimed that the parliament had
abandoned its legal responsibilities, and as such they claimed the powers of the Diet
themselves. 36 They promptly declared martial law for the capital and armed workers
with weapons from munitions depots around the city. These armed workers would patrol
the streets of Munich for weeks after the shooting, demanding revenge for Eisner’s
murder. In this period hostages were taken from prominent families and organizations in
the city, with the promise that they would be shot if further counter-revolutionary activity
was not halted. 37
The deliberations of the central council that would take place in late February and
early March reflected the confusion that had marked much of the Bavarian revolution. It
reopened the issue of the councils and reflected the three way struggle that was now
taking place between the Social Democrats, Independent Socialists, and the Spartacist
groups in the capital. In many ways the Social Democrats were in a defensive position.
Many members of the councils believed that Eisner’s assassin had been paid to do so by
Erhard Auer, who headed the SPD faction in the Diet. 38 Now, in the last few weeks of
February 1919 the Social Democrats moved to take control of the central council, doing
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more so out of fear that they would lose the allegiance of the masses than out of
conviction about its efficacy. 39
The goal of the Social Democratic members of the central council was the same
as before Eisner’s death, to make the transition to parliamentary rule as soon as possible.
In this they were joined by the Independent Socialists, which had not done well in the
January 12 elections. In the deliberations of the central council, both parties agreed that
the parliament itself would be called back into session as soon as possible, and that the
most recent election results would serve as the basis for the body. The question of the
councils would be decided by this body. 40 These decisions were very controversial for
many members of the Independent Socialists, which hoped to further the development of
the councils. Like the Social Democrats, the USPD feared losing the masses to more
radical elements – in this case to the Spartacist groups within the capital.

These

organizations were much more radical than the Independent Social Democrats and were
composed of people who favored a Russian-style revolution in Bavaria. Many of the
leaders of these factions were émigrés like Max Levien, who was an ardent admirer of
Lenin. Though members of the Spartacist groups had participated in the central council
and the Congress of Councils, they walked out on the deliberations once the final
decision to call the parliament back into session had been taken. 41
When the Diet finally was recalled on March 7, 1919 it installed a new cabinet
headed by Johannes Hoffmann as Minister President.

A member of the Social

Democratic Party who had served in Eisner’s cabinet, Hoffmann was determined to steer
39
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a middle course between the right and the left, a prudent course, but one that infuriated
both the left and the right.

As it turned out events would overwhelm Hoffmann’s

government. Economic dislocation engendered by the war, and the continuing food crisis
prevented the Bavarian government from instituting policies designed to help its
citizens. 42 Furthermore many Bavarians, particularly supporters of the Bavarian People’s
Party (BVP), were incensed by the new Weimar constitution which had been sent to
Bavaria for confirmation. The document stripped Bavaria of many of the rights and
privileges that had characterized the state’s relationship to the Reich under the
Hohenzollerns: a separate army, a separate diplomatic corps, its own Post and Telegraph,
control over its own railroads, and the right to collect its own taxes on beer. For many
Bavarians this was a crippling blow.

They erroneously believed that the federal

relationship that had tied them to the imperial government would continue under the
Weimar Republic.

When this did not take place many urged for secession from

Germany. Unfortunately for those who urged such a course the Hoffmann government
was content to maintain Bavaria within Germany, provoking howls of outrage and
unflattering comparisons to Eisner. 43
These problems only served to further convince the Spartacists and Communists
that the time was ripe for a second revolution. They were confirmed in their aspirations
by events in Hungary, where a revolution had brought a Soviet-style republic to power in
Budapest under the leadership of Bela Kun. When they met in Augsburg on April 3,
1919 they voted to call for a Soviet republic in Bavaria. This resolution, when delivered
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to Munich, was met with silence from the government, as Hoffmann had left the city to
confer with officials in Berlin. In the absence of Hoffmann the situation quickly spiraled
out of control. The Central Council ordered that the Diet, due to meet on April 8, 1919
not be called back into session. The next day, on April 5, 1919 representatives of the
cabinet, the Central Council, and the Communists and Spartacists met at the ministry of
Military Affairs to find a solution to the impasse, at which Hoffmann’s representative
called for a councils republic, or Räterepublik – which he did as a way to draw the
Communists into a coalition with the SPD, something that a congress of the party,
meeting in Nuremberg rejected outright. However, the die was cast. A rump session of
the Central Council deposed the Hoffmann cabinet and declared Bavaria to be a Soviet
republic. The Räterepublik was born. 44
The Suppression of the Räterepublik
In his history of the Bavarian revolution Allan Mitchell noted that it proceeded
differently than elsewhere in Germany. The uprising there not only produced results far
earlier than other parts of the country, but had also lasted longer. In fact, in northern
Germany, especially in the capital of Berlin, the revolution’s most radical phase came in
January 1919. During that month Spartacist groups, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl
Liebknecht, attempted to seize control of the city.

During the uprising the Social

Democratic government turned to para-military formations, the notorious Freikorps, to
put down the uprising. They did so with great severity. However, because Eisner had
successfully created a coalition government in Munich, Bavaria did not have a turn
towards radicalism until after his murder in February 1919.
44
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Räterepublik was suppressed at the beginning of May 1919, the infrastructure, and the
manner, for doing so existed and was ready to use. 45
Initially, though, the Hoffmann government was determined to deal with this
problem on its own, hoping to preserve some autonomy from Berlin in the process. The
problem for the cabinet, sitting in Bamberg, was that this necessitated a military solution
– namely the conquest of Munich. This answer meant that they needed forces and the
political will to use them. Both were in short supply in early April. For much of the
week following April 8th the cabinet tried to fix the situation by quarantine and
negotiation. When these proved fruitless, Hoffmann turned to a military solution, but the
means in which the government sought to retake Munich – inserting forces into the city
to create a reverse coup d’etat – proved to be disastrous.

Instead of deposing the

Räterepublik and restoring the Hoffmann government to its position, the insurgents were
defeated at the Munich Train Station, where they made a final stand. It even led to
further radicalization as the Communists seized control from the Central Council and
established their rule in Munich. 46
In the aftermath of the government’s failed assault on the capital, the cabinet sent
out a call on April 14, 1919 for the creation a civilian militia, or Volkswehr. Initially
these formations were to carry out the fight against the Räterepublik on their own,
without help from Berlin.

However, these forces proved to be wholly inadequate.

Organized two days after Hoffmann’s proclamation, and three days after the Palm
Sunday assault, Bavarian forces were routed by the Munich Soviet’s Red Army in
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Dachau. In reports that came back to Bamberg it was said that some of the soldiers
refused to engage with the enemy. Reluctantly, the Bavarian Minister-President asked
Berlin for help. 47
Part of the reason for the poor state of militias formed under the auspices of the
Bavarian government was the long wait before forming such groups. This resulted in
recruits that were not soldiers in any real sense, but citizens with little to no military
experience. Even groups that formed prior to the Bavarian government’s involvement
suffered from this deficiency. Rudolf Kanzler, who would be important in the formation
and running of the Einwohnerwehr, began to form a circle around him in Rosenheim in
December 1918. The men recruited to staff this militia tended to be men of distinction.
Shopkeepers, butchers, tailors, and other established men answered the call to take up
arms in Rosenheim. Few had any military experience at all. The result was that these
initial paramilitary groups were small; the Rosenheim militia itself was roughly ninety
men when the call for militias went out from Bamberg in mid-April. 48
Despite the low quality, several important Freikorps units were created during the
period of the Räterepulik. The most important of these was Schützenbrigade 21 (later
Freikorps Epp), which was organized by Franz Ritter von Epp. A soldier and explorer in
the Bavarian army, Epp began to create a paramilitary formation in early 1919. In this
endeavor he received assistance from Gustav Noske, the Minister for Military Affairs,
who was busy setting up Freikorps all over Germany in response to the Spartacist
uprising in Berlin. Epp recruited soldiers for his unit from among the lower ranking
47
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officers and non-commissioned officers who had been demobilized after the war. Epp’s
unit was given formal status after April 18, 1919 when Minister-President Hoffmann
called on Berlin for assistance. This request was granted, but with the proviso that the
soldiers used for the assault on Munich be led by a Prussian general, who would lead a
contingent of 20,000 Reich troops, in addition to the paramilitary formations being set up
by the national government. 49
With the help of the government in Berlin, other units were set up in the same
manner. Freikorps Oberland, considered by Hans Fenske to be the prototypical Free
Corps formation, was created in Bamberg under the command of Rudolf von
Sebottendorf, a military adventurer who had been active in the Thule Society. They
numbered nearly 700 men, 250 of whom would participate in the attack on the capital.
Another unit, Freikorps Chiemgau, was organized using the farmers and rural laborers of
the Chiemgau region of Upper Bavaria. Fenske notes that this particular paramilitary
formation was different from the others in that there were few soldiers among their
number.

Together with roughly 15 other formations, small units based on local

communities around Bavaria, and the small contingent of federal troops sent from Berlin,
these para-military formations would be involved in retaking Munich. 50
The attack on Munich was supposed to take place on May 2, 1919. However, it
ended up taking place a day early because of reports that the leaders of the Räterepublik
had executed a number of hostages. These prisoners, who were held in the
Luitpoldgymnasium, a local school, and had been picked up for a number of reasons – for
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coming from bourgeois families, belonging to the Thule Society, or having taken down a
Soviet poster. The hostages were killed in response to the murder of eight unarmed Red
Army soldiers, along with 20 medical orderlies, by Freikorps troops when they retook
Dachau early that morning. This justification, however, carried little weight with
government forces, which now used the hostage murder (Geiselmord) as a rallying cry
and as cause for their actions when they moved into the city the next day. 51
The attack on Munich did not take particularly long. Resistance was light when
government and Freikorps troops moved into the city. Nevertheless government forces
behaved brutally in putting down the Räterepublik. Nearly 350 people were murdered
over the course of the next several days in Munich, many without trials – some after a
very short trial. Many of the leaders of the Munich Soviet, like Eugen Levine, were
subsequently tried and executed, while others, like Ernst Toller, received stiff prison
sentences. The brutality was not just confined to killing however. In the days following
the assault a female painter, who insulted some Freikorps soldiers, was stripped naked
and beaten with a riding crop “until there was not a white spot left on her backside.” 52
Citizens, who had been in hiding during the Räterepublik, now hunted down and attacked
fellow citizens who were known to have leftist sympathies, while other denounced those
who had helped the leaders of the Munich Soviet. The severity of the suppression of the
Council Republic effectively ended the revolution in Bavaria. In the process, Munich
and Bavaria generally, were to become home to the political far right, a movement that
would find expression in the patriotic movement. 53
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Chapter 4
Political Elites and the Creation of the Einwohnerwehr
In order to suppress the Räterepublik the government in Bavaria had turned to the
army and paramilitary formations. These groups, particularly the local ones, formed the
nucleus of the patriotic (vaterländisch) movement in the state. They played a small,
though significant role in destroying the Räterepublik and insured that further revolution
would not occur. However, as the Bolshevik threat dissipated many of these local
paramilitaries did not simply disappear, but continued to grow. Their further
development reflected the fears many people had of a resurgent Bolshevism, as well as a
desire to return to the status quo ante bellum of the old imperial system. The
Einwohnerwehr came about as a result of this expansion.
Particularly important in this process was the role of the Bavarian political elite.
Lower level elites, usually located in the hinterlands, helped to found many of the
original paramilitary groups used by the government. At the same time they were helped
in their task by the actions of the Hofmann government that desperately tried to maintain
control of the situation in Bavaria in the spring of 1919. Their decision to help foster the
small paramilitaries in the weeks prior to the ‘liberation’ of Munich provided the first
taste of real political power to the leaders of the future Einwohnerwehr. In the months
that followed a working relationship developed between the men who led these small
bands and the political leaders of the state, who hoped to use the new organization to
consolidate their power and prevent future disturbances.
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Throughout the remainder of 1919 the Einwohnerwehr was organized to become
an auxiliary dedicated to the preservation of the state, its constitution, and those state
supporting (staatserhaltend) elements. It grew to encompass much of Bavaria though
there would be limits to its reach. These were tied to the association’s ideology, which
was itself a reflection of the world view of its leaders. Their unremitting hatred of
socialism along with their romanticized view of Germany, and its place in the world,
ruled out certain segments of the population that did not hold to the nationalist vision of
the Einwohnerwehr.
Lower Level Elites and Bavarian Paramilitary Organizations
Many of the local Bavarian right-wing groups that had participated in the
suppression of the Räterepublik began to form in the months following the November
revolution in Bavaria. These organizations had several things in common; they were
small, very local, and almost wholly ineffective in either preventing radical upheaval or
overturning the new government in Munich. However, their existence testifies to a
determination amongst a certain strata of the newly displaced political elites in Bavaria to
revive their positions of prominence within the Bavarian state.
The men most active in forming right-wing paramilitary organizations came from
the lower reaches of the Bavarian government and civil service. They were not people
who, before 1918, had the commanding heights within the state, but held positions that
gave them some influence and allowed others to look to them for leadership. As a group
they were surprised by the speed with which the old order fell in Bavaria and expected to
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see resistance to the new government form. When this did not materialize they began to
organize on their own.
One of the best examples of this phenomenon can be seen in the person of Rudolf
Kanzler. A middle level civil servant, Kanzler was, at the time of the revolution, a
member of the Chamber of Deputies in the Bavarian Diet. His reaction was typical of
many who held positions in the late Wittelsbach kingdom. “I waited upon men of name
and influence to call for armed opposition to the revolutionary rulers. To my boundless
disappointment, that never happened.” 1 Kanzler returned to Rosenheim shortly after the
proclamation of the Free State and began to form a paramilitary formation on his own
initiative. 2
The process by which his group was organized provided a model for the future
Einwohnerwehr, in which Kanzler played an important part, as well as other paramilitary
formations. Much of the membership came from a distinctly middle class background.
The people that joined Kanzler beginning in December 1918 included: shopkeepers,
butchers, and tailors; men of distinction but not great wealth. These were people who
had enjoyed a prosperous existence in the Kaiser’s Germany, and who felt increasingly
threatened by the process of modernization. Few, if any, members of the working class
joined this early citizen’s militia. Kanzler was content with this development because he
believed that society and the state should be controlled by men of merit. He despised the
Worker’s, Farmer’s, and Soldier’s Councils (Arbeiter-,Bauern-,und Soldatenräte) that
were set up in the months after the revolution. In his memoirs, Bavaria’s Struggle
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against Bolshevism (Bayerns Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus), Kanzler excoriated this
particular body as the root of problems in the Chiemgau. 3
Organizing the Rosenheim citizen’s militia proceeded slowly at first. Kanzler had
hoped to build up a force of 1,000 men, arm them with weapons seized from a cache near
Rosenheim, and to lead an assault on Munich in much the same way that Bavarian
peasants had done in 1705. This proved to be a daunting task as the Eisner government
and the councils had prohibited the possession of weapons without license of the
government. Kanzler wrote that he had to “beg and steal” in order to get the weaponry
needed. To disguise his activities, he used his office as a weapons depot, enlisting his coworkers in his cause. Making things more difficult was the decision of the council in
Rosenheim to fire the mayor and local government councilor, people that Kanzler would
have counted on for support. 4
In spite of these difficulties the Rosenheim militia was strong enough by April
1919 to take on the local council government. Taking advantage of the political strife
occurring in Munich on April 14/15, 1919 (Palm Sunday), Kanzler’s group seized control
of the local council’s headquarters after an altercation involving the “republican guard,”
which had fired on people near a local beer hall. Portrayed as a spontaneous riot in his
memoirs, Kanzler moved quickly to overturn local councils in the region surrounding
Rosenheim. The councils were defeated, according to Kanzler, “with the help of droves
of people, who raced to the support of only scantily armed farmers in the region, this
(coup) was successfully overcome in a relatively short time and appreciably without
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further bloodshed.” 5 Despite their success, Kanzler eventually ended his campaign when
the Räterepublik in Munich sent reinforcements to the region, which forced him to flee to
Bamberg, where he joined the Hoffmann government. 6
It was during these weeks in the north that Kanzler began to organize, in a more
systematic fashion, a true paramilitary force. In this respect he was aided by help from
the Hoffmann cabinet and the middle class parties, particularly the Bavarian People’s
Party, who were frantically organizing civil defense organizations and Free Corps in
every corner of the state. They provided him with money, officers (though Kanzler also
relied upon a cadre of officers who escaped from Rosenheim with him), and most of all
encouragement. 7 The result was the creation of the Freikorps Chiemgau, a group that
was every bit the military outfit, from the officers that led the volunteers to the staff that
managed the unit’s affairs. 8
Despite the assistance Kanzler received he faced two major difficulties in
organizing this group. The first revolved around the simple fact that the Räterepublik’s
forces occupied the Chiemgau region – meaning that the men Kanzler needed to fill out
the ranks were essentially unavailable at that time. Second, neither the Hoffmann
government nor the army provided adequate arms for the Freikorps Chiemgau. Kanzler
and his officers solved these problems through subterfuge and smuggling. Recruiters
were sent into the Chiemgau region, in what he described as “life threatening” missions,
5
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to recruit locals under the noses of republican authorities. Weapons, many of them in
caches throughout the region, were smuggled out and brought to several depot centers in
the north, where they were distributed to the volunteers. 9
The efforts of Kanzler and his staff bore fruit at the end of April, as his forces
retook the Chiemgau and Rosenheim over the course of several days from April 30 to
May 2. This campaign took place at the same time, though independently, of the
Hoffmann government’s assault on Munich. In most respects the campaign in the region
proceeded effortlessly. Most of the towns and villages in the region were taken with little
to no resistance. 10 Once the region had been retaken, Kanzler began to reorganize the
Freikorps Chiemgau.
Kanzler’s example was replicated throughout Bavaria. In Munich local citizens
organized their own local auxiliaries, but these were not coordinated very well. Their
efforts, before the advent of the Räterepublik, foundered on the weakness of the Hofmann
government in the period immediately following Eisner’s death, and were not rectified
until the cabinet moved to Bamberg. 11 Wasserburg, on the other hand, only took to
creating their paramilitary force around the time the more radicalized council government
was set up. Franz Schneider, who came to control this unit, noted that many people in the
town saw the November revolution as a comedy. Only after the local council began to
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take measures that were deemed injurious to middle class interests, did Schneider and
others set out to create the Freikorps Wasserburg. 12
The most significant figure amongst the lower echelon of the Bavarian elite that
founded and participated in patriotic organizations, however, was Georg Escherich. A
forestry official in the Wittelsbach state, Escherich traveled outside Germany in the years
before the First World War, which made him unique amongst many of his right-wing
contemporaries. His travels, however, only reinforced his authoritarian tendencies.
David Clay Large describes Escherich as the “Great White Hunter,” a personality type
frequently seen in Europe during these years. 13 Like many Europeans he treated local
natives with incredible disdain, unless they exhibited traits that Escherich himself prized.
His travels also fed his incredible ego, as it allowed him to act as a high official, even an
aristocrat – a role that went well beyond his meager station as a forestry official. 14
When World War I broke out, Escherich joined the Bavarian army as a volunteer.
He served as a captain in the artillery and distinguished himself in the battle of St. Marie
bei Markirch. 15 Wounded in the leg in 1915, 16 Escherich would spend the rest of the war
in Poland. There he served with the local military administration, gaining invaluable
experience as an organizer and manager. He also used the position as an opportunity to
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continue his work as a forestry official, through which he made many contacts in both the
army and in the government. 17
After the war Escherich returned to Bavaria. Initially he affiliated himself with a
veteran’s organization, whose purpose was to advocate for officers seeking pension and
other forms of state support. 18 However, over time, he found himself drawn to the
paramilitary movement. Escherich disliked the revolutionary upheavals of November
1918. Like many low level officials, Escherich had nothing but disdain for the Social
Democratic Party and the entire political left in Germany. As a result, the nascent
patriotic movement seemed a natural fit for him. 19 Just as Kanzler had done in
Rosenheim, Escherich set up his own paramilitary in Isen in April following the creation
of the Räterepublik. This group, inexplicably, was able to keep the council’s soldiers out
of Isen, a fate not shared by many communities in the Chiemgau. 20
In the weeks following the suppression of the Räterepublik Escherich delved into
the evolving paramilitary scene in Bavaria. He sent numerous letters to his aristocratic
friends, military officers, and government officials, in which he maintained the need for a
more thorough defensive structure. 21 His opinions became so well known, that leaders in
Bavaria sought out his advice regarding their plans for the reinstitution of the Bavarian
Army, Reichswehrgruppe No. 4. 22 Government officials sent him recruitment materials
in which they outlined this new Bavarian force, which differed in some substantial ways
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from the old Wittelsbach army. These included its reliance upon volunteer recruits, the
ability to move up in the ranks – including the traditionally closed officer corps, and
closer cooperation between officers and soldiers through trusted officials, or
Vertrauensleute. 23
In the course of this correspondence, Escherich began to outline his thoughts on
the creation of self-defense organizations that would help support the state. He
incorporated some of the ideas being circulated for the new Bavarian army. One, the new
force needed to be composed entirely of volunteers. Two, units should serve as a reserve
and be used only as a supporting force for both the army and the police. Three, the
organization would only be composed of men with the highest moral character. Four,
and perhaps most importantly, he insisted that the group needed to be centrally controlled
by a state leader. In essence, Escherich called for the creation of a civilian auxiliary that
was necessary in his view because, despite the destruction of the Räterepublik, the danger
from the left had not yet dissipated. 24
As it turned out such an organization was being created around the same time –
the Einwohnerwehr, or Civil Defense Guards. This group had been founded on a national
level by Gustav Noske, the Social Democratic Defense Minister, who hoped to use it as a
more reliable instrument of government control. While the various units of the Freikorps
had been necessary to squelch the Spartacist Uprising of January 1919, to say nothing of
the suppression of the Munich Soviet, they often proved difficult to control and tended to
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use excessive violence when employed. 25 However, after May 1919 the government no
longer needed units of ex-soldiers eager for a fight that would undercut the stability of the
national government. Nevertheless they still believed a state of emergency existed. They
assumed elements of the political left were still plotting revolution which, they argued,
would overwhelm police and military authorities. In their view Germany still needed
paramilitary protection and the men who joined the Einwohnerwehr were to provide it.
As its regulations stated, “then all men should also be called to arms, in order to protect
themselves and their possessions. Everyone, who loves law and order, belongs in the
Einwohnerwehr.” 26
Unlike the Freikorps, which had demobilized veterans as the backbone of the
individual units, the Einwohnerwehr had a more selective screening process for its
volunteers. Members had to be upstanding members of civil society, without any hint of
impropriety in their background. Anyone over the age of twenty could join. Veterans of
the First World War were preferred, but unlike the Freikorps units, not vital for
membership. Those who did sign up had to provide references testifying to their high
character. The organization officially took no account of political preferences, or class,
in regards to membership. The only stipulation was that all volunteers had to be willing
to support the state and uphold law and order. 27 This requirement removed much of the
political left, to say nothing of the working class, from consideration.
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With the support of the national government and Defense Minister Noske, the
Hofmann cabinet ordered the creation of an Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria. Officially
promulgated on May 17, 1919, the decree from the Ministries of Interior and Military
Affairs helped to define the parameters of the new organization. The Einwohnerwehr in
Bavaria was organized as a partially civilian and a partially military group, in accordance
with the regulations set out in Berlin. It was to support both the police and the army
whenever necessary and its leaders were to come from local communities. Perhaps most
important of all, the regulations called for the creation of military commissioners, or
Wehrkommissare. These officers, temporarily appointed by the army and placed in each
governing district in Bavaria, were given the task of forming and supervising the
Einwohnerwehr in the state to insure reliability. 28
For the leaders of units that already existed, the new instructions meant a chance
to continue as before. All over Bavaria, Freikorps organized themselves as Civil Guard
formations. Here again Rosenheim and the Chiemgau led the way. After the suppression
of the Räterepublik in the region Kanzler moved quickly to consolidate his forces. He
broke up the Freikorps Chiemgau and created the Einwohnerwehr Chiemgau. The
transition was easy enough, for many of the men who had fought for the previous unit
signed up for the new one. Kanzler kept many of the military officers who had aided in
the retaking of the region as leaders in this new formation. In fact, in many respects, the
new organization maintained the militaristic bearing of the former Freikorps Chiemgau. 29
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Kanzler’s goal in creating the Einwohnerwehr Chiemgau was to eventually create
a statewide organization. However, his ideas differed greatly from those who were
creating the national organization in Berlin. He believed that the group needed to grow
more slowly and thus more assuredly. He wrote in his history of the Einwohnerwehr,
“against it I wanted to create, going more slowly and from known, already existing Civil
Guards cells, built up organically (as I had practically shown how to do it already in
Upper Bavaria-East) and totally without support from state authorities, a purely private
and absolutely reliable defense organization.” 30 The advantage, as Kanzler saw it, to an
organic and independent approach came in its independence from political control.
Without state meddling, a paramilitary formation could develop its own structures and
create an esprit d’ corps. The units could be molded to the personalities and
predilections, political and otherwise, of the leadership. However, if politicians were
allowed to supervise, he believed that the Civil Guards would easily find themselves an
instrument of the state. 31
Kanzler’s ideas were not universally shared amongst the men who were creating
auxiliary units. In Wasserburg, for instance, Civil Guard units were more loosely based
than those in Rosenheim, creating what one local member called a “purely civilian
institution,” in contrast to the military bearing of the Kanzler organization. 32 As a result
local units were allowed greater flexibility in governance and normal activities. This
included raising their own funds through a variety of means, like auctioning off
30
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Christmas trees during the holidays or giving public performances. 33 Additionally,
Schneider and his men asserted their independence from Rosenheim, despite Kanzler’s
claim of control over all of southeast Bavaria; their defiance stemmed from anger at the
high handed behavior of Kanzler’s men during the liberation of Wasserburg. 34 The
differences in style and tone only added to the personal enmity of both men.
Escherich also held ideas that varied from Kanzler’s, though there were
similarities in their approach. The differences revolved around the creation of a statewide
organization, the centralization of all local units under its leadership, and how the group
should relate to the government. Escherich believed that the Einwohnerwehr should
closely cooperate with civil authorities. This approach was outlined in a June 4, 1919
letter to local communities in the regions around both Wasserburg and Isen. Escherich
argued that instead of organizing on the local level as Kanzler had done, all units should
be tied to the defense district, or Wehrkreis. All the communities within this region were
compelled to set up guard units. The minimum number of men in each unit was to be
twenty, and all were to be volunteers who conformed to national guidelines. Local
authorities also had to financially maintain the group in terms of transportation,
weaponry, and ammunition. The use of these would be controlled by the local leader
working in conjunction with the defense commissioner, who had overall responsibility
for their activities. Otherwise, in its inner workings, the Einwohnerwehr was to be
independent of government control. The leadership was to be selected democratically by
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the membership, while information on all members, its daily non-emergency activities,
and other administrative matters were kept beyond the eyes of the state. 35
The Bavarian Political Elite and the Creation of the Einwohnerwehr
The initial organizations of the patriotic movement, the various Freikorps and
nascent Einwohnerwehr, had been founded by men who held lower level posts in the
Bavarian state and army. While their involvement was critical both to rally support to
their cause and in terms of organization, these units would not have survived for long, let
alone thrived, without the tacit and active participation of leading politicians and the
Bavarian Army. The political figure most identified with the movement, both at the time
and subsequently by historians, was Gustav von Kahr. During 1919 and early 1920 Kahr
served the Hoffmann government as regional president of Upper Bavaria, which included
Munich and the regions to the south and east where both Escherich and Kanzler had their
power bases. Later on he became Minister-President of Bavaria and would remain an
important player with respect to the patriotic movement throughout the period.
Gustav von Kahr came from a middle class family of civil servants who had
served the rulers of Bavaria throughout the nineteenth century. Like many in his family
before him, Kahr received a title of nobility for his service to the Bavarian state.
Appointed regional president of Upper Bavaria in 1917, Kahr remained at this post
through the revolutionary upheavals of 1918 and early 1919. 36 Described by David Clay
Large as “a short, powerfully built man with rough facial features, close-cropped hair,
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and a prim goatee,” Kahr was ‘colorless’ to many of his contemporaries. 37 Supremely
devoted to the Wittelsbach rulers he had served, Kahr’s monarchical sympathies were
well known as was his unremitting hatred for socialism. These tendencies naturally made
him an inveterate opponent of the 1918 revolution. 38
Kahr’s interest in creating a paramilitary force that would turn back the gains of
the revolution was evident from the very first. In the days that followed the November
1918 Revolution, Kahr suggested creating a civilian organization to protect businesses
and private property. This proposal was turned aside by Interior Minister Erhard Auer as
unnecessary at the time. 39 The subsequent radicalization of the revolution and the defeat
of the Räterepublik gave Kahr a chance to try again. During the summer of 1919 he
organized a series of meetings with Escherich and other leaders of the paramilitary
movement. The first of these was held on June 21, 1919 in his office. 40 Interestingly
Rudolf Kanzler had not been invited to the meeting, a fact that reflected the esteem in
which Escherich’s ideas were held. 41
At this first meeting it was decided to divide Upper Bavaria into a number of
regional districts, or Gaue, which would correspond to local government offices. The
initial localities were organized around major cities or towns like Munich, which was a
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regional office all on its own, Rosenheim, Garmisch, Freising, Wasserburg, Weilheim,
and Landsberg to name a few. 42 The creation of districts and regional offices were
designed to correspond with local government offices and to allow for close coordination
with state authorities. Escherich followed up the meeting with another in Berlin four
days later on June 25, where it was decided that further development of the group would
be handled by local officials. 43
Following this meeting establishment of the Einwohnerwehr was expedited by
Escherich, working through Kahr’s office and assisted by both the interior and defense
ministries in Munich. In fact both offices started creating regulations for the organization
before requested to do so by Berlin. The Ministry of Defense established a series of
guidelines for the distribution and use of weaponry and ammunition that was circulated
through the government, and given to Escherich, following the June 21 meeting. 44 These
regulations were to be supervised by the local defense commissioners, who, as noted
previously, were responsible for streamlining the units’ activities and making sure the
government’s edicts were followed. 45
A second organizational meeting was held on July 2, 1919 in Kahr’s office in
Munich. Rudolf Kanzler, who had not been invited to the first conference, was in
attendance, as were many of the regional governors in Bavaria. Kahr, however, was not
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there. He was in Berlin at the time and left Escherich to chair the conference. 46 During
the discussion Kanzler argued strongly for his ideas of a private military force, but was
unable to move the government officials and military men who preferred an organization
that could serve their interests. Seeing the writing on the wall, Kanzler put his support
behind Escherich’s plan writing later, “In the interest of unity in the fatherlandish
movement and controlled by the thought that through my assistance, in view of my
experience in the area of defense, one would be able to accomplish much good and
prevent many misdeeds.” 47
The final organizational meeting was held on July 17, 1919. At this meeting,
which was chaired by Kahr, the leadership was put into place for the Einwohnerwehr.
Escherich became the state leader, while Kanzler became his deputy. Furthermore, it was
decided that regional offices of the group should correspond to military districts, and that
the Finance Ministry should take the lead in supporting the group. Finally, the
participants discussed numerous housekeeping items like identity papers for the
leadership and the type of dress for the average member. 48
Despite the unity of purpose that prevailed amongst the nascent paramilitary
leaders and the Bavarian political elite in the summer of 1919 there existed an
undercurrent of tension, one that would have a profound impact on the development of
the Einwohnerwehr and the history of Bavaria. The May 17, 1919 memo that created the
organization in Bavaria stipulated that the group was to be used as an auxiliary, an arm of
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the civil and military authorities. Strict controls were called for and the army was to
provide guidance in this area. They appointed special military commissioners in each
government district to closely supervise Einwohnerwehr units. In all cases the guards
were to answer to local control – either civil or military. They were not to be classified
as military, to avoid the expected restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, but as local
auxiliary to the police that in an emergency could be used by the local military
commander. 49 The guidelines set forth by military officials in Munich corresponded
closely to the regulations set forth by the main Einwohnerwehr office in Berlin. 50
The type of group described in the May 17 letter did not correspond however to
the reality in Bavaria. Even as Escherich and Kanzler were setting up the organization
they moved to make it practically independent from the state. The key to getting out
from under government control was to eliminate the military commissioners as a check
on them. Originally the military commissioners had been given a mandate for three
months, enough time to set up a state-wide body. After that they could be renewed by the
cabinet. As Kanzler pointed out, even before the July 2, 1919 meeting, he and Escherich
began to urge the removal of these individuals as stewards of the Einwohnerwehr. They
argued that keeping them in place would hinder the further development of the group. 51
Needless to say this brought them into conflict with both the Bavarian army and
the cabinet. The Hoffmann government had given its assent to the creation of the
Einwohnerwehr under the assumption that this group would be controlled by the civil and
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military authorities. Members of the government, such as Interior Minister Endres, had
given assurances to that fact. 52 The army, along with the Ministry of Military Affairs,
was particularly troubled by this move from the Einwohnerwehr leadership. In an
internal memo of August 9, 1919 they argued that the maintenance of the military
commissioners was absolutely vital to the smooth functioning of the paramilitary group.
In their view, the Einwohnerwehr was nothing more than a local body, one that was to be
controlled by the civil government, and in true emergencies, by the military. Thus the
need for more centralized leadership was superfluous, and even dangerous, as it might
cause further distrust amongst the allied powers and a rather large portion of the German
population. They reminded the government that, “It must not be misjudged, that the
antipathy many workers, and also many majority socialists, have against the civil defense
forces is still quite great, and that only the avoidance of anything that remotely reminds
them of so called ‘militarism’ must be avoided.” 53
The reason for the differing interpretations was the decision reached at that July 2
meeting to make the Einwohnewehr a totally private organization. Naturally this
conformed to the wishes of Escherich and Kanzler, who had wanted to be independent of
state control. It also corresponded to the reality created by the Treaty of Versailles,
which placed restrictions on the size of the German military; if the Einwohnerwehr were
placed under the supervision of the army it might violate the military articles of the peace
settlement. Thus the decision that was reached in July, and the underlying reasons for it,
allowed Escherich and Kanzler to continue to extend the Einwohnerwehr organization to
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the north, using the functioning and centralized Upper Bavarian group as the nucleus. As
new territories were brought in they adhered to the leadership circle around Isen and
Rosenheim, instead of the official government in Munich. Thus the ideas of Escherich
and Kanzler became official doctrine and allowed them to set up an independent entity,
even with the military and government providing organizational help. 54
The confusion generated by these divergent views was finally cleared up in a
decree from the Interior Ministry on September 10, 1919. The Einwohnerwehr, in its
internal day to day affairs, would be independent of the civil authorities. “Domestic
officials do not stand in the lead of the Civil Defense Forces, except in advisory and
support role.” 55 Additionally they were to be supported through funds from the state,
provided by the military or through local communities depending on whether it was a
military or police action. These were regular funds for the staff and leadership, and funds
for Einwohnerwehr members when called out to action. Finally, the military
commissioners who had helped to foster the development of the Einwohnerwehr, and
expected to supervise it, were dissolved. In its place a system of service agreements
(Dienstverträge) would govern the relationship of the group to the Bavarian
government. 56
The Organizational Structure of the Einwohnerwehr
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With lines of authority now clearly delineated the leaders of the Einwohnerwehr
could complete their organizational work. The state leadership (Landesleitung) of the
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr made its headquarters at the Ringhotel, Sendlingertorplatz 1 in
Munich. From there the leadership and their staff ran an outfit that had units placed in
every locality throughout the province. Escherich headed the organization as the state
leader (Landeshauptmann), with Rudolf Kanzler as his second in command
(Stellvertreter des Landeshauptmann). The headquarters staff was divided into nine
departments and two offices.

The group’s chief of staff and the secretarial staff

comprised the administrative staff, while the departments consisted of development
(growth of local offices - I), weapons and munitions (II), procurement (III), information
and education (IV), administration (financial – V), maintenance (weaponry and vehicles
– VI), legal (VII), personnel (VIII), and press/propaganda (IX). 57 Of the personnel at
Einwohnerwehr headquarters the most significant, beyond Escherich and Kanzler, was
Hermann Kriebel, a man who had decisive völkisch leanings and later participated in the
infamous Beer Hall Putsch. 58
From the leadership in Munich power flowed to the provincial offices. These
would be set up throughout the remainder of 1919 and into 1920. Starting from the
region of Upper Bavaria, which had been thoroughly organized by Escherich and Kanzler
by September of that year, the group steadily moved northward. Using their connections
with Kahr and the army, the leadership of the Einwohnerwehr was able to prevail upon
local leaders to create units. The area of Bavaria where the leadership had the greatest
difficulty in organizing was in northern Bavaria where there was a fair amount of heavy
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industry, and thus a large working class. As a monthly report put it, “Only in industrial
districts with predominantly left radical populations must action in the first instance be
taken in the building of Civil Defense forces, because the workers, as in the example of
the precinct of Wunsiedel, bluntly refuse to join in the building of forces.” 59
By the time it was finally organized in early 1920, the Einwohnerwehr would
have 10 regional (Kreisleitungen), and 141 sub-regional (Gauleitungen) offices
(including the 29 districts in Munich). Each regional office had a full staff to handle
administrative duties and report directly to central headquarters, while the local offices
contained a leader (Gauleiter), a deputy, and chief of staff. The most significant of the
regional and local leaders of the Einwohnerwehr was Dr. Otto Pittinger, the regional
leader of the upper Palatinate (Oberpfalz), who would later go on to head Bund Bayern
und Reich after the dissolution of the Civil Guards. 60
One of the first issues facing the state leadership of the Einwohnerwehr was
funding. Escherich was very desirous of financial support from the state. Needless to
say this created the potential for conflict with the government authorities, and so it was
initially decided that funding should be as private as possible. This had the added
advantage of allowing the organization to continue if a sudden swing in government
occurred. Gustav von Kahr characterized the thinking behind this most succinctly: “were
a communist government to receive in its hands disposition over the state’s financial
sources for a time they could draw from our resources.” 61 Thus each regional governor
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was to help set up a private office that would help find people to fund the group. The
donors would come from local businesses that would benefit from the Einwohnerwehr’s
protection. The more donors who could be found, the less money would be needed per
contributor. 62
Private donations were a tricky problem for some in the Einwoherwehr because of
the implied obligations it seemed to carry with it. At a December 1919 meeting several
Einwohnerwehr leaders objected to some of the private sources used to fund the group,
particularly the excessive reliance on the banks. They did not want, in their words, to be
thought of as a “capitalist and Jewish guard.” 63 Instead of relying heavily on large
financial institutions the Einwohnerwehr leadership decided to raise extra funds at the
local and regional level. 64 In addition, funds were sought from individual members
themselves. 65 However the need for membership dues evaporated beginning in 1920 as
the Hoffmann government gave three and half million Reichsmarks to the organization.
One million was to go for insurance, while the remainder went for the maintenance of
local offices and regular duties. Funding from the cabinet never obviated the need for
private funding, however, and private sources would continue to be used to fund the
organization. 66
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The financial support, from wherever it came, helped subsidize a growing
organization. Officers, excluding the leadership, and enlisted men were paid regular
wages for each and every time they were called out to duty. The members were paid one
Mark per day of service, with a bonus of five Marks for special duty. 67 Particularly
important was the issue of insurance. Detailed rules allowed for insurance to be paid out
for injuries and death to Civil Guard volunteers and their spouses. Insurance payments
for death in the line of duty ran five hundred Marks, and were paid out the same for both
male and female members of the organization. 68 Weapons and other property of the
Einwohnerwehr were also insured as well. 69
One benefit of state funding, indeed of the whole semi-official status the group
enjoyed, was that it led to an increase in membership. In fact the number of Bavarians
who became associated with the Einwohnerwehr grew exponentially throughout its short
history. By the time of its dissolution in July 1921 the organization had 361,100
members. Of these the vast majority, in fact 1/5 of the total membership, resided in the
region of Upper Bavaria, which never had less than 50,000 members (the first available
statistics were from January 1920). Other regions never came close to having the number
of members of this district. 70 The disparity in numbers across the state reflects the central
role that Upper Bavaria played in the creation and extension of the Einwohnerwehr. Both
Georg Escherich and Rudolf Kanzler were from the region as was Gustav von Kahr, the
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organization’s most fervent supporter in the Bavarian government. This district was also
the best organized territory of any in the province, with an established history of
paramilitary activity going back to before the Räterepublik. Thus it stood to reason that it
would remain the stronghold of the Einwohnerwehr even after it had extended across the
state.
The size of the membership suggests that a strong motivation existed amongst a
wide swath of the Bavarian population, both young and old, to join the organization. Pay
alone was not sufficient to bring men to Escherich in such numbers. However, a strong
sense of patriotism, engendered by the war and enraged by the circumstances and
consequences of defeat, helps to more adequately explain the popularity of the
Einwohnerwehr, indeed all of the paramilitary units of the post-war period. Many
Bavarians experienced the loss of World War I as both a liberating and a deeply
humiliating experience at the same time. Hopeful for a fresh start, and a lenient peace,
most Bavarians and Germans felt betrayed when the terms of the Treaty of Versailles
became known. This helped lead to a belief that they had only lost the war through the
underhanded tactics of the allies and the betrayal of disloyal elements at home. Thus, by
joining groups like the Einwohnerwehr these men could continue the struggle against
both the allies and the republican government, which was the greatest consequence of
their defeat. 71
The Einwohnerwehr placed a great premium on its membership. If it was to be a
respected, non-political upholder of “law and order” it needed adherents of the highest
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caliber. The regulations that governed the organization set the tone. All members had to
be of moral and upright character, literally perfect so that they could project an air of
confidence and respect amongst citizens – a document filled out by the local leadership
was to attest to this. They had to be dedicated to the preservation of the lawful
government, regardless of party affiliation or feelings about the sitting government. 72
Quality was to be valued much more than quantity. “It should only take up men, who are
firmly resolved, to meet in every way its high requirements.” 73
The Bavarian leadership set out further guidelines for the members as they set up
the units. One regulation involved a probationary period of two weeks for individual
members, during which time the leadership evaluated the new recruit’s fitness for
membership. Another series of regulations involved dismissal from the Einwohnerwehr.
Associates could be dismissed for injuries that impaired their ability to do their job.
Additionally they were dismissed for any arrests, or jail time, that reflected poorly upon
the organization, or as the leadership put it the “the honor of the citizenry.” 74 Finally,
members could leave the Einwohnerwehr, or be released, if they were unable to perform
their responsibilities. This governed a wide range of activities, from general
incompetence to failing to adhere to the “non-political” nature of the organization. In all
cases individual members were governed by the local leadership, who dealt with
membership issues relying upon the guidance of the state leadership. 75
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The ideological fixations of a purportedly non-political organization played an
important role where membership was concerned. Officially anyone could join the
Einwohnerwehr regardless of political affiliation or social class. The only proviso was
that they be state supporting (staatserhaltend). 76 Naturally anyone who did not fall under
this stipulation was not allowed to join. The definition of this was made clear in a
January 1920 Interior Ministry memo to the leadership. “Personalities, who are
fundamentally hostile and stand opposed to this government, are to be kept away from
entrance into the Einwohnerwehr or to be removed from it.” 77
What this meant in practice was that members of the Independent Social
Democratic and the Communist parties could not join the Einwohnerwehr. This became
an increasingly contentious issue in the second half of 1919 as members of both groups,
along with the working class more generally, began to apply for membership. The
leadership of the Einwohnerwehr, backed up as it was by the state, refused admittance to
anyone coming from either party. In their view, the Independent Social Democrats and
Communists were organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow of the government.
As long as both entities were dedicated to a Bolshevist uprising membership would
remain unattainable. 78
Up until that time the vast majority of the people associated with the
Einwohnerwehr came from a distinctly middle class background. This development had
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been what paramilitary leaders like Rudolf Kanzler had wanted. They distrusted the
working class, which had participated in the strikes leading up to the November 1918
Revolution and who had played a role, albeit a cursory one, in the Workers, Soldiers, and
Farmers Councils. The hostile feelings were reciprocated by the Bavarian working class.
Many workers remembered the role that paramilitary forces had played in the suppression
of the Räterepublik and they believed the Einwohnerwehr to be an element of the
counterrevolution. As a result few workers joined the Einwohnerwehr.
A particularly good example of the difficult relationship between the
Einwohnerwehr, indeed most paramilitary groups, and the working class can be seen in
Wasserburg in late 1919. During the month of November the working class in the region,
led by members of the Social Democratic Party, argued that members of the working
class be allowed to enter the organization. Once in the association these workers began
to push for the election of a new local leader and a reorganization of the unit. The
Wasserburg leadership attempted to negotiate with a representative of the working class,
but these negotiations proved fruitless as workers who had joined not only refused to
follow the established leadership (they insisted on following their own leaders), but they
also refused to return weapons that had been issued to them. For the Einwohnerwehr’s
leadership this incident allowed them to portray the working class of Wasserburg as
heavily politicized, and thus not acceptable to the group. As the report of the local
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military commander put it, “Accession of the united working classes as a political party,
occupational, or economic class is not possible.” 79
The example of Wasserburg is illustrative of the particular problems faced by the
Bavarian leadership as it related to industrial workers and their political representatives.
Ideologically committed to the creation of a defense force without reference to party
persuasion, religious affiliation, or social class, the organization in practice discouraged
such participation, and expelled those members of the working class that adhered to
socialism like the workers in Wasserburg, whom they saw as under the influence of the
Independent Social Democrats or the Communists. The Social Democratic Party (SPD),
which also represented the workers, viewed this issue with alarm but did precious little to
change the situation beyond moral suasion.

The national party leadership issued a

statement calling on all workers and party members to join the Einwohnerwehr, noting
that, “Weapons in the hands of a reactionary middle class are a danger.” 80 Moreover the
expulsion of socialists by various district offices brought them into conflict with the
Hoffmann government in Munich, who warned the Einwohnerwehr’s leaders about the
potential for “bad blood” between the group and Bavarian workers. 81
Nevertheless, the Einwohnerwehr’s leaders continued to prevent members of the
more radical wings of German socialism from joining the group on the basis that they
were revolutionary and not “state supporting.” This policy became even more strictly
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enforced after the establishment of the more conservative Kahr government in March
1920. Members of both parties, and the workers they represented, renewed their efforts
at joining the organization. 82 Despite their rejection of such left-leaning members, the
leadership accepted associates who had similarly questionable tendencies on the right. In
Fürth this became an issue when the local office accepted into the Einwohnerwehr a man
of known monarchist sentiment, while rejecting the membership application of an
independent socialist. 83 Both local and regional offices justified the move by saying that
the member in question, a man named Neidhardt, “generally respects the majority elected
government. He fights against it at the most with spiritual weapons and aims to
reintroduce the monarchy through the parliament.” 84 The move was reaffirmed by the
leadership in Munich. 85
Some local units of the Einwohnerwehr even tried to exclude Jews from
membership in the organization. These attempts were made in violation of the
association’s own rules, which had made provisions for excluding members on the basis
of revolutionary (Bolshevik) tendencies. The regulations stated that anyone could join
the organization regardless of social class. The German word for this, Stand, has a rather
wide definition. In addition to its common meaning the word also can mean social
standing, profession, and condition. In this context it almost necessarily had to refer not
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just to class, but also to religion as well, even though the rulebook did not specifically
mention the latter. 86
Many Bavarian Jews joined the Einwohnerwehr during the group’s brief
existence. According to statistics compiled by the Central Union of German Citizens of
the Jewish Fath (Zentralverein deutsche Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens) in 1929 over
two hundred Jews had been members of the Einwohnerwehr. These men could be found
all over the state, not just in cities like Nuremberg, but in more rural settings like in the
countryside around Kempten or Rosenheim. Of those that served, many had military
backgrounds, having served in the Bavarian Army during World War I. For instance, all
of the Jewish members from Straubing had been frontline soldiers during the conflict.
Several had leadership positions in the organization; one was even local leader of the
Golzenhofen office. The numbers might have even been higher. Neither Munich nor
none of its neighborhoods were included in the report. In addition, there were several
cities where there had been Jewish members but the respondents were not able to say for
certain how many there were. 87
Outbreaks of open antisemitism in the Einwohnerwehr occurred in two regional
districts, Regensburg and Rosenheim, and both were severe enough to warrant comment
from the Bavarian leadership and the Kahr government. In Regensburg Jewish members
had been taken into the body “without difficulty” by the district leadership, which itself
displayed no obvious antisemitic tendencies. Nevertheless discontent within the
membership led to the resignation of one member and the expulsion of another. The
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situation in Rosenheim was far graver. There antisemitic feelings amongst the
membership, and most likely the leadership, led to the promulgation of a petition asking
that the Jewish members of the local branch be expelled from the organization. 88
Eventually both the state leadership and Bavarian government intervened. The leadership
dealt with the issue at a meeting of state and local leaders in August 1920, stating that,
“an expulsion of a member of the Einwohnerwehr only because he is a Jew, is according
the regulations entirely illegal,” a sentiment that was backed up by the Interior
Ministry. 89
The internal strife within the Einwohnerwehr over membership shows the extent
to which a particular ideological stance had come to define the organization, even by the
end of 1919. The problems with working class members, and with Jewish members in
1920, betrayed the group’s obvious conservative slant. This development was the result
of the founding period of the Einwohnerwehr. The men who had founded the initial
paramilitary units were deeply hostile to the socialist left, the German revolution of 1918,
and even the government that resulted from it. After the suppression of the Räterepublik,
when the Munich cabinet was setting up a paramilitary force, these men were tapped to
play leading roles in the new organization and were aided by political figures, like Gustav
von Kahr, who were as suspicious of the majority Social Democratic government as they
were of the Independent Socialists and the Communists. Kahr and his allies managed to
allow Escherich and his men to escape the confines of state control, with all that implied,
and that would have consequences for Bavaria in the months to come.
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Chapter 5
Enforcers of the Counter-Revolution – the Einwohnerwehr, its Ideology, and Activities in
the Wake of the Kapp Putsch
The Einwohnerwehr’s extension throughout the state of Bavaria in the second half
of 1919 came about due to the efforts of elites who desired to see, at the very minimum, a
return to a more conservative order, if not a restoration of the pre-1918 government.
Their worldview played a large role in limiting the social composition of the group.
Workers, even if they adhered to the Social Democratic Party and not the more radical
Independent Social Democratic Party, found themselves harassed, ignored, and stymied
at every turn. In many instances they found themselves marginalized, or even kicked out
of local units. The ideological imprint placed on the units by local leaders and state
leaders even extended to Jews, despite regulations allowing for Bavarians of other faiths
to join.
The narrow definition in regards to membership reflected the program of the
Einwohnerwehr, which built upon the regulations of the national organization and added
a specifically Bavarian flavor to these. The world view espoused by Escherich’s units
was a mixture of utopian nationalism, strident anti-socialism (or anti-communism), a
belief in federalism, and with it a nostalgia for old Bavaria. Added to this was an
apocalyptic sense of urgency that only radicalized the men of the Einwohnerwehr and
insured that when they did act it was in the most strident fashion possible. In the process
they helped overturn Bavaria’s first democratically elected government, ushering in a

97
regime that reflected their views more generally and which allowed them even greater
leeway in the state.
The Ideology of the Einwohnerwehr
The Einwohnerwehr believed, first and foremost, that they were the protectors of
“law and order.” The concept itself was rather amorphous, but served as a rallying cry
for those who felt that political change ushered in more destructive tendencies. In the
national regulations that had been published in June 1919, it stated that the main purpose
of the organization was to serve as a self-defense force against “plunderers and robbers”
and those who had a “lust for murder.” 1 These they associated with the Spartacists and
“Bolsheviks” who were responsible for the disturbances of January-May 1919. The use
of such phrasing was very clever. By using terms commonly associated with dangerous
criminals, it allowed those who read it to see the Independent Socialists, though not the
Social Democrats, and workers as people willing to use horrific tactics to achieve their
goals. Thus, any real political argument that such groups had was illegitimate in the eyes
of many because of the tactics they were reputed to use. 2
The belief that Bavaria and the Reich faced an existential crisis stemming from
the revolutionary changes of 1918/19 remained a constant theme of the Einwohnerwehr
throughout its existence, and helped to underscore the need to preserve ‘law and order.’
In their view Germany was on the very brink of collapse. Georg Escherich made
reference to this fear in an All-Saints Day letter to all Einwohnerwehr units.
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“Unspeakable misery, destruction, and death threaten hundreds of thousands of racial
comrades, if the putting together of all state supporting forces in the homeland to care for
law and order does not succeed.” 3 Fear of Bolshevik upheaval, while the primary danger,
was not the only one faced by the community. Einwohnerwehr leaders also pointed to
the evils of the black market and the loss of honor and morality which they believed were
just as dangerous to the life of the state. In Escherich’s view these were also within the
purview of the group, as the recovery of morals and tradition would help in rebuilding the
community. 4
Recruitment materials sent out by the state leadership stoked fears of upheaval,
often in the most apocalyptic language possible. Appeals to honor both for the
community and the safety of an individual’s family were constantly evoked to encourage
men to join and gain public approval. Much of this was designed to refute arguments that
had been made against joining the group. Some of these assertions, like the ability to
defend one’s family with or without weapons, were swept aside by pointing out the
inability of the individual to defend against “masses of organized and fanatically incited
subversives.” 5 Other objections, like leaving law and order to the police and regular
army, were refuted using the argument that the Einwohnerwehr had the advantage of
being everywhere at the local level. 6 They firmly believed membership in the
Einwohnerwehr was the best way to prevent “outside agitators” from achieving their goal
in Germany, which they convinced themselves was civil war. 7
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Fear was also useful for shaking the local population out of its apathy in regards
to the dangers of revolutionary forces in the state. Local officials often engaged in
campaigns designed to engender enthusiasm in favor of the Einwohnerwehr through fear
of the consequences of inaction. For example, the local defense commissioner in
Deggendorf noted that the people in his region needed to be shaken out of their
complacency that the army would always be there to protect their property. 8 Such fear
was useful to Escherich and his men. It prevented people from falling under the sway of
propaganda from the left, which often attacked the Hofmann government and the
Einwohnerwehr for the reaction against the revolution. 9 It also served to rally the
population through difficult periods like the winter of 1919, where harsh conditions
followed a poor harvest. Without the Einwohnerwehr it was believed that many of these
people would turn towards Bolshevism. 10
In the ideology of the Einwohnerwehr and its leaders communism, and socialism
more generally, was behind the disruption of “law and order.” Many of the individuals
who were involved in the organization, such as Rudolf Kanzler, made their feelings
perfectly clear about the revolutionary changes that had swept through the state. 11 As a
result the struggle against communism became a core tenet of their beliefs. Escherich
himself made this abundantly clear when he remarked that, “The Einwohnerwehr is the
local wall against Bolshevism, and then the Einwoherwehr, just as the Organisation
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Escherich, is the only and lone expression of local power in the struggle against the
Bolshevist revolution.” 12
One danger to such rhetoric naturally was the possibility that, in the mind of the
average member, the distinction between Social Democrat, Independent Socialist, and
Communist might be lost. The organization did try to make sure that conflation of these
groups did not happen very often. In many of its memos and letters the leadership made
clear to distinguish between the “Bolshevik and Spartacist” Independent
Socialists/Communists, and the ‘state supporting’ Social Democrats, which they often
referred to as the Majority Socialists. Members from the latter were perfectly welcome in
the Einwohnerwehr, and the leadership made sure to point this out at every turn. 13 As
Kanzler stated in a July 1919 speech when it came to support, “The Einwohnerwehr has
behind it all respectable German men, from majority Socialists to the most conservative
German Nationalists.” 14
Despite such assurances that Majority Socialists were welcome in the
organization, or that their ideas were seen as respectable, problems existed between the
Einwohnerwehr and any group on the socialist left. One issue, mentioned previously, had
to do with membership by workers in the group. Often the Einwohnerwehr leadership
found the majority Social Democrats, and the workers they represented, to be just as
difficult as the Independent Socialist and Communists who tried to join the association.
In one memo the state leadership claimed that majority Social Democratic workers were
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just as enamored of radical ideas as others. 15 This led to a campaign on behalf of the
Social Democratic governments in both Berlin and Munich to open up the membership to
members of the party beginning in November 1919. 16 The state leadership saw such
efforts as an unwelcome development. They increasingly excoriated the policy of the
government in northern Germany, which was run by Social Democrats, seeing in their
actions agreement with both the Bolsheviks and the Entente Powers. 17
Due to the prominence that the struggle against communism and socialism held
for the Einwohnerwehr, the organization fought its spread tooth and nail. Armed defense
was one aspect of resistance, one that remained at the core of the organization’s mission.
Another way to defeat Bolshevism, however, was by inculcating national feeling amongst
Bavarians. The Einwohnerwehr saw themselves as the vanguard for patriotic thinking in
Bavaria and Germany. The revival of love of the fatherland would instill in the average
citizen respect for constituted authority and traditional “German customs, manners, and
uprightness,” 18 that would inoculate the citizen against foreign ideas and tendencies.
More important, from a military perspective, it would keep alive respect for the martial
values of the old Bavarian army. Escherich’s men firmly believed that their group was a
“life community” of the nation, one that exemplified that values and customs of the
military and the nation. 19
The traditional values that the Einwohnerwehr hoped to restore rested in no small
part on a highly stylized reading of the recent German past. For the organization’s
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leaders and members the events of August 1914 were crucial to their worldview. For
them the August days of the Burgfrieden was the moment of greatest national unity when
all Germans came together in support of the Fatherland in a time of war. That feeling of
togetherness, and the need to return to it, was something that obsessed many in the
leadership. “To have revived again in the widest circles this belief in us is a moral action
of the Einwohnerwehren. It was a spirit like that in August 1914, which let the
defensemen join together during the May days.” 20 According to this view of the national
community, everyone understood the needs of the other. Workers did not think their
bosses to be heartless captains of industry, while the educated strata of society
appreciated the contribution of the industrial worker. 21 That this spirit of unity was
always more fiction than fact did not occur to, or bother, the members of the
Einwohnerwehr.
Of course those intense feelings of nationalistic unity in August 1914 helped to
serve a political purpose during the war, namely the preservation of the Imperial system,
and this was something that the leading figures of the Einwohnerwehr desperately wanted
to return to. They saw in the pre-November 1918 government the accumulation of
several centuries of social and political development in Bavaria and the Reich. The
socialist governments that had ruled Bavaria since that time were considered to be
interlopers determined not only to rob the state of the means of self preservation, but to
impose foreign ideas upon it. 22 Rudolf Kanzler summed this position up nicely when he
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wrote, “The revolution and its initiators had the attempt to build up a new state without
respect for the life necessities, natural connections and traditions of the people.” 23
They could not say this outwardly of course, because to do so would put them in
opposition to legally constructed authority, which ran against the organization’s stated
purpose. Instead the leadership always claimed to be acting in a way that preserved the
Weimar and Bavarian constitutions, allowing them to pose as the defenders of the new
democracy against more radical forces. This subterfuge worked very well for the group.
It became the basis for preventing members of the Indepdendent Social Democratic and
Communist Parties from joining the Einwohnerwehr, or throwing them out. 24 It also
served as a basis for attacking both the Hoffmann and Reich governments. Rudolf
Kanzler in Bavaria’s Struggle against Bolshevism argued that much of the discontent
amongst Einwohnerwehr members and soldiers of the Bavarian Reichswehr in early 1920
was due to the Hoffmann government neglecting their duties as stipulated by the
constitution. 25 It was a charge that continued to be made against the national government
in Berlin right up to the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr, and allowed the leadership to
portray that conflict as yet another example of Berlin’s dictatorial stance vis-à-vis
Bavaria. 26
Propaganda was actively used by the Einwohnerwehr to help revive this spirit of
national unity, to gain support for the group’s policies, and to recruit new members to the
cause. Often these materials painted a bleak picture of the Räterepublik and emphasized
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the radical nature of those who sought to bring more thorough change to society. There
were several ways this was done. The first involved the collection of the histories of
local units in the Einwohnerwehr. These reports, which circulated up through the chain
of command, told of how various paramilitary formations came into existence. Each
local’s story stressed the same themes: the institution of the council government in the
territory, the resistance to such a government (whether sparked from outside, or not), and
finally the suppression of the councils and the creation of the local unit.
One example of these local histories was that of the Garmisch-Partenkirchen
Einwohnerwehr. In two reports, one for Garmisch and one for Partenkirchen, the unit’s
commander claimed that it was only after the Hoffmann government had made its
proclamation against the council republic on April 10, 1919 that planning for the creation
of a citizens brigade, which had been called for in December 1918, began in earnest. 27 In
this the community was joined by other towns such as Mittenwald, Oberau, and
Eschenlohe in planning to create a military force. This planning continued, even after the
Mürbock Putsch of April 24, 1919 brought a council government into effect in
Garmisch. 28 The local units of the various communities struck on April 27, 1919 against
the local councils, deposing them quickly. In the days that followed, units from this
region would be sent to Munich where they helped in the suppression of the Räterepublik
there. 29
The histories sent in by local units were also supplemented by additional material
providing evidence of the Räterepublik’s actions against traditional authority. The report
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for Garmisch-Partenkirchen, originally handwritten but retyped in 1937 for the group’s
archive, highlighted the proclamations and policies of the local councils in the two
communities. The guidelines stated that those who went against the councils would be
brought before the revolutionary tribunal, and possibly put to death, that all local farms
and businesses were to provide their products to the central committee, and that the
region was under a state of general strike. 30 Naturally such policies created resistance
amongst groups that would traditionally support such authority, like farmers, teachers,
and civil servants, all of whom in their own councils proclaimed themselves in support of
the Hoffmann government and the Einwohnerwehr. 31
In their propaganda the leadership of the Einwohnerwehr always stressed the wide
support their organization had amongst the population. For example they pointed out that
much of their membership, from the earliest days in April 1919, derived from Bavarian
youth with an “activist spirit.” 32 The group’s newspaper, Heimatland, noted in its
September 30, 1920 issue that interest in the first statewide shooting festival had been so
great that the Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten was printing a special edition dedicated
to it. 33 Where support for the association was not strong, this would be attributed to the
radical forces of the left, and their supporters, who plotted general strikes against the
state, and who used the socialist press to attack the organization. 34
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Perhaps the most effective way to get its message of the state in danger across to
average Bavarians was through its own media apparatus. In January 1920 the Bavarian
Einwohnerwehr began publishing its own newspaper. Called Heimatland, its purpose
was to publish the pronouncements of the leadership, defend and strengthen the local
members, inform the public of Einwohnerwehr activities like the shooting festivals, and
create interest in joining the group. Members were strongly encouraged to have
subscriptions to the paper, which cost five Reichsmarks for one year, and the regional
leadership was expected to circulate it to like-minded associations and to the “order
supporting parties.” 35
The primary purpose of Heimatland was to spread the patriotic ideology of the
Einwohnerwehr. In this it would be most successful. Rudolf Kanzler, in his observations
about the organization, wrote of the paper, “In it(s pages) to do actual politics, which
could somehow take effect on the surface it was hardly noticed.” 36 To accomplish this
objective the paper put a great stress upon articles that had a sentimental view of
Bavarian history and culture. 37 Poetry was a regular feature in the paper, and stressed the
importance of the member and soldier. 38 Heimatland also ran opinion pieces
commenting on current events, political tendencies, and how the activities of the
Einwohnerwehr helped to bring about a patriotic (vaterländisch) world view. As one
commenter put it, speaking about the group’s ideology, “and whenever unity again arises
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in these people, and when we are all united by Einwohnerwehr supported ideals, then no
enemy in the world will be able to postpone us on the way to reascendance.” 39
Another function served by the newspaper was to attack the political enemies of
the organization. These were identified as “the members of the red and other November
parties. Even those people who for decades did everything in order to destroy the
national and cultural basis of the German people and prepare for the November
catastrophe.” 40 The paper made a specific point of attacking the socialist press,
particularly the Munich Post, regularly in its articles and editorials. It accused the
newspaper of inciting hatred against the Einwohnerwehr and carrying on a media
campaign designed to lead to the dissolution of the group. Heimatland also attacked
members of middle class parties, who were prepared to accede to allied demands for
disarmament, as well as the allied powers who were determined to put an end to the
Einwohnerwehr. 41 Increasingly from late 1920 on the paper commented frequently on
foreign affairs, particularly the aforementioned dissolution of the guards, as well as the
question of Silesia. This was given particular play in the paper and was mentioned even
where the subject had no relevance, like in articles about the statewide shooting
festival. 42
In its ideology the Einwohnerwehr combined a romanticized nationalism with
hatred of socialism, and the revolution and its works, infusing it with apocalyptic
language designed to inflame its members. The effect of their program had a profound
influence on issues of membership, particularly in the group’s attitudes towards workers
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and Jews at the local level. This made the Einwohnerwehr a functionally völkisch group.
Their antipathy towards the republic, disguised by necessity, became more overt when
dealing with any political entity to the left of the SPD, and those who tried to join the
guards from that camp. Increasingly it would lead them into conflict with the state’s new
republican leaders.
The Einwohnerwehr and the Kapp Putsch
Due to the Einwohnerwehr’s ideological program Escherich and his men always
had a difficult relationship to the Social Democratic governments that ran Bavaria and
Germany. These had come to power through revolution and, as such, were viewed with
suspicion by the organization’s members, many of whom saw in it the beginnings of
degradation and decline. In this they were encouraged by leaders, both within the group
and amongst their allies in the political establishment, who saw the emerging democratic
republic as a usurpation of the correct political order and who had always viewed German
socialists as traitors. It was only a matter of time before this antagonism would come to a
head. When it did in the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 the Einwohnerwehr moved with
purpose to help put in place a government more in line with their ideological world view.
The period between November 1918 and March 1920 was marked by increasing
antagonism between the Hofmann government in Munich and the Einwoherwehr
leadership. Much of the dispute had to do with the issue of membership within the
association. The willingness of the Einwohnerwehr leadership to prevent workers from
entering the organization, or throw out those who did not accept the group’s ideology,
concerned the Hofmann cabinet and forced them and the national party into action. At

109
the end November 1919 both the Social Democratic Party and the Independent Social
Democrats began to urge their members to enter the Einwohnerwehr en masse. 43 This
was part of a campaign called “Against the Reaction” that was designed to make the
organization more democratic. 44
The attempt to change the composition of the Einwohnerwehr ran into resistance
however. Escherich claimed that allowing party members or ‘party-political’ workers to
enter units would undercut its mission and open up the Einwohnerwehr to political
disputes, instead of the organization being an un-political haven for all ‘order-loving
men.’ 45 Moreover, he argued that it was illegal owing to the group’s regulations, rules
agreed to by the Bavarian cabinet. 46 This would result in chaos for which, in Escherich’s
view, the responsibility would fall entirely to the Social Democratic leadership. 47
Furthermore Kanzler wrote that the efforts of the majority Socialists in this area only
convinced Einwohnerwehr members that they too were swayed by “radical ideas.” 48
Their actions against the organization in these months, which included organizing a
boycott of businesses that dealt with the Einwohnerwehr, only served to further embitter
the group’s membership. 49
Discontent was not just confined to carping about government interference about
the membership. The organization increasingly found itself under attack over its
militaristic bearing, and the potential uses these could be put to. For instance the
43
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Deggendorf newspaper, Bayerisches Volksblatt, noted that the reserve nature of the
Einwohnerwehr allowed it to train a new generation of soldiers much the same way
Prussia had done during the Napoleonic Wars, and would allow the country to be ready
for a new war in a generation. 50 According to the München-Augsburger Abendzeitung
the Independent Socialist press argued that Escherich’s units were nothing more than the
tools of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who were planning on using the group to evade the
strictures of the Treaty of Versailles. 51 The socialist paper Der Kampf called the
Einwohnerwehr just the latest manifestation of a militarism that the country needed to
emancipate itself from. 52
The fears that the Einwohnerwehr and other paramilitaries would lead to
complications with the allied powers was well founded. When the organization was first
set up provisions had been made to use the Einwohnerwehr as a dual purpose
organization. This brought in many recruits to Escherich’s units, along with other
paramilitaries. As James Diehl has noted, many of these volunteers hoped to have a
career in the German military. 53 This was recognized by the military establishment in
Bavaria, as well as Escherich and Kanzler. One of the enticements given to younger
members who joined the organization was to allow them to form special units that had a
specific military bearing. These formations would carry out their assignments often in
conjunction with the regular army, usually outside the community or region where they
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were based. Older members, meanwhile, had to serve in their home region exclusively. 54
In this way the Einwohnerwehr served as a functional reserve for the army, one that could
help the nascent Reichswehr in a pinch.
As it turned out this military function had a short life. The Treaty of Versailles
specifically prohibited Germany from having an army larger than 100,000 men. Not only
did this close off a potential avenue for advancement for the average guard member, but
precluded cooperation between the group and the army, for fear of the Einwohnerwehr
being seen as a military force. The group’s planned dual use was scrapped on July 30,
1919 even as the final makeup of the organization was set. 55 Police powers were not
mentioned in the treaty and Escherich’s association continued to justify its existence in
this way. However, for many of the men in the Einwohnerwehr the loss of the military
function was simply too much to bear. 56
The desire of the allied powers to strictly hold Germany to the one hundred
thousand men limit became a major aspect of European diplomacy in these early postwar years. Once the German government had signed the treaty they were given a
timetable by which they needed to demobilize their forces, which at the time still
numbered over three hundred thousand men. The process took time and was hampered
by the fact that the army leadership moved slowly in breaking up the paramilitary forces
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and weeding out undesirable elements from the new army. 57 As the leadership began the
process of demobilization they were thwarted by army commanders, like General von
Lüttwitz, who preferred to maintain the present military force, and who supported the
Freikorps. His position was not shared by many of his fellow generals, who disliked the
undisciplined nature of these units, their egalitarianism, and their political radicalism. 58
This manifested itself in an abortive coup against the government in August 1919 by
elements of the Iron Guard division, who demanded from the Reich government positions
in the army. 59
For the allied powers the process simply took too long. In September 1919 they
created the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission to oversee and expedite the work of
disarmament. This body negotiated directly with the German government, and its
members could travel anywhere in the country. Relations between the officers of the
army and the commission were consistently difficult. German officers were seen as
obstructionist and evasive. The head of the commission complained that many were
attacked wherever they went. 60 Moreover, the commission simply tired of the complaints
and excuses of Reichswehr leaders, many of whom insisted that paramilitary units like
the Einwohnerwehr were absolutely vital to the defense of the country. 61 In January
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1920 they began to force the German government to break up paramilitary units,
including the Einwohnerwehr. 62
The Bavarian government advised Escherich and his men to give the control
commission officers no information. 63 Despite this the leadership had already committed
itself to some type of action against the socialist governments in Munich and Berlin.
Rudolf Kanzler wrote in his memoirs that the government’s signature of the Treaty of
Versailles was tantamount to not protecting the German people or the constitution and
justified removing the government. 64 Beginning in late 1919 the Bavarian and national
leaderships began to coordinate with military leaders and other paramilitaries to
overthrow the republic. Kanzler was overheard discussing plans to mass gasoline and
other materials in the event of a putsch, and how the action could be blamed on
republican leaders. 65 Escherich’s second in command also wrote in a February 23, 1920
memo that it was necessary for “a swing” in the country’s domestic politics. 66 He
promised that action in the north would be paralleled by action in Bavaria, provided that
they worked together. 67
The plotting in Bavaria was paralleled by that in Berlin. There conspirators
coalesced around Dr. Wolfgang Kapp, Colonel Waldemar Pabst, and General Erich
Ludendorff. These men formed the National Union to bring all paramilitary groups and
nationalist organizations together in one association dedicated to confronting the
62

Staatsministerium des Innern an die Landesleitung der Einwohnerwehren, 28. January 1920, BHSA, IV,
EWB, B. 3.
63
Ibid.
64
Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf, 52-53.
65
Staatsminister des Innern an die Landesleitung der Einwohnerwehren, 10. December 1919, BHSA, IV,
EWB, B. 3.
66
Weisung nach Norden, 23. Februar 1920, BHSA, V, NL Stempfle, B. 3.
67
Ibid.

114
country’s democratic leaders. Kapp was the head of the organization and was aided by
Pabst, whose task was to bring the paramilitaries together and coordinate the coup. In
addition to the Einwohnerwehr Pabst recruited the Erhardt and Löwenfeld Naval
Brigades, the voluntary associations (Zeitfreiwillige Verbände), the Guard-Cavalry
Battallion, and the disbanded Freikorps from the Baltic. 68 These would strike at the
government in Berlin, despite the differences that existed between some of the
putschists. 69
The uprising began on March 12, 1920 in Berlin. Freikorps units in the north,
principally the Erhardt and Löwenfeld Naval Brigades, supplemented by a few army
units and the Berlin Einwohnerwehr seized control of the capital. Confusion marked the
affair. While the putschists had hoped to have the support of the army, most units
remained loyal to the government, though they refused to fire on the paramilitaries
involved in the coup. The national government of President Ebert fled Berlin and headed
to Stuttgart, where they coordinated resistance to the Putsch. This resistance manifested
itself in a wave of general strikes that was organized by both socialist parties. Their
actions had the effect of bringing the country to a standstill. This, along with the
reticence of the military leadership to fully support the Putsch, helped end the coup. 70
Upon hearing of the uprising in Berlin, the government in Munich reacted by
closing the border between Bavaria and the rest of the Reich. It was feared that
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paramilitary units, working in conjunction with their counterparts in other parts of
Germany, would move against the Hoffmann government. To prevent this they issued a
proclamation to all government offices and military units instructing them to ignore all
orders coming from Berlin, a proclamation that was co-signed by General Arnold von
Möhl, the Bavarian army chief who had been made responsible for the safety of
Munich. 71 Möhl promptly called out the Einwohnerwehr on March 13 to help defend the
state. 72
As the Kapp Putsch developed it became clear that there were differences of
opinion about where the real danger lay. The Hoffmann government feared that the
army, the Einwohnerwehr, and the other paramilitaries would side with the Kappists.
Others did not share their trepidation. Gustav von Kahr, for instance, believed that the
real threat to the state was the extension of general strikes into Bavaria. “Unfortunately,”
according to Kahr, “this was not recognized by officialdom in due time.” 73 Their lack of
concern about this, coupled with the fact that the army’s hands were tied in the matter (he
claimed that General von Möhl could do nothing because President Friedrich Ebert was
ruling by decree at the time), created a tremendous feeling of unease within both the
Bavarian Reichswehr and the Einwohnerwehr. He would later claim that this fact led
inexorably to the events that followed. 74
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The call up of the Einwohnerwehr caught the organization off guard. Only Chief
of Staff Hermann Kriebel was in the capital at the time, and he promptly recalled
Escherich and Kanzler. Kriebel reported to his superiors upon their return that great
antipathy to the Hoffmann government existed amongst wide circles within the
Einwohnerwehr. He also argued that not all army units could be counted upon to be loyal
to the state, despite Möhl’s guarantee. He reported that a group of EW members,
soldiers, and other auxiliaries had met elsewhere in the capital and pledged their support
to Kapp and his co-conspirators. The Einwohnerwehr leadership, after meeting with
General von Möhl and Kahr, came to the conclusion that the only way to protect “law
and order” was if the Bavarian general was given dictatorial powers over the government
for the length of the emergency. 75
Escherich, Kahr, and the rest of the Einwohnerwehr leadership argued that this
measure was necessary to preserve the chain of command and to prevent the Bavarian
army from coming under the authority of the Kappists, who were issuing orders to army
units in the state. As luck would have it, while the circle around Kahr formulated its
justification for takeover of the government, the Independent Socialist Party was holding
an emergency meeting to organize a general strike and mass demonstration in Munich.
According to Kanzler, this was further justification for placing governmental power in
the hands of the army. “Therefore the left began the struggle without being riled up
through some government or military measure.” 76 With justification now in hand,
Escherich, Kahr, Chief of Police Ernst Pöhner, and General von Möhl convinced
Minister-President Hoffmann, in a meeting held around 4 a.m., to place emergency
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powers in the hands of the Reichswehr. This move would be confirmed by the entire
cabinet in an emergency meeting early the next morning with the resignation of the entire
Hoffmann government. 77
The fall of the Hoffmann government was the only significant change to come
from the Kapp Putsch. Two days later, middle class parties in the Diet elected Gustav
von Kahr as minister-president, ushering in a more conservative government, one favored
by the Einwohnerwehr and its allies. 78 News of the resignation and the installation of the
new government did not lead to tranquility, but only provoked the workers and the parties
that represented them. The day after the Social Democratic cabinet resigned the
Independent Socialists called for a general strike in Munich. 79 This set the stage for
several days of conflict between Escherich’s men and the Bavarian working class.
Immediately after the removal of the Hofmann government an alarm went out to
all Einwohnerwehr units in the state to crush any and all dissent. In southern Bavaria this
was swiftly accomplished. In Munich units responded quickly to the call – two hours
after the alarm went out nearly ninety percent of the Einwohnerwehr’s members had
assembled in the city center. From there they moved quickly to secure the city,
disrupting and disbursing the general strike in the capital by the afternoon of March 17.
The speed and ruthlessness of the Einwohnerwehr established a sullen atmosphere in the
capital. The leader of the local Munich unit noted that those workers, and their
supporters, “voiced their displeasure in a dogged, quietly observant restraint, partly in a
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barely concealed hostility.” 80 Similar uprisings were put down throughout the region to
the south of Munich while other areas, like Rosenheim, had no disturbances to speak of. 81
However northern Bavaria became the epicenter of unrest. The general strikes
that took place here were not so easily broken up as in southern Bavaria, a result of the
region having more industry and a larger working class. They were also much more
violent. In Nuremberg 1,200 workers managed to arm themselves and attempted to seize
the main train station. Clashes with police and local units of the Einwohnerwehr left
twenty-three dead with fifty seriously wounded. There would be similar violence in
Erlangen and Fürth, where workers attempted to seize the local Rathaus. In both cases
altercations ensued with local authorities – both sides were armed – which led to
casualties. 82
It would be the strike in Hof, though, that went beyond the ability of local
authorities to handle. Workers there responded to the call to a general strike by arming
themselves and seizing all the major buildings in the town, some of them violently. They
closed all businesses except for grocery stores, erected barricades against the Reichswehr,
and set up an executive committee to run the town. 83 Led by a man named Blumtritt, an
Independent Socialist member of the Bavarian Diet, the workers in Hof disarmed the
local Einwohnerwehr unit, “mobbing” the members who tried to resist according to
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reports. 84 By March 21 unrest and uncertainty continued to reign in the city, even though
an end to the strike had been successfully negotiated in Nuremberg and elsewhere. 85
For the new Kahr government and the Einwohnerwehr leadership this represented
a clear threat to established authority as they saw it. On March 19 the Bavarian Ministry
of the Interior called out the Einwohnerwehr to help in quelling the disturbances in
northeastern Bavaria. Since local guard units had been immobilized and disarmed by the
striking workers it was decided that units from the Chiemgau would be sent north. The
decision in many ways reflected the balance of power within the Einwohnerwehr at the
time. Northern Bavaria had been difficult to organize, tended to have fewer members,
and were more likely to have large numbers of workers in them. 86 Units from southern
Bavaria, particularly the Chiemgau, were much larger, reflecting the region’s importance
as the epicenter of the paramilitary movement in the state. 87 Rudolf Kanzler personally
took command of the Einwoherwehr units as these came from his home region. 88
The force they assembled for the operation itself ended up being an exercise in
excess. The Einwohnerwehr would fight in conjunction with the local Reichswehr unit
from Bayreuth, which had left the region and made its way to Rosenheim. The unit
chosen to go north to Hof was the 1. Landfahne Chiemgau. It was comprised of seven
hundred men, sixty horses, and eighteen vehicles. They were armed with machine guns,
rifles, and pistols, and backed up by their own artillery regiment. In every way it was a
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fully realized military unit, complete with a staff to run its operations. The only thing
missing were uniforms, though these were given to the men once they reached Bayreuth.
The trip to the north was also excessive for the reactions they received from officials and
the populace, reactions that were marked by jubilation, according to Kanzler. During
their first stop in Munich they were feted by Escherich, members of the Kahr
government, and a military choir, and when they arrived in Bayreuth were again greeted
by local officials and a full military band. At Münchberg the men were greeted
enthusiastically by a populace who had suffered under the hand of the “Räterepublik.” 89
The attack on Hof itself, as the most significant action during the
Einwohnerwehr’s existence, proved to be somewhat anti-climactic. They arrived at Hof
on the evening of March 21 and completely surrounded the city by the early hours of
March 22. Their approach, though taken with security measures, was an open secret. To
forestall an attack on the city, the workers sent representatives to negotiate with the head
of the Reichswehr detachment, First Lieutenant Hausl, a move that proved to be
unsuccessful. The failure of these talks was the signal to prepare for an assault on the
town. The 1. Landfahne took up positions to the south of Hof, their artillery covering the
train station while the rest of the company moved into the city. They encountered very
little resistance from the workers or their leaders – the only resistance being offered to the
east of town where the Reichswehr placed its forces. Once in possession of the city, both
the army and the Einwohnerwehr fanned out with prepared arrest lists to seize prominent
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members of the working class, their leaders such as Blumtritt, and confiscate their
property. 90
The Einwohnerwehr sought to portray their actions in Hof in the best possible
light. In order to prove they were not there just to suppress the workers the 1. Landfahne
brought with them bakers and butchers to serve meals to the workers of Hof. Kanzler
tried to draw a contrast between the state of these workers and their leaders. When
Einwohnerwehr members went to arrest Blumtritt at his home they claimed to find the
parliamentarian’s pantry well stocked with sugar, coffee, and pork amongst other items,
and trumpeted this as proof of the double standard of the socialists. In addition several
large caches of weapons were found at the headquarters of the Independent Socialists in
the city and the printing press of the local socialist paper, providing evidence that the
workers of Hof were plotting a violent overthrow of the established order. The speed and
quickness of the operation against Hof, along with the steadfastness of the organization
during the Kapp Putsch, was trumpeted as clear proof that the Einwohnerwehr was
necessary in helping to preserve the state. 91
Preserving “Law and Order”: the Expanding Scope of the Einwoherwehr’s Activities in
the Aftermath of the Kapp Putsch
The Einwohnerwehr’s role in the Kapp Putsch in Bavaria helped bring to power
the government of Gustav von Kahr. Devoted to many of the ideas that animated
Escherich’s organization, the new Minister-President set about turning Bavaria into a
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bulwark of ‘law and order.’ 92 The Einwohnerwehr became a critical component of that
program and, in the process, enhanced many of the activities that already carried out for
the state. 93
The primary function of the Einwohnerwehr of course was to preserve law and
order in Bavaria and to support the government against those who sought to overthrow it.
In the regulations for all state and local branches it declared on the first page, “Every
local community, that wants law and order and places itself behind the government,
should band together for self defense, for defense of women and children, of homeland
and future, and to the joint struggle against plunderers, Spartacists, and Bolshevists.” 94
Such a declaration gave the group a distinctly domestic task. It was to serve as both a
national guard and as an auxiliary police force.
The removal of the group’s military function as set out in the Treaty of Versailles
allowed the Einwohnerwehr to evolve into the role that it would become most known for
– as enforcers of the conservative order in the state. This task had always been the one
favored by many in the Bavarian leadership. 95 Starting in 1920 Escherich and his top
leaders began a process of expanding upon the responsibilities given to the
Einwohnerwehr in the national regulations. In most instances they went beyond their
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original intent and gave the Bavarian organization a prominence that made it an
important element in the state. 96
The basic duties of the Einwohnerwehr consisted primarily of guard and patrol
duties in cities and towns during times of emergency. These included guarding streets
and public places, protecting official buildings like train stations and government offices,
searching homes and vehicles, observing the citizenry, and, as a last resort, serving with
the military as an auxiliary unit to assist the army in house to house combat. 97
Furthermore detailed instructions were given for how the Einwohnerwehr were to
respond to call ups, tiered by the size and danger of the disturbance, in the use of
weapons, which was only allowed if individual units were under attack or if the military
and police were focused elsewhere, and how to interact with the local population. 98
The Bavarian Einwohnerwehr went beyond these in almost every way. For
instance, the regulations stated that the Civil Guards could be called out only by local and
state authorities. 99 This was retained in the agreements between the government in
Bavaria and the organization, but with the proviso that all orders calling up various units,
or the entire group, be issued by the relevant commander. Furthermore, in cases of
extreme emergency, the unit commanders could call out the guard on their own authority,
without waiting for local officials. 100 Perhaps most peculiar of all, individual members
could undertake action on their own if their person or property were in imminent danger
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in a disturbance, though they could only do so if the extremity of the situation warranted
it. 101
The organization’s zeal also showed itself in the arrest powers they claimed for
themselves. While federal guidelines had allowed them to arrest disturbers of the peace,
the power was quite limited. People could only be arrested by members if a court or civil
servant so ordered it, or if the person was caught in the act of rebellion and attempting to
flee. 102 The government in Munich, however, allowed the individual guards more
discretion in their power to arrest people, though this was always described as provisional
arrest. People suspected of plotting domestic disturbances, or who had had a suspicious
and inscrutable personality, often based on family history, could be taken into custody on
the organization’s authority. This was in addition to being caught in the act of disturbing
the peace while the Einwohnerwehr was on duty, or simply being in flight from the
scene. 103
Additional arrest powers were not the only enhancements given to the
Einwohnerwehr. The use of weaponry also was greatly expanded. In Bavaria members
could use their weapons if it became necessary to achieve the group’s objectives, if their
superiors ordered them to do so, or if they were threatened with violence in the line of
duty, and even outside of the line of duty in self defense, or Notwehr. In this situation the
individual member could use his weapon as necessary to defend himself and others.
“Emergency defense is defense which is necessary to stave off an illegal attack on the
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body, life, honor, and property of one’s self or another.” 104 In other German states the
use of weapons was strictly monitored by the military or civil authorities, who had
responsibility for their use. The use of weapons on an individual or organizational level,
even for self defense, was not permitted elsewhere in the Reich. 105
The Bavarian organization’s obsession with guns and their use became a defining
characteristic of Escherich’s group, even more so than in the national Einwohnerwehr.
The greatest expression of this mania was the shooting festivals that which were held
throughout Bavaria in 1920. Held on the district, regional, and state level, (Gau-, Kreis-,
or Landeschießen), these events allowed the members to show off their skill with a
weapon in competitions designed to determine who was the best marksmen. 106 Cash
rewards were given for the top shooters, and the celebrations were marked by a carnivallike atmosphere. 107 There were parades, speeches, and music; the local festival in
Rosenheim, for example, held a formal dinner followed by a dance. 108 Local politicians
and dignitaries were often invited and spoke approvingly of the organization and their
place in Bavarian society, which only added to the Einwohnerwehr’s sense of mission. 109
The largest of these shooting festivals was held from September 25-30, 1920 in
Munich. 110 During these five days guardsmen from all over Bavaria gathered in the
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capital to compete against each other, but in reality to show off the organization’s
strength as a political player in the state. The festival kicked off with a preliminary
shooting competition north of the city in Freimann, but the high point was the rally held
on the Königsplatz on September 26. There the members were feted by MinisterPresident von Kahr, the Lord Mayor of Munich, and the group’s leaders, Escherich,
Kanzler, and Kriebel. 111 The Einwohnerwehr newspaper Heimatland ran a special issue
touting the events of those days. The articles not only discussed the group’s vision for
Bavaria and Germany, but spoke approvingly of their activities – particularly the events
surrounding the Kapp Putsch of March 1920. 112
In addition to those powers granted to, or claimed by, the Einwohnerwehr, they
also spent a great deal of time reporting on disturbances in the state. Once alerted to the
outbreak of unrest local units of the Einwohnerwehr were expected to file detailed reports
to the state leadership and relevant governmental officials. These dispatches were
undertaken by the regional commander and were to be updated daily at 12 p.m. In them
the local guard reported on the variety of conflict and where it came from. Local
commanders made large cities and industrial areas a high priority in their surveillance of
domestic turmoil. Additionally the political orientation of such unrest was another topic
that needed to be included in the situation reports. The leadership was always worried
about the potential ramifications of labor. They saw the general strike as a political tool
of the left and different from a more traditional strike; it could truly have greater meaning

111

Ibid.
Heimatland, “Landeschießen,” “Besprechung des Landeshauptmanns mit den Kreis- und
Gauhauptleuten,” and “Gedanken am Königsplatz,” Nr. 40, 30. September 1920, ibid.
112

127
for local authorities. This meant that the regional leadership also watched and reported
on the stance of local papers, as well as the mood of the general population. 113
Planning for and filing reports were not the only activities undertaken by the
regional Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria. Detailed plans were drawn up for guarding and
supervising transportation in the event of a general strike. The members were to erect
barricades that choked off major nodes of transportation for both vehicles and bicycles.
The strength of these checkpoints, and the guards that manned them, depended to a great
degree upon the importance of the area to both the government and revolutionary forces.
Additionally they were to watch and report on the direction of all traffic that passed
through their checkpoints, inspecting the most suspicious vehicles. 114 Equally important
was the protection of businesses vital to the maintenance of the community, or
Lebensmittelgeschäfte. Here coordination with the police and government officials was
deemed vitally necessary. As an Interior Ministry memo explained, “general street
protection and the security of smaller, more vital firms in the streets, as for example
grocery stores cannot be guaranteed through street patrols and spread out small guards as
the most recent experiences have shown.” 115
The Bavarian Einwohnerwehr spent much of its time as an auxiliary police force
guarding private property. This was a particularly important issue for the state’s leaders
and for the group’s leadership, because of the continued weakness of the post-war
economy. As economic conditions deteriorated it became much easier for people to
migrate to the underground economy that had developed during the war and in its
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aftermath. Escherich had made note of the existence of the Black Market in post-war
Bavaria as early as Christmas of 1919, noting that the Einwohnerwehr needed to play a
leading role in combating what he saw as dishonorable economic practice. 116 The result
was that the organization quickly developed into one of the primary, if not the primary,
protectors of business.
As envisioned by the political leadership in Munich, particularly after March
1920, these activities required the Einwohnerwehr to take the leading role. “For these
purposes are local Einwohnerwehren called up in the first wave and the police and
Reichswehr, in their garrisons, in the second wave.” 117 Einwohnerwehr units were to
provide protection for utilities, groceries, their suppliers, and public transportation. This
meant that local units needed to provide a force both large and strong enough to repel any
attack. In the case that defenses failed the army would provide them with further support.
The plan applied to both city and countryside alike and was geared more towards larger
concerns. Smaller business would rely on protection from a normal street watch. 118 The
protection of farms also concerned state authorities. In the fall of 1920 several cases of
arson had been reported in the vicinity of Pfaffenhofen, Dachau, and Freising. To protect
rural areas local units were employed as a night watch to prevent further incidents. 119
In the course of their activities the men of the Einwohnerwehr often showed great
zeal, often too much, and this often led to abuses of authority, violence, and even death.
Many of the people hurt in these instances came from the working class, or from regions
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that the Einwohnerwehr had difficulties in. The town of Wunsiedel provides an excellent
example of the difficult relationship between Escherich’s group and a local population.
Located in the northeastern corner of Bavaria, the town was located in a region of the
state that had a large working class population. The Einwohnerwehr found organizing in
the town to be difficult owing to the fact that the local government was controlled by both
socialist parties. 120 Thus in the aftermath of the Chiemgau Einwohnerwehr’s operations
in Hof they were ordered to Wunsiedel. There on March 24, 1920, using prepared lists,
they arrested fifty men, the majority being factory workers. 121
Often individual members let the authority they received go to their heads.
Sometimes this had tragic results. In September 1920 in the town of Wachendorf the
local Einwoherwehr leaders shot and killed a worker who was stealing potatoes. The
report on the incident indicated that the victim, a father of six, was unemployed and stole
the potatoes to feed his family. The incident caused a demonstration amongst the
workers in the town. 122 In other cases they misidentified their victims. In October 1920
four Einwohnerwehr members were arrested and tried for attacking two fifteen year old
boys in Rosenheim. They arrested both in the apartment of one of the boys, and behaved
in such a high handed fashion that they discharged their weapons in front of the family.
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The four Einwohnerwehr men thought the boys were spies. 123 As was usual, both boys
were the sons of workers and themselves apprentices. 124
The ideological program of the Einwohnerwehr required its members to see the
world divided between those who subscribed to its patriotic worldview and those who
supported radical Bolshevism. Those who subscribed to the former believed in a
romanticized Germany that existed in its purest form during the First World War. They
equally hated socialism and believed that the Revolution of 1918 had been a disaster for
Germany. That event brought misery to the country and the hated Treaty of Versailles,
which inflamed many of the organization’s members. Those who did not needed to be
opposed. Thus the Einwohnerwehr played a prominent role in overthrowing the
democratically elected government in Munich, placing in its stead a government more to
its liking. They expanded the scope of their activities, targeting those who did not
subscribe to their ideology. Thus the Einwohnerwehr became a pillar of the Bavaria of
Gustav von Kahr. In the year that followed the Kapp Putsch, Escherich and his men
would attempt to create a power base for themselves beyond Bavaria, but in the process
encountered resistance that proved too strong for the Einwohnerwehr, and its supporters,
to defeat.
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Chapter 6
Expansion and Dissolution – the Organisation Escherich and the Struggle over the
Einwohnerwehr
The activities undertaken by the members of the Einwohnerwehr were heavily
influenced by the group’s ideology. Motivated by the need to preserve law and order,
members found themselves employed in a variety of actions, some more mundane than
others. However, after the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 these took a more decidedly
political tone, as the Einwohnerwehr became involved in the political affairs of both the
German Reich and even Austria, something that brought even more scrutiny from the
government in Berlin as well as the Entente powers and led to the group’s eventual
dissolution.
Organisation Escherich and Organisation Kanzler
The Einwohnerwehr’s part in the Kapp Putsch in Munich, as well as the role it
played in stamping out the general strike in places like Hof, removed the apolitical mask
that Escherich and the other leaders had presented since the group was first formed,
revealing the true face of the organization. From March 1920 onwards the group openly
involved itself in the politics of Bavaria and the Reich as agents of the counterrevolution.
This change would have an enormous impact on the group, as now their activities were
increasingly aimed at the Social Democratic Party, an organization that until March 1920,
had been supportive of the Einwohnerwehr, one of the ‘state supporting’ political parties.
More important though was the fact that such political engagement allowed Escherich
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and his lieutenants to develop more fully their ideas for national renewal, something that
had been part and parcel of the Einwohnerwehr’s ideological program.
The vehicle by which these political ideas would be disseminated and propagated
was the Organisation Escherich, an association dedicated to coordinating all paramilitary
activities in the country. It was the result of a series of letters exchanged between
Escherich and Franz Seldte, who headed the largest veteran’s organization in Germany,
the Stahlhelm. Seldte had come to know of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr through
Waldemar Pabst and Captain Schneider, both of whom had been involved with the Kapp
Putsch. Seldte wanted to unite all paramilitary groups, including his own, into a
nationwide organization. 1 Events the following March delayed these plans, but work
began again in April 1920 in earnest. 2 Because the Stahlhelm leader felt the work was so
important he asked Escherich to take the lead in coordinating both the meetings for the
new group and to be its first leader. 3
Escherich was more than happy to take the lead in creating such an organization.
The leadership of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr had become increasingly disturbed by
events on the national level in the wake of the Kapp Putsch. “The Reich government has
let itself be tempted, in negotiations with the insurrectionists in the question of workers
guards, the negotiations with the unions and others, into more decisions which mean the
tacit surrender of civil rights to a dictatorial Bolshevistic minority.” 4 In their mind the
government in Berlin favored policies that would undermine state authority, by favoring
workers and their unions. More critically, they believed that Berlin had sided with the
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allies against the Einwohnerwehr. These actions, they claimed, put the government in
opposition to the constitution and the people of Germany, a situation that if continued
could lead to civil war. 5
Escherich organized a meeting of all the major groups in the vaterländisch
movement to be held at Regensburg on May 8/9, 1920. In attendance would be the
Einwohnerwehr of Bavaria, Seldte’s own Stahlhelm, the Jung-Deutschland Orden, and
various north German voluntary leagues (Zeitfreiwilligen-Verbände). 6 Since so many
groups were involved in the proposed venture, Escherich believed that there were several
points on which they all needed to agree. The first of these was that the group was not to
be involved in any coup activity. Secondly, each organization that joined was to be given
a portion of the Reich to control, preferably where they were strongest, like the
Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria. Third, unity of purpose was considered more important than
unity of form. Thus there would be no attempt to enforce coordination amongst member
bodies. Finally, this association was not to cooperate with civil authorities, unless a preexisting arrangement already existed. 7
As it turned out the outlines of the Organisation Escherich corresponded very
closely to the points made by the Bavarian leader. Originally called Der Deutsche Hort
(the German Shield), the assembled delegates agreed to appoint a committee to draft a
program for the group. 8 The document was completed on May 9, 1920 and changed the
name of the association to Organisation Escherich, after its leader. The primary purpose
of the group was to secure the constitution, protect people, work, and property, preserve
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the German Reich, prevent separatist tendencies, and work for law and order by
struggling against revolutionary tendencies from right and left. Its headquarters was
based in Munich and any German could be a member provided that he had an impeccable
reputation, or was from a group that stood on the side of law and order. Like the
Einwohnerwehr, this new body claimed to stand above party and religious confession. 9
The organization created at Regensburg united the various vaterländisch groups
into one entity, but allowed each to preserve its individual identity. This was
accomplished by dividing the country into zones that each of the major groups would
control, corresponding closely to ideas Escherich put forward. As decided at Regensburg
the country was divided east to west at the Elbe River and north to south at the Harz
Mountains, with Escherich and the Einwohnerwehr controlling southern Germany, The
Jungdeutscher Orden controlling western Germany, and the Stahlhelm controlling eastern
Germany. 10 Individual members who joined the association did so through the primary
group in each region, not the national body. This regional paramilitary then decided if
the person could join the Orgesch. Whether they were in the new group or not, members
followed the rules and regulations of the paramilitary organization in control locally. 11
In the week following the Regensburg meeting a second committee, led by
Kanzler, hammered out a working program for the Organisation Escherich (Orgesch).
The document put forward, known as the working program (Arbeitsprogramm), reflected
quite clearly the ideological predilections of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr as these had
evolved, and went much farther than any ideas the group had previously propagated.
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First and foremost among these was the revival of national thinking not only among all
elements of German society, but even for those who lived outside the Reich. Another
major point was the preservation of an idealistic world view (idealen Lebensauffassung)
from the encroachments of materialist philosophy. German mothers, and the need to win
them over to patriotic (vaterländisch) thinking, were a major focus of the document, as
was reaching the young. Finally, the group saw it as a major point of their work to try
and reconcile workers to employers and to protect the middle class. These points
comingled with more traditional aspects of the Civil Guard’s program such as fighting
Bolshevism, strengthening state authority, and combating economic immorality. 12
With regulations and an ideological program in place, the Orgesch began to build
up its infrastructure and extend it throughout the country. At the time of its founding the
group was particularly strong in the south, the west, and the east. These regions lined up
with individual military districts in the country. 13 However, the group had no presence in
the northern and northwestern parts of the country. These lands were particularly
problematic because they represented the industrial heartland of Germany, and as such
were strongholds of the Social Democratic Party, the Independent Socialists, and the fast
growing Communists. This fact made northern Germany a top priority of the new
association’s leadership coming out of the Regensburg meeting.
The need to revive the patriotic movement in northern Germany led the Bavarian
leadership to sponsor an organizational trip to that region. Begun on May 25, 1920, three
members of the Einwohnerwehr’s top leadership traveled to the Rhineland, Westphalia,
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Hamburg, and Mecklenburg. While there they met with the leadership of local social and
civil groups, prominent bureaucrats and officials, and members from defunct paramilitary
groups. The purpose was to revive the patriotic organizations in northern Germany under
the umbrella of the Orgesch. This included financial support, as three Civil Guard
leaders were instructed to discuss financial support for groups that adhered; funds were
administered by the leadership in Munich. 14
The trip itself was a success. Wherever the Einwohnerwehr representatives went
they received a hearty welcome along with plenty of assistance from civic associations.
Particularly noteworthy was the support received from the League of German Farmers
(Bund der Landwirte), who organized the first meetings in Düsseldorf. They helped to
identify many of the problems facing the revival of “self defense leagues”
(Selbstschützverbände). The most pertinent of these was the division between rural
countryside and urban areas, where the mass of Germany’s workers lived. Because of the
size of the cities in the region many people who held to patriotic ideas believed
themselves to be in danger. As the report about this trip put it, “By the fact that a
complete prostration of the overnight risen Red Army was made impossible through the
intervention of the Reich government, the pressure of uncertainty and fright before the
resurgence of the red terror has not been definitively removed.” 15
To facilitate the revival of paramilitary groups under the banner of the Orgesch it
was decided to use those formations that survived the aftermath of the Kapp Putsch and
to build upon them. These included a few Einwohnerwehr units, as well as several
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farmer defense units (Bauerwehren) that had been previously set up. These would be
supplemented by members from the cities, particularly the young, who would be spirited
out of the city to join units in the case of domestic disturbance. The other meetings
throughout Northern Germany, the last at Mecklenburg on June 3, 1920, followed similar
lines; local units were revived under the guidance of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, who
provided the bulk of the financial support, joined the Orgesch, and continued to protect
law and order as they had done previously. 16
In several of these meetings one question often raised by northern participants
concerned the political ramifications, both domestically and internationally, of the
league’s activities. The working program had talked about the revival of nationalist
thinking amongst all classes of Germans. In the course of their trip through the north,
members of the Bavarian leadership discussed the Greater German (or Grossdeutsch)
ideas that animated the new organization. 17 Considering that they often addressed people
from nationalist circles, this is not surprising. However, by framing their ideological
program in such a political way, and Grossdeutsch nationalism was very much a political
idea, it completely demolished the fiction that they publicly presented, to themselves if to
no one else, that they served only to protect the state and its prerogatives regardless of the
political composition of the government.
The worries about political opposition in northern Germany forced the leaders of
Orgesch to seek political allies amongst the conservative and nationalist parties, which
would protect the associations if they came under fire from the government. Working
16
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through contacts in the German Navy, Escherich met with representatives of the German
National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei) and the head of the Reich
Civilian Council (Reichsbürgerrat). 18 With their support Escherich was able to gain
more support for his activities, as well as additional funding for them. To coordinate
efforts further an office was set up in Berlin that handled the group’s interactions with
both the political parties and the national government, collected and collated reports on
national and international affairs, and put forth press release and propaganda materials. 19
The necessity of establishing political contacts in the capital became apparent
during the summer of 1920 when the existence of Escherich’s organization became
known publicly. The Bavarian leader helped this along by sending a telegram to the
Reich government on June 28 requesting that it do everything in its power to prevent the
dissolution of Germany’s paramilitary formations, including the nascent Orgesch, which
he saw as vital to the country’s interest. “I consider, by knowledge of the situation, the
continued existence of the organization as a precondition for the preservation of the
Reich constitution and essential for the continuance and rebuilding of the German
Reich.” 20
In spite of his professed belief that that the Orgesch was vital to the preservation
of Germany, Escherich’s telegram set off red flags in Berlin and raised a thorny issue for
the German government. Since the Treaty of Versailles had been signed in June 1919
representatives from the allied powers and Germany had been meeting at the resort town
of Spa to oversee the disarmament provisions of the treaty. Their pressure had already
18
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forced the government to start dissolving the numerous paramilitary groups in February
1920, an event which helped lead to the Kapp Putsch. 21 Aware of the distrust the allies
had for the Freikorps and fearful of the role that such units had played in the events of
March 1920, the government in Berlin was understandably concerned with the creation of
a new group. Escherich’s telegram prompted a reply from the Reich Ministry of the
Interior, where the state secretary remarked that the government had “umpteen inquiries
about the organization inspired by you.” 22 It was certainly not insignificant that this
reply came days after the Allied Control Commission in Spa ordered the dissolution of
the Einwohnerwehr. 23
Political resistance to Escherich’s outfit was swift in coming, animated by fear of
the international and domestic implications of the Orgesch. A variety of steps were taken
to limit the organization’s reach. This included tighter control over those paramilitary
units still being used by the government in spite of the ban. Paramilitary units in East
Prussia and Silesia, whether former Einwohnerwehr or Freikorps, were to be brought
under the control of the regional president in order to prevent these forces from joining
the Munich group. 24 Furthermore, at the behest of the Prussian Interior Minister Hans
Severing police in Prussia began monitoring the group and its activities, as well as
enforcing the ban on paramilitary groups. 25 Finally, a campaign in the press aimed at the
Organisation Escherich began in early August. Papers like Vorwärts and the Munich
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Post ran stories highlighting the danger posed by the creation of Escherich’s new group
stating that, “Orgesch, as a spearhead for certain economic and political interest groups,
is becoming entirely an armed organization of the reaction and makes its own faustian
politics.” 26 The stories highlighted the fears of Social Democratic politicians like Gustav
Noske, who was so instrumental in helping to create the Einwohnerwehr, and believed
that the Escherich circle would “conjure up serious confusion and domestic conflict.” 27
The leadership in Munich believed such efforts were persecution by the political
left. This was certainly the view of Rudolf Kanzler, who claimed years later that fears of
the “Diktat from Spa” were overblown by radical forces to persecute the organization. 28
To counter the efforts of the Social Democrats and their allies Escherich and his
underlings waged a propaganda campaign intended to allay any concerns that people had
about Orgesch and its goals. This proceeded on two levels, one aimed at government
officials, the other at the general public. To ease fears amongst Germany’s leaders the
Bavarian leader argued in a memo that the group, as constituted, was an organization of
the middle. “That my organization would be exposed to many attacks from left and right
was clear to me from the first,” wrote Escherich, who also noted that “majority socialists”
occupied leadership positions in the association. 29 He assured the government that the
only goal of the group was to fight Bolshevism, particularly “National Bolshevism,” in
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all its forms, and that they would be prepared to resist a putsch from right or left. 30
Furthermore, Escherich also bitterly complained to the government about attacks coming
from local politicians, especially those in Prussia who saw the group as unlawful and
moved to dissolve it. 31
To foster public support the Orgesch leadership turned to the press to make their
case, though this had varying results. As with government officials, care was taken here
to present the group as a moderate organization. The Bavarian leadership held press
junkets for local papers to expound on this point.32 Furthermore, they argued that attacks
against the Organisation Escherich stemmed from Social Democratic leaders who
desired to regain the trust of radicals. 33 Finally, they accused the left wing press of siding
with the radicals. The Münchener Zeitung, in its August 9 edition, attacked the press war
against the Orgesch stating, “but it is however a dangerous game, that here institutions
push to still call themselves civic, while they undermine with enthusiasm the last bulwark
against Bolshevism.” 34 Much of the media campaign was conducted through
conservative-leaning papers. Independent papers seemed to view the group much the
same way as the socialist press. The Neue Berliner Zeitung, for instance, described the
group as a herald of violence to come, 35 while the Berliner Tageblatt wrote that the
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Orgesch “only wants to build a different government that would be equal in philosophy
to the parties of the right and, as one says, to duly rule.” 36
Despite the efforts of some government officials, like Interior Minister Severing,
or the socialist press, the Organsation Escherich continued to make inroads in provinces
like Prussia. This development was partially the result of the Prussian government’s
decision on May 27, 1920 to permit paramilitary groups to continue to operate under the
strict control of regional presidents. 37 The decision to maintain local paramilitaries was
the result of continuing disputes with Poland over the borders in East Prussia and Silesia,
where it was feared that Polish forces would attempt to seize territory by force. 38 The
belief of officials in Berlin that an emergency situation existed on the eastern border
created the space whereby Escherich and his group were able to expand the Orgesch.
Most local organizations joined the group during the summer of 1920. 39
The union of these local groups with the Organisation Escherich occurred
without the knowledge of the regional government, which had authority over their
activities. A couple of factors explain why this happened. One was the promise of
financial support from the national organization. In the summer of 1920 the regional
government in East Prussia and Silesia simply could not support the local paramilitaries.
An Orgesch report from July 28, 1920 stated that financial support was an imperative for
the national organization to provide leadership and improve morale. Failure to do so
would allow the state government to eventually provide funds, and hence direction, to
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local units. A second was the influence of local leaders. As was the case in northwestern
and northern Germany, prominent local leaders formed the backbone of support, and
became the group’s local leaders. For example, the man elected to lead the Orgesch in
East Prussia, Brandis, was the leader of the local agrarian league, and as a result helped
tip the scale in favor of Escherich and away from Berlin. 40
The public fracas over the Organisation Escherich continued through the month
of August. The Bavarian leader continued to lodge complaints with the national
government in Berlin over what he believed to be unfair treatment of his group in states
like Prussia and Saxony. He argued in a telegram on August 18 that the prohibition
against the Orgesch violated the rights of local militiamen in those states. 41 Escherich
also began to appeal directly to the members of the Reichstag on behalf of his
organization. 42 Such efforts had been requested by the Orgesch office in Berlin, which
believed that only a sustained campaign of persuasion by Escherich, Kanzler, and even
the Bavarian government could turn the tide of public opinion in their favor. 43 In the end
the Orgesch did not achieve its goal of recognition by the Prussian government.
However, in East Prussia matters were different. There the Organisation Escherich was
confirmed in its control of local paramilitary groups. 44
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The success that the Orgesch had in organizing paramilitary groups in East
Prussia and Silesia was duplicated in Austria. Over the course of 1920 paramilitaries
were set up on the model of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr. Like with the Organisation
Escherich, members of the Civil Guard’s leadership played a key role here as well.
Rudolf Kanzler became the point man for organizing these auxiliaries, with the result that
the new association was named after him, Organisation Kanzler (Orka), and placed
within the larger framework of the Orgesch. 45
The initial stages of what would eventually become the Austrian Heimwehr
actually predate the creation of the Organisation Escherich. On February 16, 1920
Rudolf Kanzler received a letter from Dr. Zahnbrecher, a member of the Bavarian
Landtag who had excellent contacts in Austria. His report told of political unrest in many
of the country’s largest cities, particularly Linz, Innsbruck, and the capital of Vienna. 46
Demonstrations had taken place both in support of and against the Social Democratic
government’s creation of workers councils and were seen by many to be the prelude to a
Räterepublik. 47 Zahnbrecher reported that many Austrians in the provinces preferred to
declare the country’s constitution null and void and join with Germany, a move that had
been forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. Knowing that the Entente powers would
never permit such a solution, the request was made for Bavarian help in “the building of
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farmer guards in those rural communities (parishes) to make political preparation for
defensive measures against Bolshevism.” 48
The Austrians hoped that close coordination between them and Bavaria would
make the union of Austria with Germany inevitable and force the allies’ hands. In
particular Zahnbrecher had talked about close coordination between Bavaria and the
Austrian provinces more directly as a precursor to union with Germany, or Anschluß. 49
However, a meeting held three days after the receipt of this letter, in the office of Gustav
von Kahr, highlighted the difficulties both of creating paramilitary forces in Austria and
of bringing about a union of the two countries. The major problems were the
international implications of Bavarian support and funding. Kahr informed the meeting’s
participants that, given the international situation, he could not provide government funds
for the creation of Austrian defense associations. This meant that any coordination
between the Bavarians and the Austrians would be a strictly private matter. Kanzler
himself was put in charge of creating the Home Guard, or Heimwehr, while local
Einwohnerwehr offices in the border region with Austria would handle the particulars. 50
The creation of local Heimwehr in Austria proceeded along a regional pattern,
though only certain regions were deemed ready for the creation of a paramilitary force.
A memorandum, drawn up for the Munich meeting of February 21, highlighted the areas
where local defense organizations should be built. These included Styria, Carinthia,
Upper Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg, territories long considered having
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derived from Bavarian colonization.51 Kanzler and his representatives chose to organize
Salzburg first. The choice made sense as Salzburg was the major Austrian city closest to
Munich. In fact, as Kanzler wrote later, many of the major meetings between the
Bavarian leadership and the Austrians were often held there out of convenience. 52 The
first one was held there on February 28, 1920. Organized by Schernthaner, the local
leader of the Christian Socialist Party, it was attended by Kanzler, Schindlbeck of the
Chiemgau Einwohnerwehr, and Professor Bernhard Stempfle. The proposal for creation
of a local Heimwehr in Salzburg closely followed the example of the Civil Guards in
Bavaria. The province was divided into districts, five with roughly twelve hundred men
each. Kanzler promised to provide weapons to local units until the organization was selfsustaining. To ensure this, Stempfle urged the creation of a political block amongst the
middle class parties against the socialists and communists. 53
The other paramilitary groups were set up along a similar pattern. The date
calendar of Professor Stempfle, who became a crucial point man for Kanzler in setting up
the Heimwehren, provides the time line. From March 20 to April 10 Stempfle was in
Tyrol, helping to organize auxiliaries there. Meetings in Graz in May led to the creation
of units in Styria, while a series of talks in June helped set up local groups in Carinthia. 54
Other local Heimwehren were constituted in the months that followed. Local units were
set up in Lower Austria by August 1920, in Voralberg by November 1920, and in Upper
Austria only by July 1921. Rudolf Kanzler ascribed the difficulties in creating the Upper
Austrian Heimwehr to effective resistance by the local Social Democratic government
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and its press, opposition that was only overcome by a successful press campaign by the
political right in Austria. 55
The Austrians who joined the local guards in these provinces did so with a wary
eye on the international situation, as well as events at home, and this helped smooth the
process of setting up regional units. The chaos that accompanied the dissolution of the
Austro-Hungarian army was one such factor. During the demobilization, as soldiers
marched back home to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia, they took the
opportunity to create havoc in the Alpine provinces. This complaint was heard often
from Austrians in their meetings with Stempfle and Kanzler. Moreover, the continued
threat of a Bolshevist takeover was continually hyped during these meetings. In one
instance, Italian objections to the creation of a local Heimwehr in the Tyrol were
smoothed over by highlighting the communist threat to northern Italy. On other
occasions, participants pointed to examples of communist uprisings as justification for
their activities. Two in particular stood out. The first was an attempted putsch in Graz
on June 7, 1920, a revolt which was successfully put down. The second was to remind
Austrians of the now infamous Bela Kun revolution that occurred in Hungary during
1919, an uprising that had potential security ramifications for Austria. 56
Anschluss was never far from the minds of the Austrians, or their Bavarian
interlocutors, as they created the Heimwehr. They still believed that cooperation with
Munich, rather than Berlin, would strengthen the case for union because in their minds
Bavaria was not equated with “Prussian militarism.” 57 A meeting held on May 6, 1920 in
55

Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf, 89-103.
Ibid.
57
Dr. Zahnbrecher an Herrn Kanzler, 16. Februar 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, NL Kanzler, B. 20a.
56

148
Rosenheim attempted to give more concrete form to these hopes. While no one there
believed that political unification was possible for the foreseeable future, the committee
did discuss other measures that could be taken to facilitate an eventual Anschluss. They
discussed the creation of a Danubian confederacy between Bavaria and Austria that
would regulate trade, resource sharing, scientific exchanges, and cultural connections
between the two states. The assembled delegates deemed such an entity to be a necessary
first step to help Austria “come back to the Reich again.” 58
Another very important way to help bring about the Anschlss was to coordinate
the activities of the Austrian Heimwehren with those of the Einwohnerwehr. The best
way to do this was through the Organisation Escherich. This development itself was a
natural outgrowth of the ideological program of the Bavarian leader’s new association.
The Orgesch’s working program, for instance, was frank in its desire to revive nationalist
thinking, even among Germans not living in Germany. 59 Moreover, Pan-German
feelings were prevalent amongst many of the Austrians who joined the rapidly forming
paramilitary units, something strongly encouraged in Munich. Finally, by combining the
Heimwehren to the Orgesch it prevented groups in the north from questioning the
Einwoherwehr’s commitment to Germany. Escherich, in an address to Austrian self
defense organizations, put it most bluntly, “I state solemnly, that I and all my colleagues
hold unshakably to the unity of the German Reich and will combat all attempts, which
want to disturb this unity.” 60 Thus, on July 25, 1920 the still embryonic Austrian
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organization joined Escherich’s group as an individual department under the command of
Rudolf Kanzler. 61
With its activities in Silesia, East Prussia, and Austria the Organisation
Escherich clearly demonstrated its willingness to play a role in Germany’s foreign policy.
They had earlier weighed in on the issue of disarmament and dissolution, problems that
affected them directly. Now they began to argue vociferously for a more “national”
foreign policy from the Reich government. For many in the Einwohnerwehr and Orgesch
the current international situation presented both a danger and an opportunity. If
Germany was to navigate successfully in the new climate it needed bold ideas and
leadership.
The leaders of the Organisation Escherich believed they could provide the
leadership, or at least the answers, for the country’s current diplomatic predicament. One
of their proposals involved Germany reaching an accommodation with Russia so that
both countries could once again divide Poland. It was believed that only by recovering
the borders of 1914 could the Reich be made safe against Russian invasion, as well as
fight effectively against Bolshevism and National Bolshevism in the east. 62 Another
called on the government to organize the neighboring states of Eastern Europe into an
alliance against Russia that would be led by Germany and Great Britain. This alliance
depended to a great degree upon a grand bargain between the two countries, one that
would permit Berlin a free hand in Europe. “One must bring sacrifice, must make
concessions to England. Perhaps concede to them the absolute supremacy at sea, but to
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take ourselves the prerogative of German hegemony on land as a natural complement to
England’s sea power.” 63 These ideas naturally were more utopian than realistic as they
called for a readjustment of the balance of power, something that neither the wartime
allies nor the German government prepared to do, despite what the Escherich and his men
thought.
The circulation of such ideas, along with the group’s activities in Austria and
elsewhere, did bring the Orgesch to the attention of the British and French. Both states
watched Escherich’s project very carefully, and were quite alarmed by the organization’s
program and its rapid growth. They both feared that the Einwohnerwehr and the
Organisation Escherich were covert agents of German rearmament. Their angst was
fueled in no small measure by media stories that hyped the revanchist nature of the group.
The French newspaper Excelsior, for example, claimed that the majority of the members,
if not all, were ex-soldiers who had fought in the German army. To prove their point
they noted that the identity cards (Personal Ausweis) for members were modeled on the
army’s old military pass. 64 They also informed their readers about the association’s
growth in Austria, claiming that the ultimate goal of the Orgesch was to control Austria’s
politics in preparation of Anschluß, something they hoped Allied Control Commission
would prevent. “We hope, that they will not let themselves make errors in their
vigilance.” 65
The Dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr

63

Denkschrift zur Frage der Oestlichen Orientierung der Deutschen Aussenpolitik, 13. September 1920,
ibid.
64
Excelsior, Übersetzung aus dem französischen, 27. September 1920, ibid.
65
Excelsior, “Die Orgesch in Deutsch-Österreich,” 27. September 1920, ibid.

151
The work of the Orgesch and Orka brought a certain prestige to Escherich and the
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr. They successfully organized the Austrian paramilitaries into
the Heimwehr, and the group’s program was being instituted throughout much of the
country. They helped organize German forces in East Prussia and Silesia against the
advances of the new Polish state. Furthermore, the umbrella association allowed the
Bavarian leader to attack the policies of the Reich government directly if its measures
were lacking in “national feeling.” These attacks, along with their activities in Austria,
Silesia, and East Prussia forced the hands of the allies and Berlin cabinet, who
increasingly put pressure on the Bavarian government to disarm and disband the
Einwohnerwehr. This political struggle, which occurred at the same time as the Orgesch
and Orka were being formed, occupied much of the last year of the group’s history, and
formed the backdrop of Kahr’s regime in Munich.
The strife that consumed the Einwohnerwehr primarily came from outside
Bavaria, but it also faced significant resistance during its last year of existence both
internally and within the state. Much of the internal dissension within the organization
concerned the activities of the Organisation Escherich. By September 1920 the national
leadership of the Orgesch was staffed almost entirely by the headquarters staff of the
Einwohnerwehr. 66 The dual roles of many of the leading figures (Escherich, Kanzler,
Stempfle) seemed to suggest to many members of the group that the leadership had
become more interested in national politics than local Bavarian affairs. They began to
worry that the Einwohnerwehr was losing its identity to the new association. 67 Escherich
responded by insisting that the two organizations were separate entities, and that
66
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conflation of the two was the result of a media campaign. 68 Nevertheless a divide began
to develop as a result of the Orgesch’s activities, a chasm that as David Clay Large has
noted isolated Escherich from the rank and file. 69
The Einwohnerwehr also faced resistance from the Bavarian government.
Members of Kahr’s cabinet questioned the wisdom of the Minister-President’s close
connection to the group. 70 One member of the cabinet argued that the activities of the
Einwohnerwehr (shooting festivals, the provocations of the Orgesch), only weakened
Bavaria’s position vis-à-vis the allies, and most especially the Reich government. 71
Constitutional issues were a major focus of Kahr’s government during 1920 as they
sought to prevent further erosion of Bavaria’s rights to the national government, and a
dispute over the Einwohnerwehr only made this more difficult. 72 Finally their role in
Bavarian politics was seen as disrupting the rebuilding of national economic life. 73
The controversies surrounding the Civil Guard’s activities, whether these were
overturning the legitimate government in Bavaria during the Kapp Putsch, suppressing
general strikes in places like Hof while claiming they were communist uprisings, or
helping to organize the Organisation Escherich and Organisation Kanzler, helped to
create an atmosphere where it became incumbent upon Germany’s new leaders to break
the group. Beginning in 1920 and extending until mid-1921 German and Bavarian
68
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politics were increasingly preoccupied with the questions of disarmament and
dissolution. This conflict would not only lead to the breakup of Georg Escherich’s
paramilitary outfit, but also to the downfall of Gustav von Kahr, who had done so much
to help create the Einwohnerwehr, and who benefited from its existence.
The primary impetus for disarmament and dissolution (Entwaffnung and
Auflösung) came from outside of Germany, from the allied powers that were in process of
implementing the peace treaty. In early 1920, as noted earlier, they had forced the
German government to dissolve all paramilitary units, fearing that these would be the
nucleus of a new German army. One consequence of this, of course, was the Kapp
Putsch of these units in March 1920, an event which helped to solidify the
Einwohnerwehr’s position in Bavaria while it was fatally weakened throughout the rest of
the country. 74 Despite the internal tensions created in Germany by the uprising, the allies
continued to insist that paramilitary units be disbanded. Their insistence on these
measures became part and parcel of the negotiations taking place at Spa, where Britain,
France, and others supervised the implementation of the disarmament provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles. Beginning in April 1920 the Entente Powers put increasing pressure
on the Reich government to move against the Bavarian Civil Guards specifically. 75
The French in particular pushed hard for both disarmament and dissolution. The
Munich Post reported that French newspapers, using documents provided by negotiators
at Spa, wrote stories of the baleful influence that Escherich’s group had on politics in
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Bavaria, and the danger these posed for European peace and German democracy. 76
Several themes were highlighted in these stories: the control that the German army had
over the Einwohnerwehr, the retrograde social composition – consisting mostly of
members from the middle classes and precious few from the working classes, and the
centralized control that the leadership exercised over local units. 77 Considering the role
the Einwohnerwehr played in the Kapp Putsch in Munich, as well as the danger such a
narrowly based group posed for German democracy, the French fears were justified.
They were also shared to a certain extent by the government in Berlin. 78
However, beginning in the second half of 1919 the Reich government, and particularly
that of Prussia, began to see the Einwohnerwehr as a threat to the stability of the state.
The charge against the organization stemmed from the Prussian Minister of the Interior,
Hans Severing, who had broken up the Prussian body by the end of 1920 and greatly
distrusted the Bavarian organization, and the Kahr government’s support of it. 79
Convinced of the sinister nature of the Einwohnerwehr, the Disarmament
Conference at Spa decreed on July 9, 1920 that the German government take immediate
steps to disarm it, along with the security police. The disarming of Escherich’s group
was only part of a much larger reduction in arms amongst both the military and the
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civilian population that had been called for. 80 On August 7, 1919 the Reichstag passed
the Law for the Disarmament of the Population. The decree stipulated that the
government was to confiscate all military weapons held by people who did not have
official sanction to possess them. Those who were allowed to have such weaponry
consisted of the army and the civil authorities, who needed them in the performance of
their duties. Their weapons were registered with a Reich Commissioner for
Disarmament, who was responsible not only for their collection and numbering, but the
destruction of all contraband weapons. This official was also given discretion in
determining which weapons had military applications. 81
As written the law spelled the end for Escherich’s organization as an armed
paramilitary force. The law clearly stated that only people in positions of authority could
carry arms. While the Einwohnerwehr did act in a semi-official capacity, when called
upon by local authorities, it remained a privately controlled group that was free from the
prying eyes of the state. This had been the goal from the beginning for certain members
of the leadership. 82 As it turned out this fact only helped the Einwohnerwehr. The
independent nature of the Bavarian association prevented it from being covered under
section 10 of the law, which stated that the Reich Commissioner for Disarmament was to
carry out his tasks with the help of local authorities, including police auxiliaries. 83
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The law’s passage naturally set off a political firestorm in Bavaria. The Kahr
government, after some debate, rejected the law primarily on constitutional grounds.
Specifically they claimed that the law did not take notice of the traditional constitutional
arrangement in Germany, one in which the state had traditionally been given wideranging rights vis-à-vis other German states. As the notice of refusal sent to the Reichsrat
stated, “the Bavarian state government will not of course shirk its patriotic duty to the
Reich as opposed to the state. But it is of the view, that under the circumstances their
attempts could only be accompanied by success if, with the final passage of the law, full
understanding and appropriate consideration is given to Bavaria’s interests and special
relationship.” 84
Kahr’s refusal to disarm the Einwohnerwehr was supported by those elements of
the state that benefitted most from the organization’s existence and activities. Some of
the biggest supporters naturally came from the political coalition then in power in
Munich. The largest of these, Kahr’s own Bavarian People’s Party, saw the continued
existence of the Einwohnerwehr as decisive for the preservation of law and order in the
Bavarian state. In September 1920, they directed a resolution towards the MinisterPresident urging him to resist any efforts to disarm or dissolve the group because they
believed the weapons would just go into the hands of communists. 85 The other coalition
partners also passed resolutions in support of the Einwohnerwehr. The Bavarian Middle
Party’s resolution stated that, “the Bavarian protection organization may in neither case
fall victim to the thirst for revenge of our enemies nor to the weakness of the Reich
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government.” 86 They believed that much of the strife between Munich and Berlin was
due to the provision in the Treaty of Versailles whereby Germany was guilty for starting
the First World War, a clause that allowed them to maintain troops on German soil and
persecute the government in this matter. 87
Business also tended to be supportive. For them the major benefit of the
Einwohnerwehr, beyond the protection of private property, was their role in stamping out
graft and corruption throughout Bavaria. This they saw as vital for the revival of
economic life in the state. 88 The reaction from Bavarian economic elites to the
disarmament and dissolution drama reflected the esteem in which some of them held
Escherich’s group. Not only did they send letters supporting the Civil Guards to the
Bavarian government, but to the central government in Berlin as well. One letter sent to
Escherich from a local leader of a farmer’s union argued that, regardless of the
Reichstag’s disarmament debate, under no circumstances would the Bavarian
Einwohnerwehr be dissolved. 89
Of all the interests supporting the Kahr government in their defiance of the allies
and Berlin it was the Einwohnerwehr themselves who were most crucial. Throughout
1920 and 1921 the group’s leadership, at all levels, weighed in on the political dispute
between Bavaria and the Reich government. Their efforts consisted of writing letters in
support of the Bavarian government’s position, explaining the goals and work of the
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organization, and most importantly, highlighting the danger to Bavaria if disarmament or
dissolution were allowed. Since it touched on their existences as a group, the topics of
disarmament and dissolution infused nearly all of the thinking and many of the activities
of the Civil Guards for over a year before their eventual disbandment.
The initial reaction amongst the membership was to dismiss the drive for
disarmament and dissolution as nothing but an attempt on the part of France to drive a
wedge between Bavaria and the Reich. Einwohnerwehr leaders argued that the French
knew perfectly well why the organization was needed, but were using its existence as a
way to extend its political and economic influence into central Europe, something that
had been a traditional aspect of French foreign policy. A divided Germany made this
much easier. As one internal memo put it, “our enemies will never abide scruples to use
this opposition for their goals. With France this goal is called: disintegration of the
domestic consensus and unity of Germany.” 90
Additionally many members of the Einwohnerwehr believed that France’s policy
was not only designed to foment division within Germany, but to promote revolution. By
disarming the population, it placed them in a position where they would be at the mercy
of their enemies. Many Einwohnerwehr members considered it axiomatic that their
weapons, rather than be destroyed, would find a way into the hands of their enemies.
This made the political dispute between Munich and Berlin vitally important for the
continuance of the Einwohnerwehr’s mission of maintaining law and order. 91 They could
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not conceive of disbanding the group and would not entertain it. However, compromise
was not necessarily ruled out. A local leader in Munich wrote Escherich encouraging
him to promise that the Civil Guards would admit no more members in exchange for
allowing the association to continue. 92
At first the Bavarian leadership had some reason for hope in the province’s
dealings with Berlin. The Chancellor at the time, Constantin Fehrenbach, was from
southern Germany, and many in the Einwohnerwehr believed that fact would give them a
fair hearing from the Reich government. 93 They allowed themselves to believe this
because Fehrenbach’s coalition government did not include either of the socialist parties
which in Prussia, under the leadership of Interior Minister Hans Severing, were making
things very difficult for the organization and its leader. 94 Escherich and his staff directed
letters to the Reich government, in addition to the Kahr government, making the case for
resisting allied pressure. 95 In their appeal to Berlin, the leadership argued that the group
merely served as private security for those people who had little to no help from the army
or the police, both of which they claimed was still too weak to face the onslaught of red
terror. Moreover, since the Bavarian group had remained loyal to the Reich government
during the Kapp Putsch, it only proved that neither Berlin, nor the allies, had anything to
fear from the Einwohnerwehr. 96
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Their most potent argument, of course, concerned the consequences that would
fall to Bavaria, and by extension Germany, should disarmament and dissolution carry the
day. Many of the letters sent from Einwohnerwehr offices, and the propaganda sent out
by the leadership, painted a stark picture of a countryside ravaged by the breakdown of
order. As was the case with most of their propaganda efforts, apocalyptic language was
the rule of the day. Letters, essays, and articles all pointed to the deleterious effects of
destruction. In these, naturally, the Räterepublik of April and May 1920 loomed large,
and were often used as the example to prove the point. 97 For many Civil Guard members
the memories of April and May 1919 were still quite fresh, and they feared a revival of
those days. 98 Moreover, they believed that northern Germany was ripe for a communist
takeover in the aftermath of Kapp Putsch, 99 and that absent the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr,
“murder and plundering, and chaos and fire like two years ago,” would rule the day. 100
Moreover, during the controversy surrounding the issue of disarming and
disbanding the Einwohnerwehr in 1920 and 1921, many of the arguments used by the
Kahr Government, 101 the state leadership, 102 and even ordinary citizens 103 in support of
the organization relied upon the belief that only the Civil Guards stood between the Free
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State and a showdown with the left. In the words of one member, “the final struggle of
Bolshevism is imminent, to which under no terms will they foreswear.” 104
Political chaos was just one of the themes stressed by the organization in their
communications. The economic well being of the state was another. Many members
feared that, after the destruction of the Einwohnerwehr, the Bavarian economy would slip
into the grip of the black market; that on top of the economic costs of robbery and arson
that were sure to follow dissolution. For the leadership in Munich the case was easy to
make, as they could point to the situation in northern Germany where the Einwohnerwehr
had already been disarmed and where, in their minds, the negative effects of such a move
were easily observable. One report pointed out that robberies were common amongst the
banks, factories, and merchants of the Westphalian Rhineland, and that when the local
citizenry tried to defend itself, the government seemed more interested in the possession
of weapons than recovery of stolen property and money. 105 Moreover, they argued that
the Einwohnerwehr was needed to protect business because these tended to be the target
of political protests by leftist groups. 106
In spite of their efforts, the political situation for the Einwohnerwehr worsened
throughout 1920 and into 1921. The efforts of the Kahr government to protect
Escherich’s group had a wholly negative effect on Bavaria’s relationship to the central
government. The Minister-President directed his government to stymie the
implementation of the disarmament law over several months in the hopes that he could
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persuade the Reich government and the allies to leave the group untouched. 107 They
believed this was necessary because where disarmament had occurred in Bavaria it fell
disproportionately on the Einwohnerwehr and middle class organizations, while
communist and other radical groups continued to keep their weapons. 108 Kahr’s
reasoning, however, put the Reich government in a bind. According to the stipulations of
the Spa agreement, if Germany did not comply with the deadline for disarmament, which
according to the treaty was January 1, 1921, then French forces would occupy the
Ruhr. 109
The dispute between Munich and Berlin over the fate of the Einwohnerwehr and
its weapons raised questions about the Bavarian leader’s motives. It was believed by
some in the Reich government that Kahr was using the controversy for his own purposes.
They feared, most of all, that Escherich and Kahr maintained their defiant position
because they sought to separate Bavaria from the Reich and rectify the “mistake of
history” that created a German state under Prussian hegemony. 110 They noted that,
despite the official hard line from Paris, French officials traveled all over Bavaria
ingratiating themselves to the Bavarian elite, and hinting that the state would be spared
the worst of any allied sanctions. 111 They believed that French actions only encouraged
Kahr’s obstinate position vis-à-vis the Einwohnerwehr and put Berlin in a most difficult
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position. If they pushed too hard, the Bavarians might conceivably make a deal with the
French, who would let them keep the group in exchange for independence under
promises of protection from Paris, especially in the area of economics. 112
These fears, along with the stated consequences of non compliance, forced the
national government to take an increasingly hard line against Munich. 113 At a ministerial
meeting on February 5, 1921, one that was attended by Gustav von Kahr, Chancellor
Fehrenbach and his cabinet made clear Berlin’s intention to force the Bavarian state
government to disarm the Einwohnerwehr in order to fulfill the requirements of both the
Treaty of Versailles and the Spa Agreement. Members of the cabinet argued forcefully
that they could not allow Kahr and his government to act in contravention of the Reich
constitution and the Treaty of Versailles. Such actions, they asserted, spelled an end to
the Reich as it was then conceived, something that only served the interests of
“nationalists in France, England, and America.” 114 Despite Kahr’s pleadings, the cabinet
rejected Munich’s argument that the Einwohnerwehr only served to protect the inner
peace of the state. “Bavaria did wrong to cover themselves in the bad experiences from
March 1919.” 115 In the eyes of Fehrenbach and his ministers Bavaria was the culprit in
any difficulties they had with the allies. From that moment the fate of the Bavarian
organization was sealed.
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In addition to the Einwohnerwehr the Organisation Escherich was also slated for
dissolution. The central government and the allies undertook these measures due to the
strife that already accompanied the Orgesch in its efforts to set itself up in northern
Germany, and the prominent role it played in creating the Heimwehr in Austria. 116 Thus
to the Reich government the two organizations were linked. The Bavarian leadership
itself attempted to persuade the government of benign nature of the group. Escherich
submitted pleas to Berlin arguing that misunderstandings, both intentional and
unintentional, drove the effort to dissolve the Orgesch and that he could not be held
responsible for these views. Alternating between pleading and defiance, the
Einwohnerwehr leader argued that no people in history were asked to give up the right to
self defense, a principle that undergirded European politics for centuries. In his view the
Orgesch was no paramilitary, but “a purely internal German concern,” one that happened
to engage in foreign activity due to the oppression of the Treaty of Versailles. 117
The intent of the national government to force the dissolution of the
Einwohnerwehr only increased the determination of the membership and their leaders to
prevent it. Many local units flooded the offices of the Bavarian government urging
continued resistance, or defiantly promising a fight should any attempt be made on the
part of the government to disarm and disband them. The Civil Guard of Hiepolstein, for
instance promised to defend their territory “down to the last cartridge.” 118 The
Berchtesgaden office expressed dismay at the Reich government for believing that they
could trust the allies, who they claimed sought to destroy Germany. Dissolution was, in
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their words, “a violation and surrender of the interests of the Bavarian state.” 119 The
vehement response was not just limited to local units, but even came from the leadership
in Munich as well. In May 1921 state leaders organized a boycott of all products from
France, England, and Belgium to protest those countries’ political stance vis-à-vis the
Einwohnerwehr. In their proclamation to local units the leadership pointed out that not
only was the embargo a decisive political statement, but that it benefitted German
industry and would help make the country independent of foreign trade. 120
As the dispute continued into May 1921 most observers wondered whether it
would be possible to dissolve the Einwohnerwehr without bloodshed. On May 5, 1921
the Allies issued an ultimatum, directed specifically at the Bavarian government,
demanding the dissolution of the organization and the surrender of all its weapons.
Failure to comply would not only bring about an allied occupation of the Ruhr, but of
Bavaria as well. 121 The ultimatum also extended to the Organisation Escherich and any
paramilitaries still operating in Silesia under their umbrella. 122 The stark demands of the
Allied Control Commission caused consternation in the Bavarian Diet, which debated the
consequences of doing nothing, 123 and in the press. The Süddeutsche Presse wrote, “Mr
von Kahr has so often explained it is not true that the state leadership of the
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Einwohnerwehr approaches the character of a shadow government. Today he can prove
the truth of this statement; he must do it, if he does not want incur the gravest rebuke.” 124
With its back against the wall, the Kahr government ordered the dissolution of the
Einwohnerwehr, disappointing many of its supporters in the organization. The group’s
leadership, which had done so much to prevent the disarmament and dissolution, faced
political reality and crafted a resolution of local and regional leaders that acknowledged
the inevitable. “With heavy hearts we have given our consent, to the limits of the
possible, the exhaustive proposal, which the Bavarian Minister President Excellence von
Kahr has made as a sign of the good will of Bavaria to the Reich government and the
league of enemies in the question of the dissolution and disarmament of the
Einwohnerwehr. We cannot surpass the limits of the possible. In this belief we stand
behind our Minister President Excellence von Kahr and explain in full awareness of the
scope of this decision that we will keep with him.” 125 This resolution was backed up by
memoranda from the leading figures of the organization. Rudolf Kanzler, for instance,
argued, “I know I am one with all upright leaders and men of the Einwohnerwehr, that we
must not betray our fatherland in this critical juncture and ourselves by threats of any
kind from Berlin.” 126 Similarly Georg Escherich, in an announcement sent to the
Orgesch, wrote, “We see the dangers of civil war in the interior and with it the foreign
policy related complications, and we submit ourselves to the violence of the fact. The
Organisation Escherich is disbanded.” 127
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The decision to accept disarmament and disbandment had come after a period of
intense discussion within the organization’s leadership. Through much of Spring 1920
they debated avenues open to them should the political cover given to them by the Kahr
government evaporate. Several possible courses of action were discussed. The first of
these involved risking another European war. The leadership believed that, if they did
not voluntarily disarm, the French would attempt an invasion of Bavaria and Germany in
order to carry out the Spa Agreement, an option that many in Munich believed could not
be carried out. To undertake an invasion would require the mobilization of the entire
French army, something Civil Guard leaders thought impossible. However, in spite of
these factors, the leadership ruled out war because they believed that it could not be
prosecuted without a united front with the Social Democratic parties. Nor could they
fight in the face of united Social Democratic and Independent Socialists resistance, which
would split the country and negate the advantages they believed the Germans to have. 128
Another option had the Einwohnerwehr give up part of their weapons, while
reorganizing the group as a reserve of the state police (Landespolizei). According to this
view, the organization would give up roughly one third of their weaponry, those which
clearly had a military purpose and offended the Allied Control Commission. However,
this required the leadership to seek the views and opinions of both political allies and the
government before proceeding. Given the climate at the time this was a tricky
proposition at best, and was quickly discarded. 129
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The third option, and the one eventually adopted, was to disband under protest
and to reorganize. Riedel, who was the group’s deputy chief of staff, argued that instead
of forming a reserve police force, the Einwohnerwehr be reconstituted as a secret
organization – a paramilitary force that operated independent of state control. Such a
proposal naturally matched up nicely with the original ideas that Rudolf Kanzler had laid
out in 1919. In order to have success as an underground group, the new organization had
to be selective in the number of men it admitted. Riedel envisioned a tight knit
community of men, “the truest of the true,” to carry out the fight against communism and
social democracy. They would be supplemented by a much larger organization
composed of the vast majority of former members, who would prepare the way for a
revival of national thinking along the lines set out by Escherich. 130 Thus, the ideas as set
out by Riedel, paved the way for the survival of the ultra-nationalist ideology of the
Einwohnerwehr in a new organization, one that was more committed to pursuing the
worldview espoused by the group – even if it put them in opposition to the state they
professed to love.
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Chapter 7
Filling the Void – the Creation, Organization, and Ideology of Bund Bayern und Reich
The dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr in June 1921 dealt the patriotic
(vaterländisch) movement in Bavaria a severe blow. Escherich’s organization had been
the largest and most powerful right wing group, not just in terms of numbers but in
weaponry. With a worldview that was functionally völkisch and ultranationalist, the
Einwohnerwehr helped to overturn the gains of the 1918 Revolution in the state. They
helped topple the Social Democratic government and replaced it with one more to their
membership’s liking. They also served as the shock troops for business and government
interests; crushing any political activity they deemed extremist, especially if it came from
the working class and their political allies. Their disbandment at the hands of the allies
and the Berlin government seemed to signal that the Bavarian right, which had essentially
stopped the reforming impulse of the new democratic government in Munich, was
heading for a decline in its influence.
However, rather than marking the end or the weakening of the patriotic
movement, the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr led to a spike in right wing violence at
both the state and national levels against the republic. This manifested itself in a wave of
assassinations that took place during the second half of 1921. Conspiratorial groups,
often filled with people who belonged to paramilitary units, waged a secret war against
leading figures in the republic. 1 One of their earliest victims was Matthais Erzberger,
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who had signed the Treaty of Versailles for Germany. 2 In Bavaria assassins took the life
of Karl Gareis, an Independent Socialist and member of the Bavarian Diet, in June 1921.
Gareis had been one of most outspoken opponents of the paramilitaries and of the
Einwohnerwehr in particular. His murder sparked an intense debate within the
parliament that only further weakened Gustav von Kahr’s position as Minister-President. 3
The increase in violence was also accompanied in Bavaria by a multiplication of
organizations on the political right in the aftermath of the Einwohnerwehr’s dissolution.
The favored status given to Escherich’s units had swelled it membership, often at the
expense of other groups. Part of this was due to the fact that the Einwohnerwehr
absorbed many paramilitary units that had operated on their own during the period of the
Räterepublik. The Freikorps Oberland was one such example. They were taken into the
Einwohnerwehr as a whole unit, which allowed them to keep their structure. Once
Escherich’s group was disbanded, they reconstituted themselves as an independent
entity. 4 Thus the political right in Bavaria tended to be composed of one very large
organization and many significantly smaller ones. The Nazi Party was one of these, an
association so insignificant in the years from 1919 to 1921 that Kahr scarcely paid it any
attention, even when addressed directly by Rudolf Hess about Hitler and his program. 5
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The end of the Einwohnerwehr not only brought about a revival of previous
organizations, but marked the migration of many former members into these smaller
entities, increasing their size and importance after 1921. 6
The expansion of smaller paramilitary organizations in the aftermath of the
Einwohnerwehr helped propel the creation of a successor organization to carry on the
work of Georg Escherich and Rudolf Kanzler. This eventually came to be known as
Bund Bayern und Reich. This formation, like the old Einwohnerwehr was a paramilitary
unit dedicated to the eradication of socialism in Germany, the overturning of the Treaty
of Versailles, and the propagation of a nationalist world view. However, unlike
Escherich’s association, it was overtly political in a way that the Einwohnerwehr only
implied. It was also, despite its nominal independence, more reliant upon the army for
both direction and its place as the preeminent paramilitary organization in the years 192224.
The Organisation Pittinger and the Founding of Bund Bayern und Reich
The idea for the Bund Bayern und Reich came about as the result of a debate
between leading Einwohnerwehr leaders in the weeks following the allied ultimatum of
May 1921. Several proposals were put forward within the organization’s leadership for
how to deal with the demands of the Control Commission. The most influential of these,
and the one eventually adopted, came from deputy chief of staff Riedel. In a
memorandum he argued, “The immediate formation of a secret organization from the
truest of the true ought to be simultaneously constituted and is now already being
6
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prepared.” 7 For Riedel a clandestine paramilitary group remained the only option.
Bavaria could not resist the allied demands, in his view, because open conflict would be
opposed by Social Democrats and their allies on the left, whom he believed would act as
a fifth column in the country, and because there was simply no public support for another
war even among conservative and middle class Germans. It would be easy to set up such
an organization, he claimed, by following the cell structure of communist groups. They
could even keep most of their weapons, giving up a certain number to authorities to
placate the allies but keeping the bulk secretly hidden. What was required, according to
Riedel, was a force of thirty to fifty thousand armed men, supported by a larger entity –
made up of the bulk of the Einwohnerwehr’s former members – who prepared the way
for national renewal and would serve as a reserve to the more elite force. 8
Riedel’s ideas were adopted by the Bavarian leadership and resulted in the
Einwohnerwehr being reorganized as the Organsation Pittinger on June 12, 1921. The
new organization was secret and significantly smaller than the former Einwohnerwehr,
only being referred to as OrgPi in official documents to avoid suspicion. 9 Dr. Otto
Pittinger, a health inspector (Sanitätsrat) from Regensburg, became the head of the new
group that bore his name. A master organizer, Pittinger, like many of the leaders in the
patriotic movement, had served in the German army during World War I, seeing action in
the medical corps. After the war Pittinger returned to Regensburg, where he fell in with
the extremely antisemitic Bavarian Order Block (Ordnungsblock). From there he joined
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the Einwohnerwehr, working his way up to regional leader (Kreisleiter). 10 It was in this
capacity that he served as one of the major organizers of the Organisation Escherich.
Later he was elevated to the state leadership, where he participated in the debates over
disbandment that raged amongst the Civil Guards in early 1921. Well connected to the
political elite of Bavaria and to the major figures of the patriotic movement, Pittinger
would use these contacts to help build up the Organisation Pittinger and later Bund
Bayern und Reich. 11
Pittinger became the head of the new organization with the blessing of former
Einwohnerwehr leader Escherich who, according to Otto Nusser, believed that the new
group would be run along the same lines as the old Einwohnerwehr. 12 However Pittinger
had his own ideas for the new group and these differed greatly from those of Escherich.
The most significant of these involved politics. Whereas Escherich had been able to keep
the Civil Guards from appearing overly political, Pittinger instituted a detailed political
program for new the organization, one that was more in line with the views of many
former Einwohnerwehr members. 13
Politics was not the only area where Pittinger’s style differed from Escherich’s.
The former leader had created in the Einwohnerwehr a group that had both a military and
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a police function, though the allies would eventually force them to abandon the former. 14
For his organization, however, Pittinger adopted a purely military posture in accordance
to Riedel’s ideas. The Organisation Pittinger was devoted first and foremost to
developing a dependable reserve for the German army in Bavaria. The group was
heavily supported by leading military figures like General von Möhl, who was still the
commander of the Reichswehr in Munich. This connection was crucial for building the
OrgPi in the first months of its existence, and for Bayern und Reich later. It also proved
decisive in the initial relations between Pittinger and the other paramilitaries of the
patriotic movement. To create an effective reserve force more men would be needed, as
the OrgPi was still a rather small organization. Coordination amongst the numerous
successor groups (remnants of the Einwoherwehr, the other voluntary associations, and
Bund Oberland) would be crucial to creating that reserve, and Pittinger’s favored position
gave him the incentive to try and bring these groups under his leadership. 15
The differences in approach created tensions between Pittinger and Escherich.
These spilled out into open conflict over the situation with the Orgesch, the group that
bore the former Einwohnerwehr leader’s name and that now, after the ban of June 1921,
was operating in secret. Escherich’s leadership of both groups had created a personal
union between them and, as the Organisation Pittinger was the successor to the old
Einwohnerwehr, it was still considered a member of the Organisation Escherich. This
meant that Escherich could still control the new group in his role as national leader of the
Orgesch; this might have been the intent all along. As Escherich remained very popular
among many in the patriotic movement in Bavaria, Pittinger spent much of 1921 trying to
14
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remove the OrgPi from the national organization. The feud between the two men
became so acrimonious that a meeting was held on November 4, 1921 between Pittinger,
Escherich, and Henning von der Osten (leader of the Orgesch in East Prussia) to resolve
the dispute. A compromise was reached at the meeting where Escherich remained as
head of the national group while giving Pittinger complete control over the Bavarian
organization. Despite his popularity though, Escherich’s position in the patriotic
movement was fatally compromised. Many leaders within the Orgesch began to reject
his leadership. The deteriorating situation allowed Pittinger to gain independence for his
organization. 16
If the struggle between Escherich and the Organisation Pittinger was not enough,
the Regensburg health inspector had to deal with the other patriotic associations, few of
whom found Pittinger’s pretensions to leadership inspiring. They resented having to
coordinate their activities with the OrgPi, which had the backing of the army and thus
access to funds and weapons. The result was that these organizations attacked the group,
and its leader, frequently. The paramilitary outfit most responsible for causing trouble in
late 1921 was the Bund Oberland, which was a successor organization to the Freikorps
Oberland. 17 Beginning in January 1922 Captain Josef Römer, the group’s leader started
spreading rumors about Pittinger, his association, and its political goals. The main story
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circulated about the OrgPi leader was his desire to see Bavaria secede from the Reich and
become its own country or unite with Austria. Both would be done under the auspices of
a French protectorate. 18
Römer’s accusations against Pittinger revolved around a discussion they had in
December 1921, in which he claimed that the OrgPi leader had announced that his stated
political goal was to foster Bavarian independence under the protection of France. This
accusation made its way into the press on January 30, 1922 when the Hamburg
newspaper, Welt am Montag, published an article accusing Pittinger of treasonous
activities against the German Reich. 19 These included his involvement in planning a
royalist putsch to help restore the Wittelsbach monarchy and seeking to unite with
nationalist circles in Budapest to create a Danubian confederation composed of Bavaria,
Austria, and Hungary. 20
The charges leveled against Pittinger and his group were significant enough to
warrant a response. This took the form of a pamphlet distributed by the Organisation
Pittinger in February 1922 titled, Oberland’s Leaders in the Light of Truth, which
attacked Römer and his association directly. In the document a number of
countercharges were made. First, they accused the Oberland leadership of dishonesty,
pointing out that Römer continued to interact with Pittinger and his group up to three
days before the article attacking the health inspector was published. They also pointed
out that Oberland’s leader, in the article in Welt am Montag, claimed the discussion
between him and Pittinger took place in December 1921, when in fact it had taken place
18
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in September; this fact would have made Römer as aware of many of the developments,
like the planned royalist putsch and the trip to Hungary as anyone in the patriotic
movement. Finally, the authors of the pamphlet accused the Oberland leadership of
willfully “misunderstanding” the nature of Pittinger’s address, which they claimed was
not an endorsement of secession, but a discussion of the impossibility of Bavarian
separation. 21
The feud between Pittinger and Bund Oberland, along with his struggle with
Escherich over the Organisation Pittinger’s place in Orgesch, created major rifts in the
patriotic movement. If left unchecked such a conflict might have fractured the right wing
in Bavaria, and this was a possibility that the army could not seriously entertain.
Beginning in May 1922 the Bavarian Reichswehr, in conjunction with three independent
veterans and officer associations, began an investigation of the rumors swirling around
the OrgPi leader. Chaired by General Franz Ritter von Epp, the findings were designed
to explain “about the quality of the leaders of Oberland and their business.” 22
The findings of the commission exonerated Pittinger and his group. They found
that charges brought by the leadership of Bund Oberland against the health inspector to
be completely false, concluding that Römer had indeed lied about the timing of the
meeting between himself and Pittinger. Moreover, the September meeting was not the
only one between the two men as they met in December 1921, during a period when
Römer and his associates were preparing their lies for public consumption. 23 They also
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judged harshly the organization’s decision to make these charges in a “leftist newspaper
like the Welt am Montag.” 24 They also discovered that Römer and his associates were
motivated primarily by money. According to Prince zur Lippe, who was present at the
September meeting, the main motivation of the group’s leaders there was to obtain
money from Pittinger for their own activities. 25 As a result the commission judged
Oberland’s leaders harshly. “It is profound to lament, that for such recognizably
excellent membership material an order organization is located in the hands of an equally
recognized, incapable leadership.” 26
Even before the army’s commission had handed down its verdict in July 1922, the
Organisation Pittinger had been reorganized as the Bund Bayern und Reich. The new
group came into existence in April, just as the dispute between Pittinger and the Bund
Oberland hit its peak. No official reason was given for the transformation of OrgPi from
a small conspiratorial organization into a paramilitary force; however a couple of
plausible explanations have been proffered by scholars. Hans Fenske argues that the
Organisation Pittinger was simply too small to be effective within a patriotic movement
now dominated by small, self-sustaining units that guarded their autonomy jealously and
would not surrender it to Pittinger. 27 Meanwhile, Horst Nußer claims that Bayern und
Reich came into existence as a creation of the health inspector himself, in order to
underline the differences between the new group and the old Einwohnerwehr. Such a
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distinction allowed Pittinger to gain unfettered independence from both the Orgesch and
Georg Esherich. 28
It is quite possible though that the decision to reorganize the Organisation
Pittinger as a paramilitary unit was something encouraged by Reichswehr leaders in
Bavaria. As noted they hoped to use the OrgPi as an umbrella association to coordinate
the various paramilitaries to create a dependable reserve militia for the army. After the
Einwohnerwehr the most recognizable and prominent of these was the Bund Oberland,
whose leadership was now disgraced as a result of the feud with Pittinger. With its future
now in doubt, the army might have encouraged the health inspector to create a
paramilitary of his own to ensure that a dependable right-wing force existed for the
government and military. 29
The Organizational Structure of Bund Bayern und Reich
In terms of structure Bund Bayern und Reich adhered closely to the model of
paramilitary organization used by the Einwohnerwehr. The basic organizational unit for
the group was the region, or Gau. This local body was, according to the regulations set
out in Bayern und Reich – Deutscher Freiheitsbund, “the space, in which the civic
educational work is to be accomplished.” 30 Below the local districts were the individual
community units, or Ortsgruppen, and above were the district leaders, Kreisleiter, who
answered directly to the leadership (Bundesleitung), which sat in Munich. In most
28
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administrative matters the local leader (Gauleiter) was free to run his unit as he pleased,
so long as he adhered to regulations. 31
Unlike the Einwohnerwehr, which had portrayed itself as running according to
democratic norms, Bayern und Reich was much more authoritarian in its selection of
leaders. The leadership, which was self selected, named the regional leaders, who then
chose the district leaders, who then chose the local community leaders. All district and
regional leaders served as local auxiliary leaders in conjunction with the organization’s
role as a reserve military force. Party politics was forbidden to all members in the local,
whether they were leaders or not. The justification for such a prohibition was that the
intermeshing of politics with the activities of the group created conflicts of interest that
were not easy to overcome. 32
At the top of the paramilitary stood the state leadership, which set policy and
interacted with political and military leaders. They also maintained relations with other
patriotic groups. Authoritarian though it was the leadership was aided in its work by a
couple of committees which helped mediate controversies and assisted in crafting policy.
One committee (Ausschuß) helped advise Pittinger and his subordinates on issues on a
case by case basis. The other committee, the state representative (Landesvertretung),
consisted of the leadership, a council composed of regional leaders and other special
members, the district leadership, and other patriotic groups who coordinated themselves
with Bayern und Reich. The body was designed to allow individual members the ability
to question the state leadership on matters of goals and actions undertaken by the
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organization, and to serve as a sounding board for their opinions. Called into session by
either the leadership or via written request from local offices, the state representative’s
decisions were binding with a two-thirds vote. 33
Four departments originally handled the league’s work. These were a military
and organizational department (Wehr- und Organisationsabteilung – W. u. O.), a political
department (Politische Abteilung), a propaganda and press department (Propaganda- und
Presse-Abteilung mit Nachrichtendienst), which had its own news service, and a business
and legal department (Wirtschafts- und Rechtsabteilung – W. u. R.). The military and
organizational department worked closely with the army and concerned itself with
building up local units and training. The political department naturally handled ideology
and worked closely with the propaganda and press department to spread the work of the
association. They also ran the communication office, by which orders were passed down
to local units. Finally the economic and legal department ran the organization’s affairs.
Bayern und Reich, unlike the Einwohnerwehr, was entirely independent of the state in
terms of its finances. Funds were raised independently on the district level (each regional
office had an economics official), and these depended greatly on the local relationship of
group to business interests. 34
Significantly for the future of the organization the leadership at the state level was
reorganized before the end of the first year in such a way that it deprived the group of the
type of independence that the Einwohnerwehr had enjoyed. As the founder and head of
Bayern und Reich, Pittinger controlled both the political program and the paramilitary
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functions, a combination that prevailed at all levels of leadership. However, in the fall of
1922, the health inspector was superseded by an army general, von Stetten, who took
responsibility for the association’s military wing. The army’s purpose in this move was
to ensure supremacy. “We must endeavor to have the decisive influence in all military
questions. We have to firmly fight the idea, which here and there appears, that if
necessary the secret paramilitary organizations ‘will do things’ and the army may at best
help.” 35 Of course effective control by the Reichswehr naturally had some benefits.
Bayern und Reich now became the premier paramilitary force in the state. All other
patriotic groups, if they wished to have military support and the weapons this provided
needed to ally themselves with Pittinger’s organization. 36
In terms of its membership Bund Bayern und Reich was composed of many men
who had previously been part of the old Einwohnerwehr, and a few of the regulations that
prevailed there were continued in Pittinger’s association. Members had to have an
unimpeachable reputation. They were not allowed to be members of leftist organizations,
especially those that belonged to what the leadership called “the red international.” This
included the Social Democratic Party (SPD), whose members had been allowed to join
the Einwohnerwehr, but were prohibited from signing on to Bayern und Reich.
Furthermore members must not be “defeatists, naggers, and habitual troublemakers,” for
these people were considered more dangerous than communists. 37
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The difference between the two organizations, in terms of the membership, was
that Bund Bayern und Reich required a far more explicitly political and nationalist
orientation from their members. For the Einwohnerwehr, while nationalists were
certainly welcome in the organization, their influence was balanced by the need to
preserve the state and all ‘state supporting’ elements within it. This meant that Social
Democrats, workers, and Jews could join, though not Independent Socialists or
Communists. While this led to strife in individual Einwohnerwehr units it also provided
a check against excessive radicalism. Pittinger’s units defined their nationalism far more
clearly than the Einwohnerwehr had ever done. Members had to have a “Christian and
racial attitude,” which meant that only those Germans who had a Christian and a racial
worldview were admitted as members. Moreover they had to be Aryans; no Jews, nor
anyone else from a non-German race, were allowed admittance into the Bund Bayern und
Reich. 38
The exclusion of Jews from Bund Bayern und Reich stood in sharp contrast to the
practice of the Einwohnerwehr, which took in members regardless of their religious
affiliation. It is tempting to read into this the influence of the Nazi Party and its growing
success, and certainly a case can be made for that. 1922 was a significant year for both
Hitler and his party. However, a more important contributing factor to this development
was the latent antisemitism of the Einwohnerwehr. Many Jews who had joined
Escherich’s group were often the target of whisper campaigns. The most significant of
these of course occurred in Rosenheim, where a list was circulated of Jews in the
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organization and a petition started to throw them out. 39 Even more critical was the world
view of members of the leadership. Escherich and Kanzler seemed to take an agnostic
stance on this issue, but their Chief of Staff Hermann Kriebel was a man firmly in the
völkisch camp as was Pittinger, 40 who was a member of the antisemtic Bavarian Order
Block before joining the Einwohnerwehr. 41 Bund Bayern und Reich simply adopted the
world view of its leader.
Due to the importance that the group gave to völkisch ideas in its ideology, the
propagation of such sentiments was critical to the organization’s success. All members
were expected to convey these ideas in every aspect of their lives. To ensure that their
men did this compliance a rigorous screening process was set up. Individuals could not
simply join, they were vetted by the local unit to which they applied, something
mandated in the regulations. “It is the duty of the leadership of each local group
moreover to watch, that no bad elements worm themselves into our league.” 42 For the
state leadership it was more important to gain quality recruits for the group, as opposed to
massive numbers. Local offices were required to make the applicant agree to every point
of the organization’s ideological program. This was done before the local leadership
(Vorstandschaft), so they could judge the applicant. Initiates had to swear their fealty to
the ideas of the league in the home and in their official lives. Once completed the
applicant was voted in or out by local leaders. 43
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Members, once in Bund Bayern und Reich, were obliged to cover a couple of
costs in order to help the group run effectively. All members had to subscribe to the
weekly newspaper, Bayern und Reich, which reinforced the ideological program of the
organization, and to which individual associates were encouraged to submit articles on a
periodic basis. These subscriptions were ordered through the post office, or the printer,
though the state leadership preferred the latter as it allowed them to use their own
financial officials in the transaction. In addition, members had to contribute dues to the
organization, as Bayern und Reich was independent of government assistance.
Considering the economic distress of the period in which the group was founded (just
before the Hyperinflation of 1923), the leadership took great pains to keep dues to the
bare minimum. Each local unit was required to charge all of its associates twenty
Pfennig per month. For units that contained more than fifty men the contribution was to
be ten Marks for the unit as a corporate body. It was expected that the leadership in each
town and city would make the case for such contributions. 44
The Ideology of Bund Bayern und Reich
The ideological program of Pittinger’s organization built upon the foundations
begun by the Einwohnerwehr. These foundations placed a premium on support for a
highly stylized nationalism, hatred of all radical (read: socialist) tendencies, and a desire
to return to the sense of solidarity that prevailed at the beginning of the First World
War. 45 In the new group these tendencies were given more concrete expression. Thus,
the völksch tendencies that had been hinted at in the Einwohnerwehr became the overt

44
45

Ibid.
Heimatland, “Gedanken am Königsplatz,” 30. September 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3.

186
world view of Bund Bayern und Reich. The differences that existed between Pittinger’s
group and organizations like Bund Oberland and the Nazi Party were not based in
völkisch ideology, which the Nazis accepted, but in certain aspects of the program that
Hitler and his interlocutors believed were backwards-thinking.
The main purpose of the Bund Bayern und Reich was to help free Germany from
without and within. In their regulations and many of their correspondences they referred
to themselves as a “freedom league,” or Freiheitsbund. In this capacity they sought to
transform the nation. “Our league wants to be a school for the people, wants to unite the
best forces in the land, and wants to rear our young boys into men.” 46 To achieve their
lofty goals, Bayern und Reich spent a great deal of time on outreach to the young,
establishing local youth chapters in most Bavarian cities and requiring their members to
enroll their children in such organizations. They also sought to reach German mothers,
whom they saw as critical for propagating the Bund’s ideas and values within the family,
which was the “cornerstone of the state.” Given a firm foundation in the family and with
the young, the radical nationalist ideology of Bayern und Reich would help revive
Germany. 47
Völkisch ideas ran throughout the political mission statement of Pittinger’s
organization. Key among these was the concept of the Volksgemeinschaft, or community
of the people. This notion, as noted earlier, had been held by völkisch thinkers and
groups since the late nineteenth century. As George Mosse, who chronicled the
development of this ideology, noted, the tendency of these groups was to emphasize the
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interlocking nature of German society. Theirs was not an egalitarian ethos, but a
stratified culture where all parts worked for the betterment of the whole. 48 It was a
utopian vision, one that most patriotic groups held in the early 1920s and it was a key
element in the program of Bayern und Reich.
The members were pledged to work for this Volksgemeinschaft. “Each member
does his part in his region to this end; that class differences are overcome, that finally the
true community of the people is effective.” 49 This was to be accomplished by bridging
the divide between the classes, a divide that had been exacerbated by war and revolution.
One way of doing that was to permit wide membership. The regulations stipulated that
Bayern und Reich had an open membership policy. Anyone could join the group,
provided they had a völkisch worldview, were German, and did not subscribe to any
ideologies or belong to any groups outside of the Volksgemeinschaft. As Captain
Hofberger, the ostensible author of Bayern und Reich: Deutscher Freiheitsbund, put it,
“only when the German citizen, the German farmer, and the German worker go hand in
hand and work together, will it succeed in overcoming the emergency and saving our
Germany.” 50
Propaganda materials spent a great deal of time extolling the virtues of the
Volksgemeinschaft. Pittinger’s group distributed a fair amount of nationalist literature,
teaching materials, songbooks, and other materials designed to increase nationalist
feeling and spread the message of the group. 51 Patriotic songs, for instance, emphasized
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military marches, traditional folk tunes, and songs written exclusively for Bayern und
Reich. 52 Additionally, the leadership ran a number of instructional courses that
highlighted the organization’s program. The members who took part in these courses
were those who seemed especially capable of rhetorical argument. Classes were
conducted in small groups and held at the group’s headquarters at Möhlstrasse 10. Costs
were borne by the local offices. Once completed the individual member would be able to
continue instructional work in the organization’s regions and districts. 53
Due to the overt völkisch bent of Bund Bayern und Reich, Jews were not allowed
to become members, and reducing their influence became one of the overarching goals of
the organization. This differed greatly from the former Einwohnerwehr where the
leadership maintained an ecumenical stance despite the fact that antisemitism was
widespread amongst the local units. In Pittinger’s association though anti-Jewish
sentiments were an integral part of the program and were expressed outright by both the
leadership and the organization’s members. The regulations stated it thusly, “There is no
place in our league for members a different race than the Germans. We are racial
Germans; therefore Jews also cannot be taken in.” 54
Like many other völkisch groups of the period, and in previous decades, Bund
Bayern und Reich accused Germany’s Jews of every conceivable ill that befell the
country. Their charges consisted of all the usual antisemitic tropes. They were accused
of being behind the spirit of materialism, which they saw as corrupting society. “The
Jewish materialistic spirit of the revolution has brought about an egotistical hedonism,
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which not only damages our image domestically and internationally, but our national
economy and the national health as well.” 55 Jews were responsible for the scourge of
Marxism, whose political representatives they saw as responsible for the revolution and
the Weimar Republic. Hofberger’s ideological pamphlet made this explicit with the
extraordinary claim that nearly ninety percent of socialist and labor union leaders were
Jews. They were behind economic woes, whether as high finance capitalists, or as
swindlers and black marketers – a scourge that Bayern und Reich, like the
Einwohnerwehr before them, saw everywhere. Finally, Jews were accused, along with
others, of being the traitors who had helped to defeat the country in the First World
War. 56
Diminishing the position of German Jews, and those from Eastern Europe who
were seen as dangerous immigrants, was thus central to the program of Bund Bayern und
Reich. This stance was clearly in line with the thinking of other patriotic groups, but
owing to the prominent position of Pittinger’s organization in the calculations of the army
and government their antisemitic stance was challenged by Jewish leaders in the state.
The most prominent of these Jewish critics was Fritz Buchmann, a lawyer from
Regensburg, who sought to persuade the Bayern und Reich leader of the error of his
organization’s völkisch stance. In a couple of letters in October 1923, Buchmann
attacked the racial conceptions on which the group’s worldview was based. 57
In Buchmann’s view the patriotic associations, and Bayern und Reich as the most
significant of them, made several categorical errors in their antisemitic program. The
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first of these was that all German Jews were treated as one, undifferentiated, mass. No
complexity was allowed to enter their narrative about Jews. Moreover, no exception was
made in the program of Pittinger’s organization, or others, for differentiating between
Eastern European Jews (Ostjuden) and native born German Jews. Buchmann complained
that only in Germany could one find the kind of bewailing about Jewish influence in
society and politics, even though in most European countries one could find Jewish
ministers and officials with nary a complaint, even though some countries, like France,
had a more pronounced history of official antisemitism. Most important of all,
Buchmann’s letter attacked the notion that Jews were responsible for the radical politics
of the Marxists, noting that it was a German Jew who was one of the founders of the
German National People’s Party. 58
The central message of Buchmann’s letters to Pittinger was that, for a healthy
patriotic movement to flourish, it needed to be free of the racial ideas that placed German
Jews outside the community of the people. “The healthy patriotic movement ought to
find means and ways, to attract those patriotically hostile Germans and so also the core
German parts of the Jewish community in any form to spiritual and material service.” 59
He rejected the notion that one could separate Jewish influence or culture out of German
society as many patriotic groups wanted to do. Jews were crucial to the history of
Germany, he noted, and had always been in the German fatherland since the time of the
Romans. What he proposed was that Bund Bayern und Reich, which he called the most
important organization in the patriotic movement, enter into collaboration with the
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organization he represented, the National Association of German Jews, to help rebuild
Bavaria and Germany. 60
The desire of some Bavarian Jews to help out in the patriotic movement was not
without precedent. The membership of Jews in the Einwohnerwehr has already been
documented. Many Jewish politicians also oriented themselves to the political right, as
Buchmann noted in his letter. Even outside of Germany some Jews gravitated towards
right wing political movements. Many Italian Jews joined Benito Mussolini’s Fascist
Party in the early 1920s, some even advancing to positions of leadership within it. They
did so because Mussolini rejected, at least in this period, the kind of racial antisemitism
practiced by many on the German right – though Mussolini had been known to make
anti-Jewish statements. Individual Fascists might attack Jews over the issue of Zionism,
but the wholesale rejection of Jewish membership as seen in Pittinger’s organization was
not practiced. 61 These examples notwithstanding, the efforts of people like Buchmann to
change the ideological direction of Bayern und Reich failed to move the leaders of the
group and it would continue to maintain a völkisch stance vis-à-vis Bavarian Jews.
Closely related to antisemitism was the organization’s unrelenting hatred of
Communism and Socialism. One of the eight principles that all volunteers had to agree
to in order to become a member was “the Struggle against Marxism as the enemy of any
racial political system.” 62 For the leadership of the organization Communism went hand
in hand with their antipathy towards Jews. Like all völkisch ideologues, the members of
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Bayern und Reich saw German Jews as essentially rootless cosmopolitans, who foisted
materialism and Bolshevism on the nation. Thus the struggle against this ideology
represented the high water mark of nationalist thought and sentiment. 63
In a very practical way this meant struggle against the Marxist parties of the
German left: the Social Democrats, the Independent Social Democrats, and the
Communists. Unlike the Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern und Reich did not make any
distinction among these parties. To them, the socialist parties were all guilty of unpatriotic activity and thought; their sins against the fatherland were numerous. They were
responsible for the country’s loss in the First World War and the advent of the Weimar
Republic. “On November 9, 1918 ‘all power to the people’ belonged to the leaders of
social democracy. The republic was here. No one could stand again them; no one did
stand against them. All roads were open to socialism.” 64 As the originators and first
leaders of the republic, the political left was accused of collusion with the wartime allies,
particularly in the fulfillment of the country’s treaty obligations and their failure to
oppose allied measures, something which they claimed made another European war more
likely, not less. 65 In later years they accused Social Democrats of fomenting civil war by
creating their own paramilitary organization, the Reichsbanner, to protect the republic
from patriotic organizations like Bayern und Reich. 66 Finally, the Social Democrats and
its allies were accused of making the economic conditions in Germany and Bavaria worse
through their economic program, which included measures designed to help the workers
and increase the social safety net. “A social democratically influenced government
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benefits international financial powers, from whom the Social Democracy and their
unions are admittedly being strongly subsidized financially and bring us certainly new
inflation and grisly wretchedness.” 67
The First World War loomed large in the ideological world view of Pittinger’s
men. Bund Bayern und Reich, like the Einwohnerwehr before it, believed that the unity
provided by World War I had been the high water mark of German national feeling, and
the loss of that during the course of the war and following went a long way towards
explaining the country’s predicament in the early 1920s. To overcome it Germans and
Bavarians would need to get back to the unity of 1914, especially for the sake of the
young. “Awaken again in our young love of the homeland. Honor the old traditions and
the old habits and customs of our homeland, the traditional dress of our people. Who has
knowledge of our local history and geography, should tell it to the others, for whom the
history of a people is a master teacher.” 68
One way to help revive this feeling of unity was to dramatize German heroics in
the war. The leadership’s propaganda department published a series of essays about the
war designed to instill pride in German military exploits amongst the young. Authored
by Rudolf von Xylander, these essays covered all the important campaigns in the conflict.
They also justified the actions taken by the German armed forces and government. For
instance, in the eighth essay, which concerned the war at sea, Xylander highlighted the
success of surface units of the German navy, which had effectively been bottled up by
British forces, while downplaying the actions of U-boats. When these were mentioned
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the authors justified their use as being consistent with the rights of nations at war and by
pointing British hypocrisy in the matter. 69
Perhaps the easiest way to revive the “spirit of 1914” was of course to agitate
against the Treaty of Versailles. German opinion about the dictated peace ran high across
the political spectrum. For Bayern und Reich the fight against the peace treaty was the
group’s highest goal. “In order to become a free people again, we must struggle against
the disgraceful peace of Versaillses, which is nothing more than the instrument of our
enemies to rob, subvert, and finally to fully destroy us.” 70 For Pittinger’s organization
the Treaty of Versailles represented the high point of national disgrace. The German
government, in their view, had trusted the word of the allies which, according to one
propaganda leaflet, was undermined by the machinations of French policy and the perfidy
of the British and Americans. 71 Moreover, the republic’s Social Democratic leaders had
not only gone along with the travesty, but further encouraged the fulfillment of the
treaty’s provisions. The members of Bayern und Reich, and other patriotic groups,
believed this was shameful and that it would be necessary to hold out for an “honorable
peace.” 72
The patriotic movement and Bund Bayern und Reich in particular were to be the
vanguard for helping the German government overcome Versailles. This would be done
through maintenance of the weaponry of the paramilitary group, its actions against leftist
interests in Bavaria, and most of all working to replace the republican form of
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government in Germany. 73 Once again, the country’s internal political dynamic was tied
to the international situation. The advent of the Weimar Republic had been a
consequence of World War I, and the new political constitution that resulted from it was
seen as the ultimate marker of the country’s defeat. The liberties that came with it were
in their view false. “With this freedom, through this equality, under this sovereignty we
the people come under the hands of robbers, windbags, and charlatans. So the most
undetachable of all rights, the sovereignty of the people ends up a continuous struggle
between swindlers and dupes.” 74 Replacing the republican government, thus, was a
necessary step in nullifying the treaty.
The question of course was what form of government to pursue, and it was in this
question, among others, that the real differences between Bund Bayern und Reich and
even more radical groups like the Nazi Party emerged. The ideological program in these
areas is what has traditionally marked Pittinger’s organization as a conservative group in
the eyes of historians rather than a true völkisch entity like Bund Oberland. 75 Bayern und
Reich’s different stance on these issues that helped contribute to many of the internal
squabbles amongst patriotic groups beginning in late 1922. It also helped to partially
explain the reticence that the leadership had in helping out with the Beer Hall Putsch.
The most decisive difference the group had with more radical völkisch groups was
in the type of government that they hoped to see implemented in Germany. In its
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regulations Bund Bayern und Reich made the restoration of the monarchy an important
part of their program. In the eyes of the leadership this was crucial for the revival of both
Bavaria and the Reich. “We hold the monarchy as the most appropriate form of
government for the German race.” 76 They believed that a royal government in Bavaria
and Germany had several important benefits, not the least of which was its perceived
ability to stand above party interests. In addition, a monarchical form of government
would help to revive federalism, an issue of particular importance in Munich. Finally,
they believed a king would be more capable of taking the reins of government in their
hand more forcefully than a parliamentary democracy, something they believed was
necessary at the time. 77
The leadership of Bund Bayern und Reich was well aware of the difficulties in
achieving this goal. As the regulations put it, “The people should then decide the
monarchical question when the time for it is ripe.” 78 The means, by which monarchy
would return to Bavaria and Germany, were spelled out in an essay, Ways to the
Monarchy, put out by the organization. In it they stated that the return of dynastic
government could only be accomplished in the individual states, not in the Reich as a
whole, where the “fanaticism” of republicanism was too well entrenched. This left
Bayern und Reich, and its allies, with one of two options, either reestablish a monarchical
form of government claiming that Bavaria was a special case in Germany, or work with
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royalists in other states to overturn the Weimar Republic and its constitution. The
leadership was convinced that the second of these options was more likely. 79
Once established the second difficulty was in finding a king, or kaiser, to rule. As
noted none of the dynasties of the old German Reich were popular, and Bayern und Reich
did not overtly suggest that a member of one of these houses be given the throne. Instead
they sought one man who had the right ideological characteristics who could take charge
of the situation, and then be proclaimed, or elected, as sovereign. This solution bore
striking resemblance to the way in which the Catholic Church selects Popes, picking the
man who had the esteem of the College of Cardinals. 80 Whoever fit these characteristics
would then begin to transform German society from, “a leaderless mass into monarchical
organism.” 81
The inclusion of monarchism in the ideological program of Bund Bayern und
Reich created a significant split between it and more radical völkisch groups.
Organizations like Bund Oberland and the Nazi Party were not prepared to accept the
return of monarchy to Bavaria, or Germany. Their position was that the ruling house had
“run away” from their responsibilities in 1918. As a result it was useless to bring such
elements back into power in Germany, even by popular acclaim. One officer even said
that the great struggle on the right was between those who wanted a greater German
republic and those who desired a “south German Catholic monarchy.” 82
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Another important difference between Pittinger’s organization and the other
elements of the patriotic movement was in its view of federalism. The regulations of
Bund Bayern und Reich stated that, “What we want is a strong Bavaria in a strong
Reich.” 83 For the group’s leaders the Bismarckian Reich had been the high point in
German political organization, a state that respected the rights of the individual provinces
(Bavaria above all) while maintaining a powerful national government. “Only if the
individual members of the Reich can be given complete, full, and invigorated expression
in themselves, if the individual federal states are animalistic and developable, if we also
again have a Bavaria as it was before the revolution, standing strongly on its own feet,
worthy of its many centuries of history, than we will again attain past German glory and
power.” 84
The federalist issue was one that complicated Bayern und Reich’s relationship to
the other groups in the patriotic movement, as well as the government in Munich. The
desire to create a unitary Reich is partially what drove the Nazi Party, Bund Oberland,
and Ernst Röhm’s Reichskriegsflagge to leave the League of Patriotic Associations
(Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände) and form the Fighting League, or Kampfbund, in
January 1923. As the leadership noted in a circular memo, differences between Bayern
und Reich and Hitler, on this issue, were unbridgeable. 85 Additionally, Pittinger’s
organization constantly encouraged the Bavarian government, controlled by the Bavarian
People’s Party, to stand firm against the encroachments of Berlin. In 1924, a dispute over
the raising of fees on the German Rail service prompted Pittinger to write a detailed letter
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complaining of the government’s failure to stop the centralizing tendencies of the
national government, a matter made worse by the fact that rate hikes were done partially
in order to appease the allies. 86
The final difference in the ideological program of Bund Bayern und Reich, when
compared to the Nazi Party, concerned the issue of religion. New members were pledged
to uphold traditional Christianity. “Without religion and the fear of god there is no
ordered house, there is no ordered political system.” 87 They felt that the decline of
religion would lead necessarily to the decline of the state, and this was something that
could not be countenanced. Additionally, religious conflict was also considered
anathema to Bayern und Reich. “Today whoever wants to begin confessional disputes is
a criminal to the people.” 88 This of course, placed Pittinger’s organization somewhat at
odds with the Nazi Party, which had its origins in the radical Thule Society – a group that
believed in a German Christianity more in line with concepts of race. 89 Many leading
Nazis firmly believed in the Aryanized form of the religion espoused by the Society,
however, as numerous scholars have noted, the Party’s relationship to the Church was
always more opportunistic, using the Church when necessary, and ignoring, or even
attacking, it when the situation called for it. 90
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The ideological worldview of Bund Bayern und Reich clearly was radical and in
line with almost all of the organizations of the German right. They desired to overthrow
the current government, continue the struggle against Marxism, and reduce, if not
eradicate, the influence of Jews in German society. This made them a threat to the
democratic leaders in Bavaria and throughout the Reich. However, the differences
between Bayern und Reich and groups like Bund Oberland and the Nazi Party were
significant enough to create problems for Pittinger and his men as they conducted their
activities. These became increasingly difficult to carry out as the years went on.
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Chapter 8
Rising Discord – Bund Bayern und Reich, The Nazi Party, and the Rift in the Patriotic
Movement
Due to the nature of its organization and ideological program, Bund Bayern und
Reich was involved in more activities than the old Einwohnerwehr. Conceived as a force
to defend the state against all radical threats, the Einwohnerwehr was circumscribed in
the types of activities it could undertake. For instance, it could not plot to overthrow the
government, advocate for the dissolution of the Weimar Constitution, or overtly
coordinate with the army. Pittinger’s paramilitary group, on the other hand, did not have
these shackles, and fairly quickly became involved in the revolutionary challenge to
Germany’s republican leaders, even as it continued to engage in many of the practices
carried over from the Einwohnerwehr.
Despite its more activist agenda, Pittinger’s association was hamstrung in its
actions by its close relationship to the army and certain political leaders. Their proximity
to government power constantly undercut their ability to lead the organizations of the
patriotic (vaterländisch) movement, which was beginning to split into two factions, one
surrounding the United Patriotic Leagues of Bavaria (Vereinigte Vaterländische
Verbände Bayerns), to which Bayern und Reich belonged and a more radical wing that
began to coalesce around Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party. Their rapid rise to prominence
in 1923 posed a challenge to Pittinger and his associates. Not only did the revolutionary
rhetoric of Hitler begin to weaken the loyalty of many local units to Bayern und Reich,
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but it also attracted allies who firmly believed that the Regensburg health inspector had
no stomach for the struggle against the Weimar Republic.
The Activities of Bund Bayern und Reich
As a standalone organization, Bund Bayern und Reich undertook the activities
typical of many paramilitary groups of the period. They trained constantly with illegal
weapons, which were stored in caches all over Bavaria. 1 They protected businesses from
the depredations of radical workers and their communist organizers. 2 They held patriotic
festivals and evenings, 3 where singing and speeches were always on order. 4 Many of
these actions had been staples of the former Einwohnerwehr and were continued by
Bayern und Reich. The most prominent of these, naturally, were the shooting festivals.
A frequent occurrence amongst the local groups of the Einwohnerwehr, these
celebrations served the same purpose for Bayern und Reich: to celebrate the group’s
mission, which was self-defense, and to help hone their shooting skills. They also
allowed the organization to send an intimidating message to its enemies about its
willingness to resort to arms in defense of the Bavarian homeland. 5
The group, however, expanded its activities into areas that the Einwohnerwehr
had been unable, or unwilling, to go. One of these involved ideological campaigns
against the Weimar Republic, and its democratic leaders. The Einwohnerwehr put out
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propaganda that attacked Social Democrats, Communists, and their affiliated
organizations. 6 In addition to this they argued for the revival of a patriotic Germany and
the “Spirit of 1914.” 7 The posters, essays, and placards of Pittinger’s organization,
however, not only took aim at radical groups, but the mainline Social Democratic Party
and the Weimar constitution itself. To be sure, the materials never endorsed a particular
political party on the right. They did, however, support a position, a worldview that left
the reader in no doubt as to the organization’s preferences. 8
Bund Bayern und Reich’s propaganda activities were always designed with
Bavarian youth in mind. It was necessary to win the young for the patriotic movement.
This had been a major point in the organization’s ideological program, 9 and would
manifest itself in the group’s activities. Local units helped maintain, or start, youth clubs
which their children joined. There the young would be trained in the pedagogical and,
more importantly, the ideological worldview of the movement. Physical fitness, personal
sobriety, a sense of service, and love of the fatherland were all major aspects of the work
of the youth groups run by Pittinger’s group. Additionally these clubs were designed to
create a pool of future recruits for Bayern und Reich. Youths were to be trained in the
use of small caliber weaponry and given lessons in how to be a soldier, and why it was
honorable to serve as one. 10
In spite of their efforts, however, many of the youth of Bavaria gravitated away
from Bund Bayern und Reich as they matured. One of the characteristics of Bavarian
6
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youth, noted by the Pittinger and his men, was their tendency to join multiple
paramilitaries or other patriotic organizations. As James Diehl noted, many of the young
adult and teenagers of the 1920s had been weaned on the Wandervögel movement of the
early twentieth century, where they were exposed to many of the völkisch ideas espoused
by Bayern und Reich. However, influenced by the experiences of the previous decade
they found some of the political ideas of Pittinger’s group to be quaint and outdated, and
were attracted to the more revolutionary rhetoric of the Nazi Party and its allies. Despite
this fact, Pittinger and the leadership remained confident that, given the opportunity,
youth would come back to Bayern und Reich because of its völkisch world view and
plans for the revival of the fatherland. 11
The activities of Bund Bayern und Reich, like its propaganda, were also aimed at
the country’s internal enemies on the left, the Social Democratic Party, the Communist
Party, and their affiliated organizations. For the leadership it was imperative to strike
against the left because they represented utopian thinking at its most dangerous. German
socialists, in their view, sought to separate the workers from the community in which
they had been raised. The imposition of an un-German political and economic form on
the country by the Social Democrats – unsurprisingly they blamed this on Jewish
influence – was exacerbated by the example of the Soviet Union, where civil war and
famine had followed the Bolshevik seizure of power. Thus, in their view, the history of
socialism and communism was a cautionary tale for the Reich. When coupled with the
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difficulties of the early post-war period, fear of the political left and the need to fight it
became an imperative for groups like Bund Bayern und Reich. 12
In practical terms this meant a continuation of the kinds of activities against the
German left that had characterized the Einwohnerwehr. These included defending
business interests, monitoring and breaking up communist agitation amongst the working
class, and protecting the state from revolutionary activity. The paranoia that had defined
the Bavarian government, under both Hofmann and Kahr, from 1919 to 1921 continued
in 1922 and 1923 and, coupled with the deteriorating international and economic
situation, gave Bund Bayern und Reich a situation they and other patriotic groups
exploited.
Reports from government officials reported on any hints of discontent amongst
the population and they found plenty to cause worry. For instance, in 1922 in the region
around Dachau small farmers expressed discontent with rising prices and taxes. While
normally this would be a group that would have been solid supporters of the existing
order, in this case the government worried about the efforts of the Communists in Bavaria
to reach out to smaller farmers. 13 Communist leaders in Bavaria were often monitored,
and then arrested for their activities. These included trying to set up workers councils in
Bavaria, especially in the Bavarian Palatinate, a region directly under allied control at the
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time. 14 By the beginning of 1923 fears of communist insurrection had become so acute
amongst official circles that the government felt that the only way they could deal with
the situation was by increasing cooperation with organizations like Bayern und Reich.
Pittinger’s group often found itself in violent altercations with workers and their
representatives, the people often most discontented with the political and economic
situation as it then stood. These incidents usually tended to see a fair amount of
cooperation amongst patriotic units, usually one of the few times they did cooperate
amicably, according to Harold Gordon. 15 One such incident occurred at the German Day
celebration held in Coburg in October 1922. There altercations broke out between rally
participants and the roughly 200-300 workers who sought to break it up by confronting
the demonstrators at the train station. Despite their efforts, police were able to keep order
long enough for participants, including Hitler, to make their way from the train station to
the local beer hall. 16 Similarly during an anti-Fascist Day held in the city of Rosenheim
in July 1923 the local unit of Bayern und Reich became involved in violent exchanges
with the protesters. 17 Claiming that they were “radical communists,” local leaders
asserted that they had been attacked due to the atmosphere of such demonstrations, and
thus were forced to defend themselves. 18
The increasing vehemence of these clashes, particularly during the difficult year
1923, found Bund Bayern und Reich increasingly at the center of the government’s
14
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preparations for potential emergencies. Authorities were convinced that civil strife could
break out into open conflict at any time and felt it was necessary to be prepared for this
eventuality. The army in particular, was concerned for the need to maintain control in
Bavaria. They already had a working relationship with health inspector Pittinger and his
paramilitary unit, one that was exclusive. However, as the situation deteriorated over the
course of 1923, army leaders found it imperative to make the relationship even closer.
One way of doing this was to exercise direct control over the military half of
Bund Bayern und Reich. The army had already done so in the fall of 1922, with Pittinger
still allowed to be in charge of the political department, and overall, head of the
organization, but with a reliable military man in charge of the W.O. office. 19 The
reorganization was just the beginning, however, as the army chose to use Bayern und
Reich to help create a military reserve, or Volkswehr, in Bavaria. Pittinger’s organization
was chosen because “the state cannot even do it after the current political situation, the
setting up and organizing of one (military reserve) in determined strength.” 20 The reserve
was designed primarily to help preserve state authority. Units were to be organized by
Bayern und Reich on the local level, just like their own group. The men who were to be
recruited into these units, however, were much older, between thirty-five and forty-five
years of age, and free from any party political influence. Unlike Pittinger’s association,
which financed itself via membership dues and donations, the military reserve would be
supported by the state itself. 21
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The leadership had a difficult line to walk with the military reserve. On the one
hand, they saw its usefulness, particularly in times of war when the army would need to
mobilize men very quickly. In this instance, they could count on the support of a military
reserve. However, they doubted whether the organization was useful in the case of
domestic disturbance, particularly when Bayern und Reich provided all the functions of a
reserve in those instances. Moreover, as an official military reserve under army control
they were subject to orders from Berlin, which Bayern und Reich was not. “The
Reichswehr is the instrument of the Reich government in all instance of domestic
disturbances and that must be reckoned with, that it [Reichswehr] – as was already the
case, being needed for use in strife filled territories outside Bavaria.” 22 With the national
government in the hands of a coalition (Cuno) they saw as detrimental to the interest of
patriotic paramilitaries, the Bayern und Reich leadership felt they could only support the
creation of a military reserve as long as their own domestic program was not undercut. 23
Having run into resistance with their idea of a military reserve run by Bund
Bayern und Reich, the military leaders sought different ways to coordinate the patriotic
groups. Conceiving of a Bavaria defended by three forces, the Reichswehr, the
paramilitaries of the patriotic movement, and a reserve police used in emergencies, the
government created an emergency police force, or Notpolizei. 24 This entity, created in
the spring of 1923 was designed to help rural areas maintain law and order. The Ministry
of the Interior took the lead in organizing the force, but groups like Bund Bayern und
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Reich were critical to helping fill its ranks. On the part of the authorities this was
designed to further improve coordination amongst the patriotic bands. 25
Despite their hopes, the creation of the emergency police did create problems
amongst patriotic groups. The regulations set out by the Ministry of Interior specified
that only organizations loyal to the state (staatstreu) were allowed to participate in the
emergency police. This had the effect of disqualifying the Nazi Party and the other
groups because of their extremism and even their distrust of the reigning conservative
government in Munich. 26 This extended to Bund Oberland, whose members believed
that the emergency police was being set up exclusively through Bayern und Reich. In the
case of Oberland, however, the government’s reticence partially stemmed from the
organization’s long feud with Pittinger in 1922 as by their radicalism. 27 This led to a new
round of accusations between the two groups, as Pittinger accused the new Oberland
leaders of spreading lies about him and his organization to officials in the Interior
Ministry. 28
It also created problems for Bayern und Reich, which had difficult relations with
several local districts and units in 1923. Particularly noteworthy in this respect was the
local region around Freising, which was a part of Pittinger’s paramilitary group, but often
styled itself as Organisation, or Bund Unterland. The leadership wrote the local leader
there in May 1923 inquiring if his group was suitable as a participant in the emergency
police. The danger, from Pittinger’s perspective, was that Unterland’s participation in
some local events with the Nazi Party, including a rally where Hitler was feted as “a great
25
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man,” might give the officials pause in working closely with Bayern und Reich or the
Freising local. 29
The close coordination between the army and Bund Bayern und Reich naturally
raised questions about the organization’s relationship to the Bavarian government itself.
Most scholars have seen in the group’s interactions with the governing coalition in
Munich a lukewarm to close relationship, depending on party. This relationship could
become strained if the governing coalition strayed too far from patriotic ideas. 30 Mostly,
though, Bund Bayern und Reich’s relationship to party politics was guided by its status as
a paramilitary force. The majority of its interactions with officials were from the
military. When it did interact with party politics it kept its activities confined to
lobbying, sometimes intensely, for its own point of view.
The main efforts of Bund Bayern und Reich in the political sphere had to do with
constitutional questions. Naturally this was an outgrowth of the organization’s program,
which had as its goal a federal form of government and a monarchy. 31 While the
recreation of a kingdom in Bavaria seemed somewhat out of reach, the group was
particularly keen to preserve the federal nature of the German Reich, something they, like
the Einwohnerwehr before them, saw as under attack from the centralizing tendencies of
Berlin. “In the Weimar constitution the federalist principle has been replaced by the
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unitary one.” 32 For Pittinger’s men, the Bismarckian constitution, which granted rights
and privileges to the individual states was more satisfactory, a Reich filled with
individual, semi-autonomous, states as had prevailed, at least for Bavaria, prior to 1914. 33
Preparations for revising the Bavarian state constitution began in the spring of
1923. 34 These changes were a result of a two factors. One was the dynamics of party
politics in Bavaria, where the governing coalition, particularly the Bavarian People’s
Party, hoped to preserve local power. 35 Another was the advocacy of the patriotic
movement, particularly Bayern und Reich. The ruling coalition parties, the Middle Party
and the Bavarian People’s Party, promised Pittinger and other vaterländisch groups that
they would introduce bills in the Diet to do away with parliamentary democracy, a major
goal of Bayern und Reich. However, these bills ended up delayed for one reason or
another such as religious holidays and the opposition of smaller parties. This created
suspicion within the Bund as to the true intent of the government on this question,
something noted quite clearly by the leadership. 36
Bayern und Reich’s purpose in doing away with parliamentary democracy was
first and foremost, to protect the federalist structure of the old Reich. “The German
national state is generally only possible in the concentration of the historically developed
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German member states and on the basis of their political and cultural existence.” 37 They
believed that the Weimar Constitution was part and parcel of the old struggle of German
nationalists to create a unitary state in opposition to the individual state. It went against
the will of the people as they saw it. It also violated what they felt was the special
character of Bavaria within the German Reich. This compelled them to strive against any
and all attempts by Berlin to expand its powers. 38
Their fears in this area approached hysterical paranoia. Pittinger and his men
firmly believed that the national government was planning to take over Bavaria at any
time. In October 1923, as the political situation built towards the Beer Hall Putsch, the
Bayern und Reich leadership reported that the government in Berlin “waits only for the
opportunity to bring the Bavarian state of emergency, and the inconvenient man, to an
end.” 39 To this end, it was reported, the Reich cabinet was preparing a law to allow them
to circumvent local statutes in Munich. Additionally, the army leadership in Berlin
sought to impose new regulations on the Bavarian Reichswehr, which General von Epp
(one of the originators of Freikorps in the state) saw as a reduction of the state’s rights. 40
Bund Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues of Bavaria
Pittinger’s organization was certainly the largest of the Bavarian Wehrverbände,
but not the only one devoted to helping create a patriotic utopia in the Freistaat. There
were seventy-three such entities in Bavaria in the early 1920s, some of which, like
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Bayern und Reich, were paramilitary formations. 41 Others, like the Pan-German League,
were patriotic groups devoted to a certain ideological line. Others, like the Nazi Party,
were involved primarily in politics. Patriotic groups grew exponentially in the wake of
the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr, but it also weakened the movement in the pursuit
of its goals. This situation would need to be overcome if the patriotic movement hoped
to play any role in Bavarian, or German, politics and society.
The solution was the creation of the Union of Patriotic Leagues of Bavaria, or
Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände Bayerns. This organization itself was part of a
much larger entity, the United Patriotic Leagues of Germany (Vereinigte Vaterländische
Verbände Deutschlands), and the Bavarian group was nominally subservient to the
leaders in Berlin, though it was the largest and most important of the provincial
organizations. The United Patriotic Leagues was organized in the summer of 1922 and
was headed by Dr. Hermann Bauer, a man that Harold Gordon referred to as Theodore
Roosevelt in reverse. 42 Composed of a wide diversity of patriotic societies, the group
acted only with the consent of the leaders of the individual associations. Thus Pittinger,
as head of the organization’s major paramilitary, held great influence. 43 It also
potentially served the interests of the army leadership, who despaired over the need to
bring all the paramilitary groups together in one entity. 44
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Numerous organizations were involved in the United Patriotic Leagues. Some
were political organizations like the Pan-German League. Others were veteran groups
like the National League of German Officers (Nationalverband deutscher Offiziere) and
the Union of Bavarian Regimental Officers (Verband bayerische OffiziersRegimentsvereine). Special interest associations, such as the Central union of German
War Wounded (Zentralverband deutscher Kriegsbeschädigter), were also included in the
organization. The diversity of members led to the creation of nine different groupings to
allow Bauer the ability to coordinate their activities more effectively. Bund Bayern und
Reich held a special place in the United Patriotic Leagues. Not only was it the largest
paramilitary organization, but by December 1924 it was the only one. 45
The primary activities of the United Patriotic Leagues were propaganda
campaigns designed to win adherents to a patriotic point of view. These were directed at
the parties of the left during elections, or to argue against certain policies. 46 The purpose
naturally was to get Germans to look at the post-war years as a time of defeat, weakness,
and division; something that could only be rectified by adopting the posture and positions
of the United Patriotic Leagues. 47 Another key component of the group’s public relations
strategy was to hold festivals to stress the nationalist point of view along with the unity of
all the patriotic associations. These were the German Day, or Deutscher Tag,
celebrations.
The German Day rallies had been organized by the German Racial Protection and
Defiance League (Deutschvölkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund, or DVST) as an essential
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celebration of German national consciousness. 48 Initially all of the major associations
were represented at German Day events, though by November 1923 the celebration came
to be more identified with the more radical organizations around Hitler and the Nazis.
The vast majority of German Days in Bavaria were held during 1923 as the situation in
Germany deteriorated precipitously, and in known Social Democratic strongholds, which
guaranteed a certain level of violence. 49 The most violent altercation took place in
Nuremberg, after the German Day, where clashes between radical nationalists and
workers left one worker dead and two severely injured. 50
As the leading group in the United Patriotic Leagues, Bayern und Reich played a
large role in these celebrations. Their leaders spoke at German Day events, and their men
marched in the parades and demonstrations that usually accompanied them. Pittinger’s
men stressed unity when they appeared at the German Day. One speaker proclaimed:
“Yes but for our people today it does not involve the form of government at all, but the
state itself, whose existence is at stake. Reason enough, that all who think and feel
racially close ranks together. You have done that here in Kulmbach and that give the
meeting its special meaning.” 51 The addresses given by BuR leaders tended to emphasize
areas of common interest. These included the struggle against the Treaty of Versailles,
against the communist menace, but also against the depredations of international
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capitalism, which was a common theme for more radical groups like the Nazi Party but
played up by the Bayern und Reich speaker at Kulmbach. 52
The proclamation of unity proclaimed by Bayern und Reich leaders usually
masked very real differences between Pittinger’s group and other associations affiliated
with the United Patriotic Societies. These differences could not always be overcome.
For instance the German Day in Bamberg in October 1923 was marked by a rather severe
dispute between the representative of Bayern und Reich, von Xylander, and Hitler over
ideological issues. The primary issue was over whether to trust the leadership of future
actions of the patriotic movement to Gustav von Kahr, who was then General State
Commissioner and an almost unofficial dictator in Bavaria. Pittinger’s organization and
the United Patriotic Leagues supported Kahr unquestioningly, whereas Hitler, in his
remarks, argued that the former Minister-President lacked the natural instinct of a
politician and was no revolutionary. The desire on the part of the more radical groups for
a national revolution became another flashpoint amongst radical nationalists in the fall of
1923. 53
Such disputes naturally masked other areas of contention. One of these was
religion. At the Nuremberg German Day in September 1923 Kaplan Roth of Bund
Bayern und Reich spoke at length about how religious faith, particularly Catholicism,
undergirded the völkisch world view. “Our savior model is Jesus, who came to the world
not to bring peace, but to bring the sword.” 54 In the address Roth claimed that the true
savior for Bavaria and the Reich was Jesus, who “knew and wanted for his people no
52

Ibid.
Bamberger Tagung, BHSA, II, G.St.K. 100.
54
Deutscher Tag Nürnberg 2. September 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 22.
53

217
neutrals; as he said: whoever is not for me, is against me. Neutrality in serious things is
weakness of spirit and character.” 55 Though Bayern und Reich’s ideological program
talked about traditional Christianity, Roth twisted it to serve völkisch purposes.
“Christianity, also Catholicism, in no way makes Christians defenseless in racial matters.
The words, the judgments, and destinies of the savior speak for our opinions against the
Jews.” 56
Bund Bayern und Reich, the Nazi Party, and the Widening Chasm of the Vaterländisch
Movement
The United Patriotic Leagues and the organizers of the German Day Rallys tried
to paper over the differences between the former, including Bund Bayern und Reich, and
Hitler and his Nazi Party. However these were ever present and broke out into the open
at the beginning of 1923. The major differences between Hitler’s party and Pittinger’s
paramilitary were based on the former’s rejection of the monarchical, federalist, and
religious worldview of the latter. The Nazi Party program, moreover, was revolutionary
and modern. The militancy with which Hitler and his followers pursued their goals
caused a great deal of unrest within Bund Bayern und Reich, and gained him followers
willing to help him. They set up an alternate power center on the right that challenged
the hegemony of Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues right up to the Beer
Hall Putsch.
The year following the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr had been an important
one for Hitler and his party. Having gained control of the Nazi Party as its preeminent
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leader in July 1921, he spent the next year and half turning it into a power in Bavarian
politics, and in the process began a process of self-transformation that turned the beer hall
agitator into the Führer of the movement. 57 A ceaseless agitator, Hitler was referred to
as the ‘drummer’ in these years and often sought after as a speaker by other organizations
on the political right in Bavaria. Hitler spoke at a large rally in August 1922 organized
by the United Patriotic Leagues and Bund Bayern und Reich, and quickly became a staple
of the German Day Rallies that began to be held in Bavaria in late 1922. 58 Hitler’s
success at these events only fed the growing Führer cult, one that made him the last word
in all party matters and which he believed made him the man of the moment in the
patriotic movement. 59
Hitler’s success in these venues was paralleled by the party’s entrance into
paramilitary politics itself. In November 1920 Hitler and other party leaders had set up
their own paramilitary force. Originally called the ‘Sport and Gymnastics’ department, it
gradually evolved into the Sturmabteilung, or S.A. – more popularly referred to as the
brownshirts or stormtroopers. This paramilitary force was small, but began to grow after
November 1921. 60 One consequence of the creation of the brownshirts was that it
brought Hitler into contact with Captain Ernst Röhm, the Reichswehr’s weapons liaison
officer. Röhm introduced Hitler to several important people in the paramilitary
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movement who were able to help the Nazi leader build up his force, though it did not
become a factor in paramilitary scene in Bavaria till late 1922. 61
The rapid rise of the Nazi Party, and its militant stance, caused numerous
problems for Bund Bayern und Reich internally. Beginning in late 1922 a number of
local units left the organization. Most departed for ideological reasons. They simply no
longer felt comfortable working towards Pittinger’s goals. Some left because they found
that Bayern und Reich was too constricted in its definition of itself and its work. This
development could especially be seen in the case of the district of Lower Bavaria
(Niederbayern). On February 8, 1923 this local unit resolved to leave Bund Bayern und
Reich and form its own organization. The reason for doing so was because the Lower
Bavarian leadership wanted to share their weaponry with like minded paramilitaries,
something that the state leadership prohibited. 62 Despite efforts to bring the local group
back into the fold, the leadership and members held firm and on October 20, 1923 were
recognized as an independent paramilitary unit. 63
Another unit with which Bund Bayern und Reich had difficulties was Alfred
Zeller’s United Leagues of Munich (Vaterländische Verbände Münchens). This
organization, which comprised the remnants of the old Einwohnerwehr in the city, was to
join Pittinger’s group as a corporate body, but chose not to in January 1923 because they
feared having their independent existence subsumed by Bayern und Reich. At a meeting
on January 5, 1923 the United Leagues, the remnants of the old Einwohnerwehr units in
the capital, declared that their reason for not joining Pittinger’s association concerned
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issues of organizational cohesion; they feared that some of the cells (Bezirke) in the city
would no longer follow Zeller’s orders if they entered Bayern und Reich. They also
wanted to maintain control of their mobile units. 64 The state leadership, despite their
desire to see the United Leagues join as a body, was perfectly willing to let them keep
their independence, rejecting the premise that local cells could control mobile units and
warning of the competition that would result between the two groups for members. 65
Hitler’s radicalism and success, coupled with the actions of local leaders like Heiß
and Zeller, led to a split in the United Patriotic Leagues in January 1923. The Nazi Party,
Bund Oberland, Zeller’s VVM, and the Niederbayern group, among others helped to form
the Working Group of Combat Leagues, or Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Kampfverbände. 66
This organization was dedicated to the type of radical revolution envisioned by Hitler and
his counterparts in other groups like Oberland. It was also more volatile than the United
Patriotic Leagues. There was frequent discord amongst the members, disputes that
primarily concerned tactics. This could clearly be seen in the Working Group’s only
major event, the planned disruption of the May Day celebrations in 1923. In the days
leading up to the demonstration, several groups, particularly the VVM, resisted the
violence planned by the leadership. As a result, the disruption of worker’s parades did
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not go off as planned. Several groups left the Working Group due to the bloodlust shown
by the leadership in this instance. 67
Helping to fan the flames of discord amongst patriotic organizations was Captain
Ernst Röhm, who was the Reichswehr liaison officer to paramilitary groups like Bund
Bayern und Reich. In this capacity he provided illegal arms to radical nationalist groups,
during 1922 to Pittinger almost exclusively. Röhm had been a fixture in the patriotic
movement since right after the war. He helped establish and supply Escherich’s
Einwohnerwehr, and was later involved with more shadowy organizations like the Black
Reichswehr. A combat veteran of the First World War, Röhm believed in decisive
action. By early 1923 he felt that the time was ripe for patriotic groups to strike against
the government. 68
Röhm came to believe that paramilitary organizations like Bund Bayern und
Reich, and its leader Pittinger, were incapable of carrying out a revolution against the
political order. For him the year 1922 had been a decisive turning point, one in which the
patriotic movement failed to take full advantage. In September of that year Röhm and
Hitler planned a putsch against the government, the third attempted overthrow of the
government in Munich since the fall of Kahr. Like the others before it, this planned
uprising was scuttled in no small part due to the efforts of Bayern und Reich leaders.
Röhm accused them of spreading rumors about him and his circle, referring to them often
as “psychopaths.” The weapons needed for the putsch were never distributed. Failure to
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move, in the captain’s view, was a failure of will and led to a decisive break between the
captain and Pittinger in January of 1923. 69
Röhm’s attack on the Bayern und Reich leader caused an open rupture in the
patriotic movement, one that became increasingly bitter. In his break with Pittinger
Röhm made a number of charges. One was that Pittinger divided the radical right by
attacking its leading members, like General Ludendorff, while supporting less savory
characters, like the United Patriotic League’s head Hermann Bauer. Rather than work for
unity, at a time when it was needed, Röhm claimed that Pittinger undermined figures like
Hitler who worked tirelessly for the movement. The Bayern und Reich leader was also
accused of cowardice in the face of government pressure. Röhm referred specifically to
planned disturbances in Munich and the Chiemgau, each of which Pittinger called off due
his inability to make a decision – in the case of the latter by questioning the patriotism of
his own subordinates. Finally, the captain accused the health inspector of hoarding
weapons for his own purposes, rather than sharing them with other paramilitaries. These
facts convinced Röhm that Pittinger was incapable of bringing the paramilitary
formations together to fight the internal and external enemy. 70
The person that Ernst Röhm increasingly saw as vital to reviving the fortunes of
the patriotic groups was Adolf Hitler. The Nazi leader had the necessary political skills
to effectively struggle against the nationalist’s enemies on the left; he also had the will to
do so. The captain implied as much in the explanation he put forward in January
regarding his split from Bayern und Reich. 71 Such a viewpoint was not unknown
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amongst many right-wing Bavarians. Pittinger was well aware of Röhm’s opinions. In
fact the Bayern und Reich leader argued that the timing of the discord between him and
the Reichwehr’s liaison officer had as much to do with his attempt to create a power
center on the right, as it did with his alleged cowardice, or the break between him and
Escherich. The increasing difficulties Pittinger and Bayern und Reich had with
subordinate groups, like Zeller’s in Munich or Hofmann’s Bund Unterland, were heavily
influenced by the captain and his machinations in regards to Hitler. 72
The break between the two men was simply the beginning of the feud. More
allegations were made in the first half of 1923. In these Röhm had an ally, General Erich
Ludendorff. The former army commander had taken refuge in Bavaria following the
Kapp Putsch, and from his new home remained very much involved in radical nationalist
politics. At first this was a welcome development to many on the political right in
Munich. Ludendorff had numerous connections in Austria and Hungary, both of which
were important to the patriotic movement. Pittinger himself had worked closely with the
general in regards to this, having traveled to Budapest on Ludendorff’s and Colonel
Bauer’s behest to coordinate activities with right-wing elements there. 73 Ludendorff had
also developed close connections with several key paramilitaries in Bavaria, most
decisively Bund Oberland. 74
Pittinger’s relationship to General Ludendorff was nearly as prickly as his
relationship with Ernst Röhm. Ludendorff did not care much for the federalist Germany
idealized by the Pittinger and his group. Thus he sought, early on, to undercut Bund
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Bayern und Reich. One memo, describing the general’s relationship to other patriotic
groups, noted the close relationship that existed between Ludendorff and Captain Römer
of Bund Oberland and made the allegation that the former quartermaster was behind the
dispute between Pittinger and them. 75 He also accused the Bayern und Reich leader of
pursuing separatist politics in the 1921 trip to Austria and Hungary. Major von
Wandesleben, an associate of Ludendorff and Bauer’s claimed that the Sanitätsrat
negotiated for the creation of a Bavarian-Austrian state that would be separate from the
Reich itself. 76 By February 1923 the relationship between the two men had grown so
toxic that, at a meeting of nationalist organizations held in Klagenfurt, Austria,
Ludendorff claimed that any Austrian organization that continued a relationship with
Bayern und Reich could not in any way be tied to him. 77
With Ludendorff in his corner, Röhm proceeded to make a number of claims
against Pittinger in early 1923 designed to decrease the confidence army and political
leaders had in the leader of Bayern und Reich. Several of these had already been given
voice in the memo of January 1923. Pittinger was accused simultaneously of cowardice
in the face of the government, lack of resolve in organizing a putsch, the use of weapons
provided by the army to make other units bow to his will, and failing to unite, and
provide leadership, to the other organizations of the patriotic movement. 78 To these
Röhm added another – financial malfeasance. The Reichswehr’s liaison officer accused
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Pittinger of misappropriating funds to the tune of fifty million Reichsmarks in February
1923. 79
During 1922 army leaders, along with politicians like Gustav von Kahr, had been
trying to find ways to maintain a secret weapons cache in contravention of the Versailles
Treaty and numerous other agreements of the Allied Control Commission. Bavarian
leaders feared using government funds so soon after the dissolution of the
Einwohnerwehr. At an October 1922 meeting attended by General von Epp, Kahr, Dr.
Pittinger, and ministerial counsel Dr. Roth it was decided that money for these weapons
should come from business and industrial concerns in Bavaria. Dr. Kuhlo, acting as a
representative for a consortium of German industrialists, apparently gave the Bayern und
Reich leader nearly fifty million Reichsmarks to purchase weapons for use by patriotic
groups. As the liaison officer responsible for obtaining and maintaining the weapons
cache, Röhm claimed that the weapons were never purchased, nor that he saw any of the
money himself. 80
Röhm’s accusations were serious enough to warrant a military investigation.
General Franz Ritter von Epp, a figure intimately involved with many of the paramilitary
groups of the period, presided over the inquiry. Epp’s query went far afield. He
interviewed, most naturally, Röhm, Ludendorff, Kuhlo, and Dr. Roth. 81 Over the course
of the investigation several things became clear. One, despite the representations of Dr.
Roth and Captain Röhm, the sum of fifty million Reichsmarks was never doled out to
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Pittinger or any of his men. The testimonies of both men were undercut by that of Dr.
Kuhlo, who claimed to have never dispensed money on the part of industrialists to Bund
Bayern und Reich. The rumor, as he saw it, came from someone within industrial circles
who misrepresented a statement from someone close to Pittinger. 82 Two, it became clear
that whatever money had been transferred from industrialists to patriotic organizations
went to the Working Group set up by Röhm, Hitler, Lenz, and Hofmann in January 1923.
According to Kuhlo, the address given for Bund Bayern und Reich’s headquarters was the
same as for the Working Group’s. 83 Three, Ministerial Councilor Roth appeared to
misrepresent his testimony, both about the October meeting and the claim that Pittinger
received the money. 84 Part of the reason for Roth’s mendacity stemmed from reports that
he was closely tied to Zeller, Hofmann, and the rest of the Working Group. 85 Epp’s
findings brought the charges of financial malfeasance to an end.
Having cleared his name in the financial charges, Pittinger struck back at Röhm,
asking the Bavarian Reichswehr to remove the captain from his responsibilities as the
liaison officer for the patriotic paramilitaries. The Bayern und Reich leader’s request led
to the convening of a special commission to investigate the entire feud to see if Röhm had
made an honest break with Pittinger, whether he had slandered the man as a coward, and
his fitness to serve as weapons officer. The conclusions drawn by the commission
exonerated Röhm in many ways, making it difficult for the army to comply with
Pittinger’s request for his removal. They did however, manage to extract a retraction of
the cowardice remarks that the captain had made in reference to the Bayern und Reich
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leader. The findings of the commission were accepted by Röhm, Pittinger, and the head
of the Bavarian Reichswehr, General Otto von Lossow. 86
The length of the Röhm-Pittinger feud, which lasted for much of 1923, had helped
bring about and exacerbate the split in the patriotic movement epitomized in the creation
of the Working Group. On September 17, 1923 the intransigence of the radical circles
around Röhm calcified further with the creation of the Fighting League, or Kampfbund.
This new organization was an umbrella group consisting of Bund Oberland, Captain
Adolf Heiss’s Reichsflagge, and the SA of the Nazi Party. The organization had a three
headed directory of Heiss, Dr. Friedrich Weber of Bund Oberland, and Adolf Hitler, who
quickly rose to the position of political leader within the group. 87 As Harold Gordon
noted, the creation of the Fighting League reflected the increased power of Hitler in the
patriotic movement, something that was reinforced by the fact that the SA and not the
Nazi Party as a whole belonged to the organization. The Fighting League was radical
völkisch in its ideology and totally committed to revolutionary violence, making it
difficult for the United Patriotic Leagues or Bund Bayern und Reich to work with it. 88
By May 1923 Bund Bayern und Reich was the preeminent paramilitary
organization in Bavaria, but found itself increasingly under siege. Using its contacts with
the Bavarian Reichswehr, Pittinger’s organization undertook activities designed to
maintain the conservative order in Bavaria even as they planned to overturn democracy.
To that end the group became a leading voice in the United Patriotic Leagues, an
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umbrella association designed to serve as a rallying point for the patriotic movement.
However, the rapid growth of the Nazi Party in 1922 created challenges for Pittinger and
his men. Hitler’s radicalism and increasing popularity carved out space on the
revolutionary right for himself and his party. Their success began to cause problems for
Pittinger and the leadership of Bayern und Reich. Local units fell away, the
organization’s leader was involved in a dispute with Ernst Röhm and General Erich
Ludendorff that encompassed the first half of 1923, and Hitler set up two organizations,
the Working Group and the Fighting League, designed to foment revolution, and setting
the stage for the Beer Hall Putsch.
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Chapter 9
The Constraints of Independence – Bund Bayern und Reich, the Beer Hall Putsch, and its
Aftermath
The opportunity for patriotic (vaterländisch) organizations like Bund Bayern und
Reich to overthrow democracy was probably never better than in November 1923. A
year of international strife and economic collapse had left the Weimar Republic with few
defenders. The belief that the time was at hand galvanized and radicalized the patriotic
movement, pushing its various parties, associations, and paramilitaries towards action.
However differences amongst the different groups made a coordinated uprising
impossible and insured that, when it did happen, it was marked by confusion and delay.
Bund Bayern und Reich’s role in the Beer Hall Putsch was marginal at best, and
this reflected the limits of its brand of paramilitary politics. Dedicated to the overthrow
of Weimar democracy and revocation of the Treaty of Versailles, Pittinger’s men found
themselves hampered in their pursuit of their goals by the close relationship they had with
the Bavarian Reichswehr. When that body was for the overthrow of the government, they
were just as prepared to march on Berlin as the Nazis were. When the army backed off,
Bund Bayern und Reich stood down. The ramifications of that act would affect the
organization for years to come.
Bund Bayern und Reich and the Beer Hall Putsch
The events of the Beer Hall Putsch of November 8 & 9, 1923 capped off a year of
strife for the patriotic movement and Bund Bayern und Reich. Having found its own
agenda increasingly surpassed by the revolutionary program of Hitler and the
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organizations of the Fighting League, Pittinger’s group would play a rather interesting
role in the events of those two days. Committed to some type of action, Bavaria’s largest
paramilitary group nevertheless remained loyal to Gustav von Kahr, who had been a
patron to the patriotic movement, and to the army, from whom their prominence amongst
the paramilitaries was owed. They did so despite discontent among local units that felt
that the time was right to move against the government and many of whose members
were attracted to the revolutionary ideals of Hitler.
The prelude to the abortive coup saw an increase in radicalism by the
organizations of the Working Group during the spring of 1923. In particular they
agitated against the Law for the Protection of the Republic and planned to disrupt the
traditional May Day celebrations in Munich. They were very open about their intent and
goals and one result of their radicalism was that it alerted the Bavarian government to the
very real danger posed by Hitler and his allies. Accommodation to their demands was
out of the question for the Knilling cabinet. 1 Additionally, authorities were seriously
undercut by other paramilitaries, particularly Bund Bayern und Reich, who hoped to push
their ideological program but were unwilling to go the route that Hitler intended to take.
Pittinger’s exhortations on the constitutional question was just one example of the
pressure that reduced the government’s “room to maneuver,” and forced Knilling to walk
a tight rope between the two camps. 2
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Such a balancing act became more difficult over the course of the summer as the
government had to deal with numerous protests by the Nazis, who used the economic
distress of the summer and autumn months as an excuse for demonstrations. These were
difficult to put down or keep quiet despite the best efforts of the Bavarian government to
hush up such activity. 3 They also tended to become violent as the Nazi Stormtroopers
were just as willing to attack police and security forces as they were communists. One
such event occurred on July 14, 1923 where a demonstration on Arnulfstrasse by the
Nazis was violently broken up by police. One eyewitness to the event swore that the
police charged the demonstrators with swords and rubber truncheons, though this was
preceded by the virulence of the protestors who moved to within fifty meters of police,
who had cordoned off the post office. 4
The government’s response to such provocations was increasingly to crack down
on civil disturbance from both the left and the right. Police and prosecutors were
instructed to undertake any and all measure to preserve security and order. However,
even as they ordered such measures the cabinet continued to undercut their efforts against
Hitler and the Fighting League. They refused to move against the German Days
organized by the patriotic movement in communities throughout Bavaria. These had
increased throughout the year and became increasingly marked by its strident overtones.
Nevertheless the Interior Ministry continued to be more concerned with the actions of the
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communists, who had organized their own paramilitary organization – the Communist
One Hundreds – to take advantage of the chaos of the Ruhr Crisis. 5
Unwilling to move against the more radical elements of the patriotic movement,
the government in Munich decided to turn to a man who had an intimate working
relationship with them, Gustav von Kahr. After leaving the post of Minister-President in
1921 Kahr returned to his previous position of provincial governor of Upper Bavaria.
From there he continued to be heavily involved in right-wing politics and the
paramilitaries. Kahr was involved with many of the coups planned in Bavaria in 1921
and 1922, and he remained close to the leaders, such as Pittinger and General von Möhl,
who were prepared to carry these out. 6 As a result of these connections Kahr was
recalled to the government on September 26, 1923, but this time in the post of General
State Commissioner (Generalstaatskommisar). In this post, the former MinisterPresident was given virtual dictatorial powers in Bavaria. 7
The reaction of the working class and their Social Democratic allies to Kahr’s
appointment was to prepare for action to defend the republic, which they were convinced
was now under attack. Many workers and socialist organizations in Bavaria formed
councils in response to protest, according to one pamphlet, the increasing treason of
patriotic organizations against the republic and its leaders. 8 Naturally Pittinger’s men
claimed that it was the worker’s councils that intended revolution and the government
agreed with them. The fear and paranoia over a potential communist insurrection had

5

Abschrift des Ministerium des Innern, 23. September 1923, BHSA, II, M Inn 71 708.
Von Kahr zu Lerchenfeld: Der zweite bayerische Rechtsputsch mißlungen, (Munich: Verlag des
Bayerischen Wochenblattes, München, February 1922), 90-5 & 106-7, IfZ, Gk 1279.
7
Abschrift der Leitung des Vereinigten Vaterländischen Verbände Bayerns, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 22.
8
An die Bayerische Arbeiterschaft und Ihre Betriebsräte!, 30. September 1923, BHSA, II, G.St.K. 99.
6

233
grown so acute amongst official circles that the government felt that the only way they
could deal with the situation was by increasing their cooperation with organizations like
Bayern und Reich. 9
The elevation of Kahr, however, was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm by
Bund Bayern und Reich and the other organizations of the United Patriotic Leagues. 10
They saw in the creation of the position of General State Commissioner the beginning of
the end of the republic. All during the summer of 1923 Pittinger and his men had been
advocating for the creation of a dictatorship as a way to restore the old Bismarckian
constitution. They favored a “return to Kahr” as the means by which to achieve their
goals. 11 Both Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues pledged to do their
utmost to help the new General State Commissioner achieve these objectives and to deal
with the crises that they saw enveloping both Germany and Bavaria. 12
Upon assuming office Kahr made efforts to unite the vaterländisch movement
around his person. One of the means by which he did this was to suspend the Law for the
Protection of the Republic that was so hated by all the paramilitaries. He also pardoned
the leader of the Reichsflagge, Captain Adolf Heiss, who had been under arrest at the
orders of the Berlin government. 13 These measures seemed to have a rejuvenating
influence amongst many of the patriotic organizations. Though Kahr was attacked by the
Fighting League in the pages of the Nazi paper Völkischer Beobachter, 14 many
organizations that had been a part of the defunct Working Group pledged support to the
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General State Commissioner. For instance, the Blücherbund decided to throw its support
to Kahr because not to do so threatened the “peaceful and vigorous development of the
patriotic movement,” and was the only way to affect a “German racial revolution.” 15
The coming together of the patriotic groups was facilitated, in no small part, by a
renewal of the strife between Kahr and Berlin that had begun with the dispute over the
old Einwohnerwehr. This new conflict began with a ban on the Völkischer Beobachter
by the Reich government. The paper had printed a derogatory article against General von
Seeckt, the leader of the Reichswehr, and his wife, claiming that she was Jewish. The
Berlin cabinet, whose negative reaction to Kahr’s appointment led them appoint a
“dictator” of their own, used the incident as a means of undercutting the new Bavarian
leader. In the crisis they also tried to make use of the army, ordering the head of the
Bavarian military district, Otto von Lossow, to carry out the ban. These were to no avail,
as the Bavarian “dictator” simply ordered Lossow, who reported to both men in the case
of emergencies – which both states were now officially under – to ignore orders coming
from Berlin. This move led to his removal from the post by national authorities, though
he was ordered to stay in the position by Kahr and the cabinet. Even though the crisis
was eventually resolved by late October, 16 the conflict poisoned federal relations, and
further led to calls for a takeover of the Reich government by forces on the right – forces
that now believed a takeover of Bavaria by Berlin would come any day. 17
Pittinger and the leadership of Bund Bayern und Reich worked hard to rally all
patriotic organizations to the General State Commissioner because they believed that a
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takeover, or Reichsexecution, would come via the army and were confident that Lossow
and Bavarian troops would stand with them thus bringing about a final reckoning with the
republic. 18 Their efforts naturally began within their own group. Many local units had
expressed dissension throughout the year 1923 with the direction of the organization.
With the agitation of Hitler and his circle it was unknown how some of the local units
would react. Luckily for Pittinger, most local units stood foursquare behind Kahr.
Throughout October many units of Bund Bayern und Reich pledged their loyalty to him
and the Bavarian leadership. 19 In one example the local leadership of Schiltberg bei
Aichbach greeted the creation of a national unity front amongst all paramilitaries and
promised to work against anyone who tried to disrupt Kahr’s political goals. 20 Other
units followed with similar declarations. 21
The full unity of purpose that Pittinger and Kahr hoped for amongst the
vaterländisch groups failed to materialize however. For many of the organizations
affiliated with Hitler in the Fighting League, as they took stock of the situation in the fall
of 1923, they came to believe that a dictatorship headed by the Nazi leader was preferable
to one headed by Kahr. In an anonymous memo distributed by the leadership of
Wikingbund, one of the successor groups to the Einwohnerwehr and one of the most
radical, they spelled out precisely what a dictatorship by the state commissioner would
look like. “As mentioned above the dictatorship of Kahr in reality has sprung not from
strength, but from weakness. … This development involves both for the dictator Kahr
and for the farther future considerable dangers. If the present exponent of the
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dictatorship does not do justice to the hopes of nationally active circles, then he will fall
just as quickly as he came and the civil war follows after him.” 22 However, a dictatorship
led by Hitler promised to fulfill the goals of national/racial solidarity, antisemitism, and
national activism that the author found appealing. 23
The result was that the Fighting League worked feverishly to undercut Kahr.
However, this was not without its dangers, as there were pressures exerted upon Hitler to
stand behind the General State Commissioner. Harold Gordon described the two camps
as tomcats that warily eyed one another upon first encounter. Each made conciliatory
gestures but did nothing to strike a killing blow. 24 An example of the virulence of their
attacks can be seen in the German Day celebration held in Bamberg in October 1923. At
the meeting the representative of Bayern und Reich, von Xylander, made an impassioned
speech defending the course of action set by Kahr and appealing for unity. This was
rejected by Hitler and his associates with laughter, sneers, and speeches where the
General State Commissioner was attacked as a man of the past. “But apart from that in
the history of all the revolutions, that never could a man from the old system master it,
only a revolutionary.” 25
In the eyes of the Fighting League Kahr was the worst possible person to lead
Bavarian resistance against Berlin. They believed that the national government would
come at Munich with the strongest possible measures, and that the “dictator of Bavaria”
would wilt under the pressure. In their view ample evidence existed that Kahr lacked the
necessary resolve. At the Bamberg meeting, Hitler and Weber complained that the
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General State Commissioner seemed more concerned with disrupting the activities of the
Fighting League than preparing for a showdown with the “socialist” government. Kahr
used police powers to disrupt the meetings of the Fighting League, fourteen of which
were planned for October 1923 alone. 26 In the eyes of leaders like Ludendorff and
Röhm, this was only the continuation of what they saw as harassment by the Knilling
Cabinet, who had been banning people from attending Nazi meetings since the summer. 27
With the workers of Bavaria stirred up by their leaders into calling workers councils upon
news of Kahr’s appointment, 28 Hitler and his associates argued that it was no time for
weakness on the part of patriotic organizations or their allies. 29
Kahr, and his allies in Bund Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues,
were just as interested in undercutting Hitler and his allies. The banned meetings of the
Fighting Leagues were just the beginning of this process. Pittinger and his associates
prepared a propaganda campaign in October 1923 about the current political climate that
was to be sent to other German Länder, but made sure that the message remained in the
hands of the United Patriotic Leagues and Pittinger. A letter sent to the Bayern und
Reich leadership on October 23, 1923 showed the importance of controlling the message.
Local leaders in the town of Ehingen in Württemberg requested that propaganda material
be sent there with the hope that this would move the local populace into the patriotic (as
defined by Kahr and Bayern und Reich) camp. The request had been induced by a Hitler
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speech, and the materials would help not only in reinforcing the message, but ensuring
that the enthusiasm of the people in the town was channeled correctly. 30
The back and forth between Kahr and his allies and the Fighting League took
place in the context of the rapidly deteriorating situation, both economic and political, in
Germany during the fall of 1923. The collapse of the German Reichsmark, following the
Berlin government’s disastrous response to the French occupation of the Ruhr Valley,
had destroyed the life savings of many in the middle class. The economic desperation,
and the feelings of political impotence it engendered, led many Germans to call for the
abandonment of parliamentary democracy. Kahr, already an unwelcome figure to the
republic’s democratic leaders, was deep in negotiation with General von Seeckt of the
Reichswehr and the leaders of northern associations like the Stahlhelm to put pressure on
the Reich government to step aside in favor of a directorate or military dictatorship. This
was the expected coup that many on the right had favored, including the leaders of Bund
Bayern und Reich and with the backing of the army seemed to be within reach. All that
was needed was a broad based-backing for such a move in the north and in Bavaria. 31
Such support unfortunately did not come. In the north of Germany the crowd
around Seeckt did not have the prestige necessary to carry out a putsch, and the general
himself seemed unwilling to go along with anything illegal. The dissolution of the
republic, were it to take place, had to be done legally, according to him. The patriotic
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groups were just as wary of the situation, though it seemed to give them the opportunity
to achieve the major goals. The hang up for Bayern und Reich was Seeckt himself. In
the eyes of the leadership a coup and new government led by the general would do
nothing to resolve the “national-völkisch” question that was the organization’s major
goal. Moreover, Seeckt was the one responsible for the Lossow affair and had prepared
the Reichswehr outside of Bavaria to march against the state if necessary. Thus they had
grave misgivings about the general, even as they continued to support Kahr and his
negotiations with the army leader’s circle. 32
Despite their misgivings, Bund Bayern und Reich continued to prepare for action
right up until a few days before the Beer Hall Putsch. During October plans were put in
place to secure Bavaria in the case of a move against either the government in Munich or
a national coup in Berlin. Of particular concern for Kahr and Pittinger was the danger
posed by Bavarian communists. These needed to be neutralized to secure the state and
many of their plans dealt with this issue. The local leader in Füssen reported to the chief
of the Bavarian state police (Landespolizei), Colonel Hans von Seisser, on the
deteriorating situation in the Allgäu region and the need to move against both
communists and social democrats there. In this instance, a reported influx of communists
and a lack of resolve by local authorities led to a request by the community leader to
request for one hundred men of the state police to supplement the two companies of
Bayern und Reich already there. 33
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Pittinger’s organization, however, did not take part in the Beer Hall Putsch. This
was a result of the relationship of his organization to the Reichswehr. Despite being an
independent group in terms of funding and its political activities, Bund Bayern und Reich
depended to a much greater degree on the army to carry out its mission both politically
and militarily. The army provided arms, training, and perhaps most importantly prestige.
Bayern und Reich was the largest of the paramilitaries and one that the army leadership
dealt with almost exclusively. Despite Röhm’s challenge to this state of affairs, the
relationship between the two organizations remained close up to, and beyond, November
1923. This arrangement stood in contradistinction to the relationship the Einwohnerwehr
had to both the army and the state. In that case, Escherich’s association, though
essentially semi-official in nature due to having been formed and funded by government
and military officials, was practically independent in how it operated. This freedom
made the Einwohnerwehr a force in Bavarian politics, something that Bund Bayern und
Reich never fully was.
The dependency of Pittinger’s group on the military and political elite for
guidance effectively constrained Bayern und Reich in the events that followed in a way
that it did not with Hitler and the Fighting League. Whereas the latter went ahead with its
own plans for a putsch upon the foundering of Kahr’s negotiations with rightist circles in
Berlin, the former saluted smartly and continued to support the General State
Commissioner. Just two days before the Putsch the triumvirate of Kahr, Lossow, and
Seisser met with all of the patriotic paramilitary groups, including both Bayern und Reich
and the Fighting League. In that meeting the political and military leaders made it clear
that any plans for a coup, whether planned in support of events in Berlin, or undertaken in
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Munich, would be opposed by the Bavarian military and the state police. 34 A report by
the leader of the Chiemgau leader of Bayern und Reich summed up the disappointment of
the membership and their determination to carry on. “With heavy hearts we withdraw all
of our orders. It succeeded in defiance of initially difficult dysphoria.” 35
The putsch itself provides the clearest indication of Bayern und Reich’s
dependency upon political and military elites. Upon hearing of Hitler’s actions at the
Bürgerbräukeller, Dr. Pittinger phoned Kahr’s office to confirm what he had been told.
At first officials there did not have any real information about the events surrounding the
meeting, as the hall was not accessible. Later, Kahr was told that it looked very much
like a putsch. Pittinger insisted that the units in the Chiemgau be put on alert. However
officials at Kahr’s office informed the Bayern und Reich leader that the phones were
down there. Upon hearing the news Pittinger personally took an army car down to
Rosenheim to organize the units in support of the government, reporting back to Kahr’s
office in Munich on his progress. 36
The trip to the Chiemgau has remained somewhat shrouded in mystery,
particularly as it relates to Pittinger’s motives. 37 It is clear though, that Pittinger
continued to throw his lot in with Kahr. At Aibling Pittinger instructed the local unit to
follow only those orders that came from the General State Commissioner. He issued
these orders to the unit at 3 a.m., plenty of time for the health inspector to discover
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Kahr’s position vis-à-vis the putsch. 38 This becomes even clearer when one reads the
directive from Pittinger to Merz, the state’s councilor in Aibling. In it he ordered
roadblocks designed to stop the putschists from reinforcing their compatriots in Munich.
Despite this, however, it was clear that Pittinger and his men approved of the dissolution
of the government, regardless of the circumstances in which it occurred. The placards
proclaiming the new national government of Kahr, Hitler, and Ludendorff were
distributed by the Pittinger’s men in Aibling, and these gave the impression that Bayern
und Reich approved of the dissolution of the Diet and cabinet. 39
Mixed messages seemed to be the order of the day for Pittinger, for not every unit
in Bund Bayern und Reich was informed of events or put on alert, and those that were
sometimes found themselves with conflicting orders. The Chiemgau regiment that
Pittinger had mobilized was distressed by the lack of information given to them by the
Bayern und Reich leader, and unsure of their vague orders. These included massing in
Rosenheim to be prepared to march, but no word was given as to the goal. By the end of
the day of November 9 the numbers mobilized reached three thousand men, leading to
problems of housing and feeding such a force, and this led to disillusionment. 40
Additionally the local unit in Pfaffenhofen was not informed by the leadership of the
happenings in the Bürgerbräukeller until the next day. According to local officials, they
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had no real information, beyond rumors, of the events in Munich until news reached them
that the putsch had been put down. 41
Their distress led to outright resentment at the leadership of Bayern und Reich,
and indeed the political elite in Bavaria, in the days after the putsch. Regional leaders in
the Chiemgau reported that, two weeks later, much of the rank and file had expressed
unhappiness with the way they had been led during the Putsch. For the most part this
anger was directed at the members of the Bavarian People’s Party in the region. 42
However, a fair amount was directed at the General State Commissioner. Kahr, in the
minds of many local units, had missed a golden opportunity to overturn parliamentary
democracy in Bavaria, if nowhere else. 43 “One expected a dictator and not a General
State Commissioner, i.e. one is ill-humored, that the government is still visible as such.
One encounters on that score so many harsh judgements, to a certain degree exasperation
against the government that one is affected by.” 44 For many members on the local level
Kahr had simply not kept his word. For this he was called a “traitor” and a “knave.” 45
The lack of action on the part of the General State Commissioner during the
Putsch itself only explains part of the anger amongst the membership. Another was the
demand for loyalty amongst the remainder of the patriotic organizations, including those
that had not participated in the coup at all. On November 10 Kahr’s office in Munich
sent out a memo where it demanded that, to regain public confidence, the organizations
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of the United Patriotic Leagues provide explanations of their opinions on the Putsch, their
political views, and pledge their support for the current government. 46 On this score the
Bayern und Reich leadership was very prompt in their response. They claimed that the
group stood behind Kahr one hundred percent, and blamed Hitler for the events of
November 8 and 9, saying that he had broken his promise not to move against the
General State Commissioner. 47 Pittinger’s rapid response was seconded by the military
leadership of Bayern und Reich which, while supporting Kahr and laying the blame at the
feet of the Nazi leader, pointed out that the former Minister-president had the backing of
both the Bavarian Reichswehr and the state police, making it necessary to back the stance
adopted by Pittinger and Kahr. 48
Such reinforcement from the paramilitary’s leadership had some effect on local
units, though there continued to be some discordant notes. Some units registered their
support for Kahr straight away. The leaders of Jura-Maingau stated that standing behind
the General State Comissioner presented Bayern und Reich the opportunity to prove that
they were the proper instrument in his quest to overturn parliamentary democracy. 49
Other units pledged support, but hoped for amnesty for lower level putschists, or leniency
for their organizations. The local unit in Bad Kissingen insisted on saying that they only
did what they thought would best serve the fatherland. 50 The district leader of
Staffelstein stressed this too, writing, “Therefore we sincerely request (Kahr), to lift the
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ban on the national leagues ‘National Socialists, Oberland, Reichskriegsflagge,’ in order
to allow the collaboration of these organizations with us again, to let judicial proceedings
against persons connected to the Hitler Putsch be suspended and at best to grant the
convicted amnesty.” 51
Other units took the opportunity to use Pittinger’s lack of leadership, and the
leadership’s stance after the putsch to make a case for more thorough reforms of Bund
Bayern und Reich. The leader in Oberfranken wrote to Pittinger two days after the failed
coup and argued that much of the success of the Kampfbund was due to failure on the
part of local leadership in Bayern und Reich. He noted that many men in positions of
authority were not well versed in the ideological underpinnings of the paramilitary.
These had been sacrificed, he believed, to the needs of military efficiency and political
expediency. The regional leader also argued that the Bayern und Reich leadership had
sacrificed traditional ideas of military organization and justice, for a top down system
weighted too heavily in favor of the leadership. To prevent a revival of either the Nazis
or the Fighting League, which he believed was a malevolent force in Bavarian politics,
the local leader suggested more rigid discipline and adherence to the program and the
traditional military code. 52
The actions of Bund Bayern und Reich during the Beer Hall Putsch, while
controversial amongst the membership, did bring benefits to the organization. One of
these was a renewal of its preeminent position within the patriotic movement. In a
statement released after the coup ended, Kahr made special note of the loyalty of
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Pittinger’s association. In the same proclamation the General State Comissioner banned
those organizations that had participated in the coup. Naturally this included the Nazi
Party, but also Bund Oberland and Ernst Röhm’s Reichskriegsflagge. 53 The prohibition
on these groups meant that many of their former members could now join other
paramilitaries, including Bayern und Reich, which were not under the ban. This process
began in earnest in the weeks following the abortive coup.

In the Chiemgau, for

example, many Nazi Party members joined Bund Bayern und Reich following the failure
of the Putsch. There they joined the organization’s third battalion led by a man named
Jäger, who already had shown his displeasure with the health inspector’s leadership, a
sentiment shared by his men. Their main reason in switching allegiances, as an Interior
Ministry memo stated, was to continue to agitate until such time as the prohibition was
lifted. 54
The renewed prominence of Bayern und Reich was matched by the growing list of
paramilitaries that fell into disfavor with the Bavarian government, or with Kahr himself.
In late 1923 and early 1924 many sister organizations within the United Patriotic Leagues
also came under the government ban. One reason for this was the stance taken by these
groups following the Beer Hall Putsch. On November 10 a number of paramilitaries,
Blücherbund, Reichsflagge, and Bund Wiking among others, penned an open letter to the
General State Commissioner which, while supportive, cast aspersions on his willingness
to fight for the goals of the patriotic movement. In particular they questioned if he would
ban socialist organizations as he had the Nazi Party, or declare the Weimar constitution
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null and void. 55 Such opinions led to increasingly difficult relations, if not outright
prohibition for several groups. Bund Wiking, which had belonged to the Working Group
at the beginning of 1923, found itself under investigation by the Bavarian government at
the insistence of the cabinet in Berlin, 56 while the government considered banning other
groups, like Jungdeutscher Orden, in localities where they had caused particular
problems. 57
The decision to stand by Kahr in the aftermath of the putsch became increasingly
more tenuous for the leadership of Bayern und Reich. Rumors swirled about the General
State Commissioner’s relationship to the Putschists and his real intentions. Many of
these rumors came from patriotic organizations themselves. A police report from
Ingolstadt noted that placards began appearing on city streets after November 14 that
detailed Kahr’s infamy. 58 Titled, “Who has broken his word? Kahr!,” the posters
claimed that, rather than objecting to the putsch and working hard to defeat it after being
freed, the General State Commissioner, along with Lossow and Seisser, continued to
entertain the idea of a coup. As late as 11 p.m. one of the major conspirators, Ernst
Pöhner, was with Kahr. The anonymous authors claimed that it was only after a 3 a.m.
meeting with Cardinal Faulhaber, the archbishop of Munich-Freising, that Pöhner was
arrested and energetic action against the putsch began. This made Kahr a traitor in their
eyes. “Remember these four dates of the second November betrayal!” 59 Such assertions
made Kahr a liability to the Knilling cabinet and led to the forced resignation of Kahr in
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February 1924, 60 a move that the Bayern und Reich leadership believed was only done to
appease the “members of the völkisch parties.” 61
The Long Term Consequences of the Putsch for Bund Bayern und Reich, 1924-1928
The four years that followed the Beer Hall Putsch were ones that saw further
changes to the structure of Bund Bayern und Reich, but also decline. Pittinger’s
organization found it increasingly difficult to operate as a paramilitary association after
1924, and slowly began to evolve into a more traditional political organization. At the
same time the process by which the group saw its position on the right further eroded to
the more revolutionary voices on the right associated with Hitler and his Nazi Party
continued unabated.
One thing that became increasingly clear to the government in Munich in the
aftermath of the putsch was that its reliance on private patriotic associations for security
had become burdensome. Public safety had not been served in November 1923 and this
needed to depend on more stable foundations. In early 1924 members of the Bavarian
People’s Party managed to persuade the government to create an emergency force called
Notbann. This organization was conceived as public paramilitary dependent upon the
state for its support, and which would direct itself against both the right and the left. For
the Knilling cabinet this was the group’s greatest virtue. “A paramilitary free from
politics. At last ‘duty’ includes the duty, to make themselves available unconditionally at
each call up of the state government against a domestic threat.” 62 General Franz Ritter
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von Epp, a major figure in the creation of many patriotic paramilitaries became the
formation’s first leader. 63
Bund Bayern und Reich welcomed the creation of the Notbann, though they were
concerned with certain aspects of the new formation. They were pleased with the fact
that they had a working relationship with the appointed leader of the group. They were
also delighted that members of their organization could join. However, Pittinger and the
leadership had several nagging questions. One concerned the relationship of Bayern und
Reich to the Reichswehr. The creation of a new paramilitary force implied that the
special relationship between the two organizations was null and void. A second concern
was over the stipulation that members of the Notbann be completely free from politics.
Members of Pittinger’s group could join the new formation, but had to leave their politics
at the door. The leadership believed that the work of its members in the new association
should not preclude their work for Bayern und Reich. Finally, they expressed concern
that Epp’s new entity seemed to preclude the purely paramilitary functions of Pittinger’s
units, and they hoped that these could continue as much as possible. 64 Despite such
misgivings they pledged their full support, even defending the new organization as vital
to skeptics like General von Lossow. 65
The Notbann became a prime example of how bitterly the patriotic movement had
been divided by the events of 1923 culminating in the Beer Hall Putsch. For those on the
radical right, epitomized by the remaining groups of the Patriotic Working Group, the
new organization was nothing more that the “dictatorship of the middle,” the triumph of
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Bavarian particularism in the face of the events of November 8 and 9. They doubted
whether the working relationship between the new Notbann and Bund Bayern und Reich
could even work. In their view, the patriotic and explicitly political program of
Pittinger’s organization had to be sacrificed to the needs of the Notbann. 66 Such a view
was rejected by Epp himself, who said in an essay that his formation only followed the
self-defense concepts pioneered by the Einwohnerwehr. 67
The creation of the Notbann led to further soul searching within Bayern und
Reich, and with it to a second major reorganization. Many local leaders began in early
1924 to express doubts related to the group’s paramilitary activities, the departure of local
units, the upcoming parliamentary elections in Bavaria, 68 and their own difficult financial
situation. 69 These problems were taken up by the state representative beginning in April
1924 and led to a reorganization of the state leadership. A new department was added: a
chancellery, or Zentral-Abteilung, which coordinated all of the administrative work of the
leadership, was responsible for enforcing regulations, and supervised most nonparamilitary activities. The Propaganda and Press department was split into separate
offices, with the former coordinating its activities with the defense and organization
department, while the press office ran the organization’s newspaper, Bayern und Reich.
The defense office’s responsibilities remained unchanged from before. They coordinated
all the personnel in the local offices, and coordinated their activities with the army. The
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only additional activity assigned to this office was their coordination with the German
Emergency Force (Deutscher Notbann), which had been created in the aftermath of the
Beer Hall Putsch. 70
Pittinger’s organization continued to be beset by the defection of local units in the
aftermath of the Beer Hall Putsch. One local unit, in the months following the Beer Hall
Putsch, dissolved its relationship with Bund Bayern und Reich because the leadership had
become enamored with the political ideas of Hitler. This unit, from the region of Upper
Franconia (Oberfranken), split off during the summer of 1924. The new group they
created, Wehrverband Oberfranken, adhered specifically to a party-völkisch
(parteivölkisch) line as enunciated by Hitler and the Fighting League (Kampfbund).
Specifically, according to the report of a local diet held in the city of Kulmbach, the new
group adhered to ideas of a unitary Reich, which was vehemently opposed by Bayern und
Reich. 71 They also hoped to revive the spirit of solidarity amongst that existed amongst
radical nationalist organizations just prior to the putsch. “If we fail to liquidate
completely the eighth and ninth of November completely in us, then we deserve our fate.
Ludendorff, Hitler, Kahr, & Lossow must stand together. If the leaders are not ready to
effect that, then they are not. …otherwise we will not acquire freedom.” 72
Another problem that continued into the post-1924 period was the bleeding away
of members to more radical völkisch parties and units. This development was partially
attributed to the feeling amongst many members that, with the creation of the Notbann,
there was really no need to continue as a paramilitary unit. Those young people who
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were in Bayern und Reich in particular saw things this way. Many joined other
organizations, a trend that was worrisome to the leadership. However they continued to
hope for the best. As Pittinger put it, “many members of our league belong to other
associations, whose patriotic disposition cannot be doubted.” 73 He believed that once the
transformation of Bayern und Reich was complete these members would return.
The transformation of the group from a paramilitary unit to a state political
(staatpolitisch) entity was the point of the reorganization. What this meant for Bayern
und Reich was that military training that had been partially undertaken to prepare its
members for a foreign war, would be scrapped for a program that prepared the minds of
the people of the state for defense thinking. However, this did not mean that all
paramilitary activtity was given up. Pittinger made clear that internal enemies still
existed in Bavaria, and these still needed to be fought, particularly socialist and
communist groups. The political program, however, would now take precedence over the
other. 74
One way to do this was to continue to advocate for the abandonment of
representative government, and they did this in a clever way. Beginning in 1924
Pittinger’s group began to agitate for the use of the people’s referendum
(Volksreferendum) as a tool of democracy. On the surface this seemed very innocuous.
Legislative power would be put in the hands of the people, not the representatives in
Munich. The bill did not pass. The major roadblocks were provided by the democratic
parties in the Diet and the Farmer’s League, both of which objected on the grounds that
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the bill would strengthen executive authority at the expense of parliament. Their
obstinacy, anticipated by the governing coalition, prevented easy passage, and this fact
enraged the Bayern und Reich leadership. 75 Their response was to mobilize all of the
local units to campaign on behalf of the bill’s passage. 76 Despite the efforts the bill on
the people’s referendum went nowhere. Naturally the leadership blamed their erstwhile
political allies for its failure. 77
They also continued to put pressure on the government in Munich to stand up for
Bavaria’s rights vis-à-vis Berlin. In August 1924, at the insistence of the allied powers,
Berlin centralized the Reichsbahn, the national railroad. This move removed the
Bavarian rail system from Munich’s control and naturally outraged Pittinger and his men.
The Bundesleitung sent a strongly worded letter the Minister-President of Bavaria, Dr.
Heinrich Held, urging the Bavarian government to resist such measures as it would
undercut Bavarian sovereignty. 78 Pittinger believed that the centralization of the
Reichsbahn violated the state treaty of 1871, from which Bavaria received most of its
privileges. Moreover it would deprive the state of control over much of its economy. For
Bayern und Reich the actions of the Reich government proved that they were more than
prepared to sever the bonds that bound Bavaria to the rest of Germany. 79
Perhaps the best example of the political work done by Bund Bayern und Reich
was its propaganda activities on behalf the United Patriotic Leagues, of which it
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continued to be the leading member. The organization continued to put out propaganda
at election time attacking the Social Democrats and the Weimar Republic. During the
1924 Reichstag elections they distributed a series of pamphlets to dissuade their fellows
from supporting the Social Democrats or the Communists. Each essay had a theme, from
fears of a revival of a European war to those of a civil war. 80 In spite of the changing
topics, the message always remained the same; the Socialist leaders of the new Germany
were responsible for the country’s miserable state of affairs, and only by adopting a
patriotic and völkisch view of homeland (Heimat) and Fatherland would Germany be
revived. “The republic may go to hell, if only Germany, the fatherland, is being saved!
Constitutions come and go. But the name ‘fatherland’ will outlast all storm periods, it is
eternal.” 81
Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues also undertook a similar
propaganda campaign in support of Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg’s candidacy in
the 1925 presidential elections. While, in this instance, their support went to one specific
candidate, Hindenburg filled the role of stand in for the type of politician Pittinger and his
men felt should rule in Germany – a person who put country above party. “We are not
allowed to ask, if the candidate belongs to this or that party, if he is Catholic or
Protestant, if he promises to us all and everything. We are only allowed to ask: is he a
veritable German man?” 82 The former World War I military commander stood in sharp
contrast to the party politicians who, in their view, conspired with each other to maintain
the republican governing coalition. In particular Pittinger’s organization, and their allies,
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targeted the Catholic Center Party, which they accused of not only betraying their
country, but their faith as well. 83
Propaganda was not only put out during election time, but at any point that there
was an issue of public policy of which Bayern und Reich, or the United Patriotic
Leagues, did not approve. When the Treaty of Locarno was signed in 1925 the patriotic
movement, and Pittinger’s group in particular, reacted negatively to the news. Despite
the agreement’s positive effect on Germany’s relations with the western allies, France in
particular, Bayern und Reich and its allies attacked the treaty in no uncertain terms. For
them, Locarno only underlined the status quo in Europe as epitomized by the Treaty of
Versailles. The guarantees made concerning the country’s frontiers in the west did not
extend to the east, the area that most concerned Pittinger and his men. Moreover, by
signing the treaty, Stresemann had only given official imprimatur to the “war guilt lie”
that lay at the center of the post-war arrangements. Bayern und Reich, indeed the entire
patriotic movement, pledged to continue to work to overturn the peace settlements by any
means necessary. 84
What this meant in practice was to continue to use propaganda against the Paris
settlements. The Treaty of Versailles in particular was always a major topic in the
organization’s efforts. Most materials put out by the group attacked the treaty, and its
role in creating the conditions in which Germany and Bavaria found itself. For instance
the German calendar for the year 1925 produced drawings and cartoons, fifty-three in all,
attacking the agreement. Additionally, the written material was similarly vehement.
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“Think of Versailles! Think of it daily, what a humiliating disgrace has been done to us
there, how we have been robbed and plundered, how it made us defenseless and
dishonorable! The Versailles peace is no peace, but war, no treaty, but a breach of
human rights.” 85
The Beer Hall Putsch showed the limits of paramilitary politics as practiced by
Bund Bayern und Reich. Closely aligned with the government, and with an ideological
program that aimed somewhere between the old imperial system and the racial fantasies
of völkisch thinkers, Bayern und Reich was never in a position to act on the obvious
wishes of their membership. The group’s lack of action, backed up by the army,
delegitimized it in the eyes of some. In the Putsch’s aftermath, the organization charted a
different course, one that forced it to eschew many of the trappings of its original
mission. By the time that happened of course, the situation in Germany had changed, and
even in the patriotic movement the momentum had shifted to Hitler and the Nazi Party.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
When Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933 it
marked the culmination of over a decade of agitation on the part of patriotic
(vaterländisch) organizations in Bavaria, who had hoped to see German democracy
overturned since the very first stirrings of revolution in November 1918. The hatred they
felt towards the Weimar Republic, which they always identified with the political left and
Marxism drove the proliferation of Freikorps, paramilitaries, and political parties in the
republic’s early years. The Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich were an integral
part of this development, at different times, and their existence provided an institutional
framework by which völkisch ideas gained widespread acceptance. That many members
of the Civil Guards and Bayern und Reich found their way into the Nazi Party or, at the
very least, voted and joined affiliated organizations stands a testament to the role such
groups played in the formative years after 1918.
Many of the men who played such a large role in the history of these two
organizations continued to participate in the politics of the patriotic movement, but often
with less prominence than before. Georg Escherich, the former leader of the
Einwohnerwehr, spent much of 1922 and 1923 in semi-retirement from politics. His
opinions on the issues of the day were still sought after by prominent people, but kept his
distance from the patriotic groups in the months preceding the Beer Hall Putsch. 1 In the
late 1920s he returned to patriotic politics with the creation of a new group, Bavarian

1

Escherich an Hugo Stinnes, BHSA, V, NL Escherich, B. 32.

258
Homeland Protection, but this outfit did not last long. 2 Escherich then went into
permanent retirement, dying of natural causes in 1941. 3
His second in command, Rudolf Kanzler, continued to be involved in the patriotic
movement after the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr, though not in a prominent way.
He became involved for a while with the paramilitary group “Treu-Oberland,” though it
appears he never held a large position within it. 4 Retiring from public life, Kanzler
returned to prominence in 1931 with his memoirs over his years in the Einwohnerwehr,
Bavaria’s Struggle against Bolshevism. In the 1936 he was tried in a Munich political
court accused of swindling a former associate. 5 Like Escherich he died of natural causes
in 1956.
Dr. Otto Pittinger, the Regensburg health inspector who was the head of Bund
Bayern und Reich, continued to be a controversial figure in the patriotic movement. In
1924, in addition to his duties as head of Bayern und Reich, Pittinger served as a star
witness in the Hitler-Ludendorff trial. There he testified to Hitler and Ludendorff’s
knowledge of government warnings not to undertake a putsch against the state. 6 His
testimony did not make him popular with many in the patriotic movement, nor were his
innovations accepted within Bund Bayern und Reich. The drop off in membership and in
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financial support permanently weakened the group, and in 1928 it was folded into the
Stahlhelm. 7 Pittinger however did not live to see it. He died in 1926 of natural causes. 8
Gustav von Kahr, who did so much to foster the development of the
Einwohnerwehr, and whose actions on November 8 and 9, 1923 thwarted Hitler and his
plans, was essentially retired from politics after 1924. Pensioned off as a civil servant,
Kahr lived in Munich comfortably until June 30, 1934, when he was arrested by the
Gestapo and SS. Taken to Dachau as part of the round up surrounding the event known
as the “Röhm Putsch,” Kahr was tortured and killed for his role in putting down the Beer
Hall Putsch. His badly mutilated body was discovered a couple of days later near the
camp. 9
Ernst Röhm, who had been such a help to both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund
Bayern und Reich in his role as weapon’s liaison officer, continued to play an important
role in the patriotic movement and Nazi Party right up until his death. Not tried like the
other conspirators of the Beer Hall Putsch, Röhm spent the next year trying to set up a
new paramilitary organization, the Frontbann, and later was elected to the German
Reichstag on the ticket of the Deutschvölkischer Block. Later Röhm left Germany to
serve as a soldier of fortune in South America, before returning in 1931 to take command
of the S.A. Under his leadership the organization grew rapidly until by 1934 it had nearly
a million members. Always controversial and difficult to handle, Röhm hoped to see his
men supplant the regular German army once Hitler came to power. In 1934, hoping to
secure army support for his succession to the presidency once Hindenburg died, Hitler
7
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made an arrangement with army leaders and had Röhm murdered as part of a general
purge of the S.A. 10
The murder of Röhm and Kahr at the hands of the Nazis, and with Hitler’s
approval, marked the final postscript to the patriotic movement. Killed by an erstwhile
ally from the faction’s early years, both men found themselves as captive to events as
Escherich, Kanzler, and Pittinger had been before them. 11 Instead of leading to a renewal
of Germany under völkisch precepts, the patriotic movement had been co-opted and
superseded by a political organization that shared much of their worldview, but differed
in ways so profound that it often led to division as much as unity. In the end, the
ideological program of group’s like the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich
could not compete with the dynamism of the Nazis and this helped lead to the withering
of the Bavarian paramilitaries.
This study of the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich has looked at the
development of each group in terms of its ideology, its membership, and activities. Each
in its own way had a distinctive history, but contained characteristics that made it similar
to other patriotic entities. The primary similarities between these two paramilitary
formations and the others can be seen in its loathing of Marxist Socialism in all its forms,
an aggressive German nationalism, distrust, if not outright hatred, of parliamentary
democracy, and a belief that there needed to be a return to an earlier vision of the German
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state, or German culture, or to the ideals of 1914. These major ideas, for a long time,
united the patriotic movement and gave it coherence.
Patriotic paramilitaries had other traits in common as well. Most were begun by
men who were part of the lower to middle reaches of the Bavarian state bureaucracy.
These were people who, had the old regime continued past 1918, might have one day
advanced to the highest reaches of the state and its bureaucracy. The revolution seemed
to close the door on further advancement, and this partly motivated people like Gustav
von Kahr, Rudolf Kanzler, and Otto Pittinger in creating, or helping set up various
Freikorps and paramilitary units. A cozy relationship with the Bavarian army was
another major commonality amongst patriotic formations, though this relationship was
often one sided.
However it would be the differences in how the two organizations developed and
operated that provide the key to their importance in the history of the radical right in
Bavaria. This is a crucial point, for each group evolved in a particular historical setting
that influenced not only how it reacted to the state, but also to the events of importance in
the early republic. The Einwohnerwehr, organized in Bavaria following the events of
May 1919, served the function of an umbrella organization. Not only did it come to
supersede the various Freikorps units that had been created to deal with the Räterepublik,
but it took in whole organizations like the Freikorps Oberland, which found itself
fighting on the Reich’s eastern borderlands. Bund Bayern und Reich, on the other hand,
had been created out of a need to provide stability to a fluid situation following the
dissolution of the Civil Guards. Its existence was tied to the need to keep as much of the
old paramilitary structure intact as possible. That it was eventually unable to do so,
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spoke to changed circumstances within the Bavaria amongst those predisposed to
patriotic and völkisch ideas.
Four major conclusions can be asserted in relation to Georg Escherich’s
Einwohnerwehr. The first of these was that the Civil Guards were functionally völkisch
in terms of their world view. Despite the regulation’s insistence that the organizations
only function was to protect the state, and all state-supporting elements within it, in
reality the leadership carefully crafted its ideology and activities to support traditional
social and political arrangements. For them the uprising of November 1918 was just as
troublesome as that of April and May of 1919. That the new political order came from
Social Democrats, first in an alliance between the SPD and USPD, later a revolt by more
radical elements of the USPD in the Räterepublik, struck them as a misfortune to both
Bavaria and Germany. The country’s new masters were seen alternately as robbers,
swindlers, and murderers who were prepared to give the Fatherland over to its enemies
rather than work for its welfare. USPD and KPD members were routinely denied entry
into the guards, and many SPD members also had problems reconciling the worldview of
the EW’s units with their own political beliefs. For the leadership, the political left was
outside the ‘people’s community,’ and the only reason Escherich and Kanzler tolerated
the SPD during the Einwohnerwehr’s existence was due to the fact that majority Socialist
governments were in power both in Munich and Berlin. When the moment of truth came
in March 1920, Escherich and his allies were just as willing to threaten Social
Democratic leaders with violence just as they had with the Independent Socialists.
Another aspect of its völkisch stance could be seen in the thinly veiled
antisemitism that prevailed in many local units. Officially non-sectarian, as well as non-
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political, Civil Guard members and their leaders frequently ignored regulations to take in
members regardless of religion. Jews were harassed in many rural units, most
significantly in the Chiemgau, which was a stronghold for the Einwohnerwehr. Such
incidents show that strong antisemitic tendencies were prevalent in Escherich’s
organization. Several members of the top leadership were broadly sympathetic to
völkisch ideas and many, if not all, subscribed to the ultra-nationalist views of the PanGerman League, whose own leader, Heinrich Claß, often spoke out against Jews using
the most abusive language.
As was the case with many of the men who joined more radical organizations like
the Freikorps later-Bund Oberland and the Nazi Party, Einwohnerwehr members were
deeply impacted by the First World War and its aftermath. Like many Germans who held
to völkisch beliefs during the old Reich, the onset of the Burgfrieden in 1914 came to
symbolize for them the true unification of Germany, when citizens of all stripes put aside
political differences to fight a common enemy – a true people’s community. Defeat and
revolution tore apart their imagined vision of the Reich. For people like Rudolf Kanzler,
the most important work of the guards was in reviving this spirit. Their propaganda
frequently depicted the political environment of the new republic, particularly that
emanating from the left, as essentially un-German. It was vituperative, contentious, and
totally free of the unity that Escherich and his men believed necessary to return Germany
to a state of order and power. They believed only by putting aside party politics, i.e.
adopting their ideological world view, could the Fatherland be revived.
Often this worldview was wedded to older concepts of homeland and white-blue
Bavaria, something that was not prevalent in more radical organizations. This was
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illustrated most clearly in the articles of the Einwohnerwehr paper Heimatland as it
related to the first state shooting festival. The articles written about that event tied
current events, the dispute over weapons, the fears of a more centralized Reich, and the
need to return to the ideals of 1914 with an older tradition of solid Bavarian patriotism
that described traditional Bavarian citizens upholding their rights and weapons in much
the same way as citizens had done for decades and centuries. It also manifested itself in
the group’s obsession with the rights of the state within the new constitution written at
Weimar, a document that they found to be overly centralized and detrimental to Munich’s
position in a federal German state.
The second major conclusion is that, over the course of its history, the
Einwohnerwehr became a significant power player in the Bavarian state. Originally, this
had not been the intention of the Social Democratic leaders who helped bring the Civil
Guards into existence. They wanted a reliable force that could be called upon to
supplement the army and defend the state. In Bavaria, however, factors came together
that allowed Escherich and Kanzler to create a de facto independent entity there. The
most decisive of these developments was removing the guards from the outright
supervision of the army. By removing government oversight, while taking its money and
arms, the Einwohnerwehr could develop its own practices and procedures. One can see
the effect of this in terms of ideology where, as mentioned above, many local units
discriminated against workers and Jews, even though the regulations allowed
membership from those groups.
The extraordinary leeway given to the Civil Guards helped foster a sense of
arrogance and entitlement amongst many of the men. Members of local units were often
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involved in trouble with the law owing to the zeal with which they carried out their
activities. Workers and working class districts tended to be targeted no matter the
circumstance, economic or political, and this created tensions between the organization
and the SPD Hofmann government, as both clashed bitterly over a number of issues.
Eventually the acquiescence shown to Escherich’s group came back to haunt the
government as the guards played a decisive role in the events of the Kapp Putsch in
Munich.
During the tumultuous days of March 1920, Escherich is said to have boasted that
he had a hundred thousand men behind him. The implicit threat in that statement
illustrates, perhaps better than any other, how powerful the Einwohnerwehr had become.
Its power and influence only grew from there. Under the new government of Gustav von
Kahr, the regional governor of Upper Bavaria at the time, Escherich’s association was
able to expand its influence. It moved into Austria with the Organisation Kanzler and
into Silesia and northern Germany with the Organisation Escherich. Despite the political
opposition from Berlin and the northern states, and the illegality of such activities, no
sanctions were placed on the group. In fact the Kahr government went out of its way to
defend the Einwohnerwehr against both the Reich government and the allied powers who
had come to take a dim view of the paramilitary’s activities.
Escherich’s organization was not only a power player in Bavarian politics, but
increasingly became bolder in its political program. This development, which went
against the group’s regulations, was a consequence of its expansion. Following the Kapp
Putsch, Escherich and the Bavarian leadership came to believe that there needed to be a
continued ‘patriotic’ presence in northern Germany. The need, as they saw it, helped
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lead to the founding of the Orgesch, which was to keep alive a nation-wide patriotic
movement. The criticisms leveled against the Reich government, coming under the
auspices of this new entity actually had been present in the months prior to the Kapp
Putsch, when propaganda materials out of Munich criticized the actions of democratic
leaders in Berlin, and in Munich. Thus the Civil Guards, despite their protestations,
became one of the focal points of resistance to the Weimar government, and its
constitution.
Finally, the Einwohnerwehr became the means by which patriotic ideas were
spread beyond the borders of Bavaria. The existence of a strong ultra-nationalist
organization in Bavaria became crucial after March 1920 when energetic action by
workers, and then the Reich government, had broken the power of far-right groups north
of the Main. The activities of the Orgesch, founded in conjunction with the Stahlhelm,
and the Orka (a sub group of the Organisation Escherich), helped to maintain the
patriotic movement. In many ways they were crucial in helping spread it. Under the
guidance of the Orka, the Heimwehr movement was established in Austria and would
become a crucial player in politics there over the next decade. The Orgesch also helped
to organize resistance to Polish ‘encroachments’ in Silesia, setting up numerous umbrella
groups to coordinate fighting units, and sending Freikorps units from Bavaria, most
notably Freikorps Oberland, to assist the Silesians.
The dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr in the summer of 1921 opened up a
vacuum in the patriotic movement, one that was not easily filled. Due to pressure from
the allied powers, the Bavarian government could not set up a semi-official organization
tied to the state, as the Civil Guards had been. In its place would come a plethora of

267
paramilitaries, each only a fraction of the size of the former Einwohnerwehr and without
its influence. The fracturing of the nationalist right that resulted would characterize the
far-right, now far more contentious amongst itself, right up until the Beer Hall Putsch and
beyond.
Bund Bayern und Reich, which came into existence in this milieu, quickly became
the most prominent of these organizations, but was different in its character and actitivies
than the old Einwohnerwehr. The most significant difference between the two groups
was that Pittinger’s association was much more radical in an overt way. The
Einwohnerwehr had been functionally völkisch, but Bayern und Reich was explicit in
proclaiming this orientation. Its program spoke of creating a racist Bavaria and
Germany, excluded Jews from its membership and spoke of eliminating their influence in
the Reich, and sought to overthrow the Weimar Constitution and Republic. AntiMarxism continued to be a major point in the program, just like it had been with the Civil
Guards, but now consciously included the SPD in its list of enemies. They also wanted to
see the expansion of the Reich into a greater German state.
In addition to being a more ideological organization than the old Einwohnerwehr,
Bund Bayern und Reich also was much more dependent upon its state sponsors in a direct
way. In fact without support from the army, which became, after the dissolution of the
guards, the primary – and secret – means of support for the patriotic movement, it is
doubtful that Otto Pittinger’s group would have made a major impact. Military support
allowed money to flow into the health inspector’s coffers. Their decision to deal with his
organization, both the Organisation Pittinger and Bund Bayern und Reich, as the

268
exclusive paramilitary in the state helped to swell membership following its creation in
1922.
The backing of the army however, could not stop ideological infighting within the
patriotic movement, or within Pittinger’s group, and this fact made Bayern und Reich
more dependent upon the army than ever before. The struggles between Pittinger and
Bund Oberland, the dispute with Ernst Röhm over weapons and funds, and the strife
between the United Patriotic Leagues and the Patriotic Working Group/Fighting League
ordinarily might have spelled the death knell of any organization, and Bayern und Reich
suffered many defections from within its own ranks, both members and whole units,
during the year. During all of this the Reichswehr maintained its strong connection to
Pittinger and his men, siding with him in nearly all of these disputes. They also took over
control of the military arm of the organization, a discordant note that denoted lack of faith
in Pittinger and also only served to bind Bayern und Reich even more closely to the army.
The fruits of such a relationship could be seen in the group’s reaction to the Beer
Hall Putsch. Actively supporting a ‘March on Berlin,’ when that seemed a possibility,
Bayern und Reich backed off the moment the negotiations between Kahr and far-right
activists in northern Germany broke down. Like the other associations, Bayern und
Reich was warned not to undertake any operations that would force the army’s hand, a
promise they kept. Of the major paramilitaries in Bavaria in 1923, Pittinger’s
organization was the only one that did not participate in the putsch and actively worked
to squelch it outside Munich by preventing outside reinforcements from reaching the
capital.
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Another striking characteristic of Bund Bayern und Reich was its seeming
provincialism, a tendency which caused a great deal of strife for the organization.
Pittinger’s strong inclinations towards a federal constitution, in which Bavaria maintained
the rights it had under the old Bismarckian constitution, was a hallmark of the group,
indeed all the associations united under the United Patriotic League banner. They sharply
opposed further centralization of the German state, which was one of their major
complaints about the Weimar constitution. It also fed their paranoia about a possible
strike against Bavaria from the national government, and helped make the case for their
continued existence as a prop of the Bavarian state.
However, their adherence to federalism and states’ rights came under sharp attack
from other entities on the far right. The organizations around Hitler and the Fighting
League often accused them, wrongly, of pursuing separatist politics at the expense of the
Reich. This became the subject of numerous investigations, both in the Bund Oberland
controversy and the Röhm-Pittinger dispute. In each case Pittinger was accused of
dealing with foreign emissaries to divide Bavaria from Germany, whether to create a
Danubian state or a sovereign state on its own. The investigations into these allegations
exonerated Pittinger in each case, but the rumors would persist right through the Beer
Hall Putsch.
Finally, Bund Bayern und Reich found itself increasingly outflanked by the Nazi
Party and groups affiliated with the Fighting League. This became a huge problem for
Pittinger and the leadership in late 1922 and throughout 1923 as the situation in Germany
deteriorated precipitously. In the Ruhr Crisis of 1923 Bayern und Reich found itself
agreeing with the strategy outlined by the government, one that seemed ineffectual and
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doomed to failure by Hitler and his allies. Their attacks and simple slogans, coupled with
the crippling hyperinflation brought about a shift to the more radical paramilitaries and
their spokesman.
One consequence of this was that Bayern und Reich began to lose members. As
an association that had the restoration of monarchical government as one of its goals,
there was already a perception of Pittinger’s organization as solidly establishmentarian,
despite the radical nature of their program and their willingness to advocate for and plan
the overthrow of democracy. Despite the leadership’s best efforts, many of the younger
members found their way into Fighting League-affiliated groups, and many local units
disassociated themselves with Bayern und Reich for what they perceived was its lack of
radicalism. Many of the leaders of these outfits became enamored with the revolutionary
ardor of the Nazi Party, and its leader, something that Pittinger and his men could not
replicate due to their beliefs, the lack of anyone to match Hitler’s charisma, and the ties
that bound Bayern und Reich to the army and state.
In the end, both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich helped prepare
the groundwork that later bore fruit for Hitler. By adopting the world view of völkisch
ideologues, consciously or not, they helped acculturate many Germans of varied
backgrounds to the idea that the Weimar Republic, and the society it was trying to create,
was essentially un-German and thus worthy of destruction. The paramilitaries of the
early republic in Bavaria essentially helped this process along by engaging in violence
against organizations on the left, and against workers, by propaganda activities, and by
plotting to violently overthrow the government. Even though they did not succeed in
many of their endeavors, they did succeed in de-legitimizing democracy for many
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Bavarians who might have, under better circumstances, given the new government a
chance. This was the true legacy of the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich.
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Appendix A
Chronology of Major Events
1918
January 1918 – Demonstrations in Munich led by SPD and USPD leaders. Kurt Eisner
jailed after protest.
October 1918 – Kurt Eisner released from jail in Bavaria.
November 7, 1918 – Joint rally of SPD and USPD in Munich leads to revolution forcing
the last Wittelsbach king to flee. Bavaria becomes a Free State, Kurt Eisner becomes
head of the government, and the first Worker, Soldier, and Farmer councils set up.
December 1918 – Rudolf Kanzler forms first paramilitary militia in Rosenheim.
1919
January 12, 1919 – Parliamentary elections lead to defeat for Eisner’s USPD.
February 21, 1919 – Kurt Eisner assassinated while entering Bavarian Diet.
March 1919 – the establishment of the Hofmann government and the radicalization of the
councils.
April 5, 1919 – Räterepublik (council republic) set up in Munich, Hofmann government
flees to Bamberg.
April 8, 1919 – First attempted assault on Munich is defeated by council forces
April 14, 1919 – Hofmann government calls for creation of militias to deal with
Räterepublik.
May 1, 1919 – Government forces retake Munich and suppress the Räterepublik.
May 17, 1919 – Hofmann government calls for creation of Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria.
May-August 1919 – Organization of the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria under Georg
Escherich with help of the Bavarian Reichswehr and Governor of Upper Bavaria, Gustav
von Kahr.
August-December 1919 – Spread of Einwohnerwehr throughout Bavaria, difficulties with
workers entering the organization, and problems with SPD Hofmann government.
1920
February 21, 1920 – Meeting in Munich to discuss the creation of self-defense
organizations in Austria. Followed by meeting in Salzburg on February 28.

273
March 12-22, 1920 – Kapp Putsch in Bavaria resulting in the resignation of the Hofmann
government, the creation of a conservative government under Gustav von Kahr, general
strikes in Bavaria, and the suppression of industrial workers in northern Bavaria,
particularly in Hof.
April-June 1920 – Founding and organization of the Organisation Escherich (Orgesch).
April-August 1920 – Creation of Heimwehr in Austria under auspices of Organisation
Kanzler (Orka).
July 9, 1920 – Interallied Military Commission demands the dissolution of the
Einwohnerwehr and the Orgesch.
August 7, 1920 – Law for the Disarmament of the Population passed by the Reichstag.
August-September 1920 – Antisemitic incidents in Rosenheim Einwohnerwehr.
September 25-30, 1920 – The first Einwohnerwehr state shooting festival
(Landesschießen) held in Munich, including a large rally at the Königsplatz on September
26.
1921
May 5, 1921 – Allied powers issue ultimatum to the Bavarian government calling for the
disbandment of the Einwohnerwehr.
June 1921 – Einwohnerwehr disbanded, Organisation Pittinger (OrgPi), as successor to
Einwohnerwehr, created on June 12.
June-November 1921 – Feud between Georg Escherich and Otto Pittinger over control of
the OrgPi.
1922
January-July 1922 – Feud between Pittinger and Josef Römer of the Bund Oberland.
April 1922 – Creation of Bund Bayern und Reich.
Summer 1922 – Creation of the United Patriotic Leagues to coordinate all patriotic
organizations
1923
January-December 1923 – French occupation of the Ruhr due to German unwillingness
to pay war reparations. German government adopts passive resistance in Ruhr, then
decides to print money, destroying German currency. Country slides into economic
chaos.
January 28, 1923 – Nazi Party and other organizations leave United Patriotic Leagues to
form Working Group of Patriotic Fighting Leagues.
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January-March 1923 – Several local units leave Bund Bayern und Reich to form
alliances with Hitler and Working Group.
January-June 1923 – Röhm-Pittinger dispute over questions of competence and the
misallocation of funds further divides patriotic organizations in Bavaria.
Spring 1923 – Bund Bayern und Reich encourages changes to Bavarian constitution that
would have overthrown republic in the state.
May 1, 1923 – Planned disruption of May Day celebrations failed, causes dissent within
the Working Group.
Summer 1923 – Bavarian government having greater difficulties with all patriotic groups,
especially the Nazi Party.
September 26, 1923 – Gustav von Kahr named General State Commissioner in Bavaria
with dictatorial powers.
October 1923 – Efforts to unite all patriotic organizations around Kahr begins and fails.
Kahr resumes his feud with Berlin and plots with patriotic circles in northern Germany
for a putsch against the Reich government.
November 7, 1923 – Having failed in negotiations with ultra-nationalist circles in Berlin,
Kahr, Otto von Lossow, and Hans von Seisser obtain a pledge from all patriotic
organizations, including Bund Bayern und Reich and the Nazi Party, to abstain from any
coup attempt.
November 8 & 9, 1923 – Hitler, Ludendorff, and the Fighting League attempt to seize
power in the Beer Hall Putsch. Bund Bayern und Reich remains loyal to Kahr and works
to subvert the coup attempt after a period of confusion.
November-December 1923 – Aftermath of the Beer Hall Putsch. Kahr bans Nazi Party
and Fighting League groups and obtains loyalty from Bund Bayern und Reich and other
patriotic organizations. Discontent within Bayern und Reich with Kahr and the
leadership of Pittinger begins to surface.
1924
January-March 1924 – Bavarian government begins to organize the Deutscher Notbann
to serve as a reliable self-defense force. Bund Bayern und Reich members allowed to
join, but not do political work while members of the force.
February 1924 – Bund Bayern und Reich continues to urge constitutional reforms that
will undercut democracy in Bavaria.
February 26, 1924 – Hitler-Ludendorff Trial begins in Munich. Bund Bayern und Reich
head Otto Pittinger is a witness in the trial.
March-July 1924 – Continuing organizational issues for Bund Bayern und Reich as local
units defect and a reorganization of the leadership is carried out.
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1925-1928
1926 – The head of Bund Bayern und Reich, Dr. Otto Pittinger, dies of natural causes.
1928 – Losing members, Bund Bayern und Reich is folded into the Stahlhelm.
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Appendix B
Glossary of Important Terms
Anschluß

-

Term refers to the desire for union
between Austria and Germany
amongst many people from both
countries in the years after World
War I.

Auflösung

-

A term meaning dissolution, this
referred to the struggle to disband the
Einwohnerwehr in 1920-1921.

Bund Bayern und Reich

-

League of Bavaria and the Reich,
founded by Otto Pittinger in April
1922 and was the most significant
paramilitary force in Bavaria after
the dissolution of the
Einwohnerwehr.

Bund Oberland

-

Formed out of the Freikorps
Oberland, which had helped in the
“liberation” of Munich, Bund
Oberland’s leadership became
embroiled in a feud with Bayern und
Reich head Pittinger and later allied
with Hitler in the Beer Hall Putsch.

Burgfrieden

-

A term that means civil peace, this
was used to connote the intense
national feeling in Germany brought
about by the outbreak of the First
World War.

Deutscher Notbann

-

Paramilitary unit created by the
Bavarian government in the wake of
the Beer Hall Putsch to ensure a
more reliable emergency force.

Einwohnerwehr

-

Civilian Defense Guards, or force,
set up in the months after the
suppression of the Räterepublik in
Munich.
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Entwaffnung

-

Term meaning disarmament, this
term was used in the dispute over the
Einwohnerwehr.

Freikorps

-

Translated literally as Free Corps,
these units were made up of exsoldiers who followed charismatic
officers. They helped suppress the
Spartacist Revolt, the Räterepublik,
and fought the new Polish state in
the east.

Gauleiter

-

District leader in the Einwohnerwehr
and Bund Bayern und Reich and was
later used to denote a district leader
in the Nazi Party.

Germanen Orden

-

Pre-World War I völkisch group that
was a predecessor of the Thule
Society.

Heimat

-

Homeland, often used
interchangeably with fatherland.

Heimatland

-

This was the official news organ of
the Einwohnerwehr.

Heimwehr

-

Name given to the Austrian
paramilitary organization created by
the Orka in 1920.

Kampfbund

-

This was the name of fighting league
created by Hitler and Ludendorff in
September 1923, would participate
in the Beer Hall Putsch.

KPD

-

An acronym for the Communist
Party of Germany, this party formed
after the war and was opposed to the
Nazi Party and the SPD alike.

Kreisleiter

-

This was a Regional leader in the
Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern
und Reich.

Landespolizei

-

A militarized police force created in
the early 1920s in Bavaria, its leader,
Hans von Seisser, was taken hostage
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by Hitler at the beginning of the Beer
Hall Putsch.
Landesschießen

-

This was a state shooting festival
held in Munich by the
Einwohnerwehr in September 1920.

Notpolizei

-

An emergency police force created
by the Bavarian government in
spring 1923.

Organisation Escherich

-

Group created by Georg Escherich
and Franz Seldte in the Spring of
1920, which was designed to
coordinate all patriotic groups.
Known by the acronym Orgesch.

Organisation Kanzler

-

A subset of the Orgesch, this group
helped to organize paramilitary units
in Austria in 1920. Known by the
acronym Orka.

Organisation Pittinger

-

Group created upon the dissolution
of the Einwohnerwehr, was intended
as a coordinating agency for other
paramilitaries. Known by its
acronym OrgPi.

Ortsgruppe

-

This was a local cell of both the
Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern
und Reich.

Räterepublik

-

The council republic that developed
in the aftermath of the Eisner
assassination and which is known
more popularly as the Munich
Soviet.

Reichswehr

-

Name given to the German army
during the Weimar Republic.

Reichsbahn

-

The name of the national German
railway during the Weimar Republic.

Ruhe und Ordnung

-

Term that was often used by the
Einwohnerwehr to justify their
actions.
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SPD

-

An acronym for the Social
Democratic Party, which was the
political party representing
Germany’s working class and who
took power in Germany following
World War I.

Stahlhelm

-

Translated as Steel Helmet, this
organization began as a paramilitary,
but also served as an advocate for
veterans. Akin to the American
Legion.

USPD

-

An acronym for the Independent
Social Democratic Party, which was
formed during World War I as a
result of the schism within the SPD.
They took power in a coalition
government in Bavaria following
World War I.

Vaterländisch Movement

-

Patriotic movement that included a
number of paramilitary organizations
and political parties in post-1918
Bavaria

Völkisch Nationalism

-

A racially-based form of nationalism
developed in post-unification
Germany. Völkisch thinkers
emphasized German superiority and
preeminence while denigrating all
those who did not belong the racial
community, or whose political
viewpoints were at variance with
their own.

Volksgemeinschaft

-

A term referring to the concept of the
community of the people, where it
was believed that all Germans would
live in harmony despite differences
of class or religion.

Wandervögel

-

A pre-World War I German youth
movement that emphasized getting in
touch with nature, and was suffused
with völkisch ideology.
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Appendix C
Map of Bavaria

Source: Travels Through Germany website: www.travelsthroughgermany.com/bayernmap.htm
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